Introduction
The Israeli government recently announced that it had given preliminary approval for the development of the Marine Gaza natural gas field, situated about 36 km off the Gaza coast. The development of this field has been on the agenda for over 20 years, since its discovery in September 2000 by British Gas, which was licensed by the Palestinian Authority (PA) with Israel’s approval to drill for gas in the area. Over this period there were many contacts between Israel and the PA in an attempt to advance the project, but they were thwarted by the vast security and political challenges in the region, which were exacerbated after Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007.
In the past few years, the contacts to develop the gas field, which is estimated to hold about 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas, have made some headway. On February 21, 2021 the PA and Egypt signed an agreement to develop the field, and on June 15, 2022 Israel, Egypt and the EU signed a deal to boost gas exports to Europe, which is facing a severe energy crisis due to the Russia-Ukraine war. Subsequently there were further intensive contacts, especially between Israel, Egypt and the PA. The efforts to develop the field are of a piece with regional and international understandings on advancing strategic economic projects that will benefit the Palestinians and enhance stability and security even in the absence of a political process between Israel and the Palestinians.[1]
Involvement in the Gaza Marine project has boosted Egypt’s status as a major regional player and a mediator between all the interested parties. The PA too sought to use the gas agreement with Egypt to position itself as a regional player, on a par with the states in the region, which like them is a member of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF)[2] and is concerned with the welfare of its citizens. Moreover, the PA hoped this move would lead to regulating the use of other natural resources under its sovereignty, especially to the resolution of the water issue, which is contested between the PA and Israel.
Hamas, however, has expressed opposition to any agreement on the Gaza gas field signed without its involvement, and even threatened to attack offshore gas platforms from Gaza, echoing the threats made by Hizbullah in the context of the marine border agreement signed by Israel and Lebanon in October 2022.
In light of these threats by Hamas, the development of the Gaza Marine field necessarily requires reaching understandings with this organization to ensure long-term calm in the area. Indeed, the acceleration of the talks on developing the field was accompanied by an acceleration in the talks on security understandings with Hamas. In the recent months indirect negotiations, mediated by Egypt’s General Intelligence Service, have been underway between Israel and Hamas. According to reports in the Arab media, Egypt recently relayed an offer of an economic incentives package for Hamas in exchange for a long-term hudna (truce) with Israel.
It should be noted that Egypt-brokered negotiations between Israel and Hamas have periodically taken place in the past in order achieve calm following rounds of fighting between the two sides. But the difference is that, this time, the truce on the agenda is a long-term one, in return for an economic incentives package that is part of an international economic initiative.
Negotiations with Hamas, a terror organization that took over the Gaza Strip by force in 2007, raises many questions and poses many challenges for all the parties concerned. On the one hand, the economic incentives offered to Hamas can improve the lives of the Palestinians, especially in the Gaza Strip, and ensure security stability. On the other hand, they will weaken Israel’s position in other contexts, such as negotiations over the hostages and missing persons. Furthermore, Hamas will be granted a kind of international legitimacy without having to meet the demands of the Quartet[3] to cease its terror activity and recognize Israel and past agreements with it. Moreover, incentives mean more funds channeled to Hamas. It is unclear whether the proposed incentives package includes giving Hamas a share of the gas revenues, as it demands. But even without this, Hamas is likely to gain profits that may be channeled towards the continued development of its military strength, a scenario that Egypt will be required to guarantee against.
The incentives package apparently seeks to free Hamas of dependency on its allies in the Iran-led resistance axis and thus prevent its involvement in a future escalation orchestrated by Iran, which supports Hamas with funds and weapons.[4] This initiative thus places Hamas in a dilemma, having to choose between improving its international standing and maintaining its commitment to the resistance axis.
Such an arrangement vis-a-vis Hamas will also have far-reaching implications for the PA. On the one hand, the development of Gaza Marine may boost the international status of the PA and confirm its purported sovereignty over the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, an arrangement with Hamas will weaken the PA on the domestic level, especially considering that, in addition to an economic crisis, the PA is facing a deep domestic political crisis due to its poor performance and the absence of a clear procedure for the transfer of power ahead of the imminent departure of PA President Mahmoud ‘Abbas. The PA is increasingly concerned that the gas negotiations will ultimately lead to a de facto recognition of Hamas’ “state” in Gaza, which will essentially eliminate the two-state solution based on a PA-controlled Palestinian state in both the West Bank and Gaza. Moreover, an arrangement with Hamas without intra-Palestinian reconciliation will only deepen the rift and exacerbate the struggle between the PA and Hamas for control of the West Bank.
This report reviews the efforts to advance the development of the Gaza Marine natural gas field and their implications for the Palestinian arena.
Issue Of Gaza Marine Gas Field Deepens PA-Hamas Conflict Over Sovereignty In Gaza
The attempts to advance the development of the Gaza Marine gas field highlighted the difficulty of developing the Gaza Strip in the absence of an intra-Palestinian reconciliation. While the international community perceives the PA as the legal authority in the Gaza Strip, in practice it is Hamas that has absolute control there. Moreover, the February 2021 deal between Egypt and the PA to develop the gas field with Israeli approval deepened the conflict between the PA and Hamas over the legitimacy of the PA rule and in particular over the control of Gaza and its natural resources. Whereas the PA sees the development of Gaza Marine as an economic lifeline for the Palestinian people and as a means to boost its international standing, Hamas – which does not recognize the legitimacy of the PA’s rule – claims to be exclusively in charge of the gas field off the Gaza coast, and claims that the Egypt-PA deal is an attempt by the illegitimate PA to steal Gaza’s natural resources.
The disagreements over this issue developed into public sparring between Hamas and PA officials. In February 2021, immediately after the signing of the Egypt-PA deal to develop the gas field, Hamas political bureau member Moussa Abu Marzouq tweeted: “Gaza must be present in any understandings regarding the gas fields off its shores. If it is forced to import gas from the occupation [i.e., from Israel] in order to fire the only power station in the Strip, it will not be able to sit idly by as our natural resources slip away from us. We must know the details of the agreement.”[5] Hamas official Hammad Al-Raqab tweeted a similar vein: “The agreement is clear. ‘Abbas has agreed to steal Gaza’s gas and has sworn allegiance to Europe for a sum of money.”[6] Political bureau member Suheil Al-Hindi said: “We will not allow anyone, neither the occupation nor anyone else, to take control of these resources and enjoy them at our people’s expense.”[7]
PA officials responded to the Hamas officials’ statements by counterattacking. For example, in response to Abu Marzouq’s statements, Hussein Al-Sheikh, the PA Civilian Affairs Minister and PLO Executive Committee secretary-general, tweeted: “Agreements are signed between states, not factions or organizations. Palestine is a member of the [East] Mediterranean Gas Forum.”[8] PA head qadi Mahmoud Al-Habbash also responded to Abu Marzouq, stating: “It appears that Moussa Abu Marzouq is weak on geography… Someone should tell him that Gaza is part of Palestine.[9] PLO Central Committee member ‘Omar Hilmi Al-Ghoul wrote: “Since the coup against the legitimate [Palestinian government] in mid-2007, Hamas has taken no actual responsibility for the Palestinians [living] in the southern districts [i.e., in Gaza], and has served only as a means for attack, harassment, and suppression of the will of the people. Hamas’s leaders and members must examine all expenditures on health, education, social [services], and [government] services connected to electricity, water, and development… in order to understand that the element that is bearing [these costs] is the PA and the legitimate government, while Hamas has played the role of collecting taxes – which have multiplied like mushrooms [after a rain] – from the pockets of the poor and oppressed, and has commandeered medicines and even humanitarian aid sent to the Palestinian masses in the southern districts. This is in addition to its trading in the blood of innocents…”[10]
Billboard in the Gaza Strip: “Our Gas Is Our Right” (Image: Felesteen.news/p/117279, September 13, 2022)
Like Hizbullah, Hamas Threatens Gas Platforms With The Aim Of Imposing Its Position
Hamas has attempted to impose its position by force, by means of threats to damage gas facilities. In September 2022 it held a “Right To Natural Resources and Gas Fields” mass protest event at Gaza port. During the event Shihab kamikaze drones circled in the air above as a threatening message.[11] At the same time, Hamas’s military arm, the ‘Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades, released a video showcasing the Shihab drones and featuring the text “Gas Is A Palestinian Right That Will Be Retaken By Force.”[12] Similarly, in western Gaza city, the ‘Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades inaugurated a square with a model of a Shihab kamikaze drone.[13] Another threatening message was sent by Hamas on the morning of the protest, when it fired several rockets towards the sea.[14] The drone and rocket threats are in addition to Hamas’s other maritime capabilities to harm strategic facilities at sea, such as explosive autonomous submersibles and explosive swift boats. 
“Gaza’s Gas Or…” Poster disseminated on an ‘Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades-affiliated Telegram channel (T.me/qassamiah_7alat/1072, September 15, 2022)
Hamas’s threats echoed threats issued by Hizbullah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah in June-October 2022, against the backdrop of the negotiations that were held at the time over the demarcation of the Israel-Lebanon maritime border. Nasrallah’s threats were accompanied by the launch of drones at the Karish gas platform in Israel’s territorial and economic waters. On several occasions, Hamas spokesmen linked Hizbullah’s position on the demarcation of the Israel-Lebanon territorial and economic waters to Hamas’s position on the development of the Gaza Marine gas field, and depicted the struggle with Israel over energy resources as shared by the entire resistance axis led by Iran.
Hamas representative in Lebanon Ahmad ‘Abd Al-Hadi said on September 13, 2022: “We are following the negotiations between Israel and Lebanon, [and we] support Hizbullah’s position in these negotiations. We strive jointly to put an end to Israel’s plundering of natural resources.[15] Furthermore, Hamas enlisted Hizbullah to help advance its position. Hamas’ leaders discussed the issue several times with Hizbullah leader Nasrallah, who even mediated in the matter of Hamas political bureau head Ismail Haniyeh’s September 2022 visit to Russia that was aimed at obtaining Russia’s support for Hamas’s position on its rights to the Gaza Marine gas field.[16]
In an op-ed published June 6, 2022 in the Hamas-affiliated Felesteen daily, Yousuf Rizqa, a former advisor to Haniya, discussed the logic behind Hamas’ threats against Israel’s gas platforms, pointing at the relationship between the threats against the gas platforms issued in Gaza and Hizbullah’s similar threats in Lebanon: “The occupation state fears that the resistance will attack [its] gas drilling platforms in the Mediterranean, both the [platforms] close to Gaza and those close to Lebanon… The resistance in Gaza understands how important these platforms are to the enemy and that damage to them is something highly significant that the enemy fears… The resistance must impose on the occupation an equation stating ‘gas for gas’ and that erasing the gas platforms from [the list of the resistance’s] military targets requires erasing the occupation’s threats to produce Gaza’s gas… There is no bargaining over Palestine’s rights to produce its own gas in Gaza. Decades of neglect are enough – we want our gas in order to ease our [economic] burden.”[17]
Indirect Egypt-Mediated Hamas-Israel Negotiations: Hudna In Exchange For An Economic Incentives Package
With its threats, Hamas, which in actuality controls the Gaza Strip, has demonstrated that it is likely to be a significant obstacle to any plan to develop the gas field. Israel has made greenlighting the development of the Marine Gaza field conditional on a demand that the Egyptian security apparatuses work to calm Hamas and lift its threats to the gas platforms’ security.[18] This condition essentially paved the way to the indirect negotiations between Israel and Hamas amid the latter’s threats. Hamas thus managed to insert itself by force as a significant player in the talks on the development of the gas field.
The Al-Arabi Al-Jadid daily reported as early as December 2, 2022 that “Egypt’s coordination with regard to the agreement on the gas field off the Gaza coast is not [talks] just with the PA but also includes Hamas.” It added that Hamas “is considered part of [this] agreement led by Egypt in coordination with the occupation government.” The paper even noted that “the intensive Egypt-mediated negotiations between representatives of the occupation [Israel] and Hamas have led to a significant breakthrough.”[19]
In May-June 2023, Cairo saw a great deal of activity with the arrival of high-level Palestinian delegations from Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the PA for separate discussions with Egypt’s General Intelligence Directorate on the gas field’s development. According to Arab media reports, Cairo even required the presence of Hamas political bureau head Ismail Haniya and PIJ secretary general Ziyad Al-Nakhaleh, so that the talks would succeed. [20]
It was also reported that, at the meetings, General Intelligence Directorate chief ‘Abbas Kamel presented an Egyptian plan for a long-term hudna (truce) between Israel and Hamas in exchange for an economic incentives package for improving the humanitarian and economic situation in the Gaza Strip. [21] The incentives proposed by Egypt include easing restrictions on Gaza fishermen, easing the passage of goods via Egypt to the Strip, an increase in goods exported from Gaza, and acceleration of work on Egyptian housing construction projects in Gaza. Also proposed was that Gaza would connect to Egypt’s power grid to end the energy crisis in the Strip, and that funding would be provided for the continued operation of the Strip’s power station. Also discussed at the talks was the establishment of a seaport in Gaza near El-Arish port in northern Sinai that would be under Egyptian administration, and the paving of a highway between Gaza and El-Arish for bringing goods from Gaza to the port and from there to the rest of the world, and vice versa. It was also reported that Egypt had promised to work to bring in equipment for factories in the Gaza Strip “whose entry is made difficult by the Israeli authorities,” but no further details were provided.[22] This proposal was reportedly part of regional and international understandings to which the U.S. and Qatar were also party, and these were preceded by consultations among Egyptian and Iranian security officials on the situation in the Strip and the West Bank.[23]
According to reports, “the issue of the gas and how it is produced and sold” was specifically raised at meetings between Hamas officials and Egyptian officials. The Lebanese Al-Akhbar daily reported, citing Palestinian sources, that Hamas was demanding either a share of the gas itself or a defined allocation of the gas revenues.[24] With regard to the outcome of the talks, there were conflicting claims. One report stated that the Hamas government in Gaza was indeed promised some of the gas revenues,[25] but there were also denials that the subject of gas revenues had even come up in the talks.[26]
Hamas’s Dilemma – International Legitimacy Or Loyalty To Iran
The efforts to harness Hamas for economic projects is aimed, inter alia, at distancing it from its allies in the resistance axis, which is led by Iran. Thus, Hamas, which did indeed refrain from direct involvement in the two recent rounds of Israel-PIJ fighting in Gaza, would gain a significant achievement in the domestic arena for its people, and at the same time would situate itself in the international arena as a pragmatic actor by taking a tactical measure permitted by Islam (i.e., a hudna with Israel) without having to make any significant ideological concessions. In this context, Wisam ‘Afifa, a senior Hamas official and head of the movement’s Al-Aqsa media network, explained that “there is an Egyptian and regional aspiration for Gaza to be distant from any escalation linked to other arenas” and that “Egypt’s traditional role in instilling calm [between Hamas and Israel] has increased after the Aqaba and Sharm Al-Sheikh summits, in accordance with the American vision and in light of the escalation in other arenas led by Iran.”[27]
According to the Al-Sharq Al-Awsat daily, Egypt’s original plan was to establish a “long-term hudna” for five to seven years, but then it realized that there was first a need for a phase of confidence building between Israel and the Palestinian factions in Gaza.[28] The online Rai Al-Yawm daily reported that Egypt’s efforts had not yielded a serious and clear agreement document with regard to a calm, and that the only goal currently on the agenda was “a temporary extension” of the present ceasefire.[29] Hamas officials, on their part, denied that the talks in Egypt had dealt with an Egyptian proposal for a long-term hudna.[30]
The Egyptian proposal for incentives poses a dilemma for Hamas vis-à-vis Iran, which supports it financially and militarily, and Hamas’ position is thus likely to depend, to some extent, on Iran’s position. Iran may pressure Hamas to reject the proposal, and/or push the PIJ to replace Hamas in escalating the violence against Israel if a Hamas-Israel hudna is achieved. Alternatively, Iran may actually greenlight the hudna with Israel and the economic development of Gaza, just as Hizbullah, with Iranian consent, agreed to the demarcation of Lebanon’s maritime border with Israel. In any case, while Iranian approval may lead to stability in Gaza, it will not necessarily prevent Iran from encouraging Hamas to escalate its violence in the West Bank, and it is unclear whether Israel will tolerate this kind of “division of labor.”
Against the backdrop of the contacts underway in Egypt in attempt to arrive at understandings, Iran invited Hamas and PIJ officials to high-level briefings with top Iranian officials.[31] The numerous statements made during and after these meetings do not so far indicate any change in the position on the indirect talks with Israel. Rather, they stressed the cooperation between Hamas and the PIJ and the unity of the resistance axis in its struggle against Israel.[32] In fact, Khamenei tweeted that “it is a compulsory religious duty of all Muslims to be involved in efforts aimed at liberating Palestine.”[33] In addition, Iranian Majlis Speaker Mohammad Baghr Qalibaf said in a meeting with Isma’il Haniya that the path of negotiations was doomed to failure and that the main goal of the resistance front was “the extermination of Israel.”[34] At the same time, the online Rai Al-Yawm daily reported that understandings had been reached in Iran between Hamas and the PIJ in order to ease the tension between them that arose due to Hamas’ restraint during the recent two rounds of fighting in Gaza between the PIJ and Israel. The two movements agreed to act only in the framework of the joint operations room and avoid unilateral haphazard rocket attacks on Israel. These understandings can be seen as an Iranian attempt to restrain the PIJ and help Hamas achieve calm in Gaza.”[35]
An additional obstacle to the Egyptian initiative was the PA’s bitterness over the incentives package offered to Hamas, because of its fear that such a move would legitimize Hamas at its expense. In this context, the PA daily Al-Hayat Al-Jadida wrote in an editorial: “It was clear from the first moment [of its takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007] that Hamas was striving to obtain this despicable loot called ‘hudna,’ and that the only thing Israel was trying to do against Hamas was to make this hudna permanent and thus to eliminate the national Palestinian enterprise for freedom, return, and independence!… But we continue to support our men in the Strip… and to resist under the banner of ‘no to a state in Gaza’ and ‘no to a state without Gaza.'”[36]
Similar criticism was voiced by former PA minister Ibrahim Abrash. He wrote in an op-ed: “The negotiations in Egypt are not aimed at achieving reconciliation and national unity, but at establishing a hudna that will perpetuate the schism, pave the way to a Gaza statelet with the consent of all Gaza factions, including Fatah [in Gaza], with the spoils of the Gaza government divided among them, and sever Gaza from the national track. The talk about reconciliation in this context is throwing sand in people’s eyes.”[37]
Despite these obstacles, it should be considered that the Egyptian initiative for a hudna between Hamas and Israel is of a piece with regional and international understandings and with significant changes in the balance of power and trends in the region. These include natural gas enterprises in the Mediterranean due to the energy crisis resulting from the Russia-Ukraine war, the Saudi-Iran rapprochement, the Saudi openness to Hamas, the reconciliation of the Gulf states and Egypt with Qatar, and Syria’s return to the Arab League, along with the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, the Abraham Accords, and the Biden administration’s efforts to promote Saudi-Israel normalization.
* Y. Yehoshua is MEMRI’s Vice President for Research.
[1] Al-Arabi Al-Jadid (London), June 4, 2023. The issue of the Marine Gaza field was at the center of discussions at the U.S.-sponsored summits in Aqaba (February 26, 2023) and in Sharm Al-Sheikh (March 19, 2023), attended by representatives of Israel, the PA, Jordan, Egypt and the U.S. Qatar too is indirectly involved in this enterprise, since it is part of the project to convert the Gaza power station from diesel to gas (wafa.ps, June 21, 2022; Al-Ayyam (PA), June 22, 2022). In addition, Qatar’s state-owned energy company is part of gas exploration ventures off the coast of Egypt, in cooperation with Egypt’s EGAS company, which is involved in the development of Gaza Marine (sputnikarabic.ae, March 29, 2022).
[2] The EMGF is an international framework established in 2019 by Israel, Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Jordan and the PA with the aim of promoting regional cooperation in developing the natural gas resources.
[3] The Middle East Quartet, comprising the U.S., Russia, the EU and the UN, was formed in 2002 to help promote peace between Israel and the Palestinians.
[4] On Iran’s support of Hamas and the PIJ, see MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 10637 – Iranian Qods Force Commander In Letter To Palestinians: Iran Will Continue To Support You With All Its Abilities Until The Zionist Entity Is Eliminated; Hamas Leader Replies: Iran Is A Firm Foundation For Our Struggle Against Israel And U.S. – May 31, 2023; MEMRI TV Clip No. 10239, “Palestinian Islamic Jihad Leader Ziyad Nakhalah: Iran Has Paid The Palestinian Resistance Billions Of Dollars – It Pays For Every House Demolished In The West Bank And Every Weapon Used By The Resistance,” April 17, 2023. See also MEMRI reports: Special Dispatch No. 10562 – Lebanese Media Reports: On The Evening Before The April 6, 2023 Rocket Attack On Israel, Iranian Qods Force Commander Esmail Qaani Visited Lebanon, Met With Officials From Hizbullah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad – April 13, 2023; Special Dispatch No. 10124 – In Tehran Visit On The Eve Of The Gaza-Israel Conflict, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Leader Nakhaleh, Iranian Regime Heads Praise Iran’s Support For PIJ; IRGC Qods Force Commander Qaani: ‘The Palestinian Fighters Are At The Stage Of Planning To Strike The Final Blows Against The Rotting Body Of The Zionist Regime, When The Time Is Right’ – August 8, 2022; Special Dispatch No. 9717 – On Second Anniversary Of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani’s Killing, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad Continue To Praise Him; Controversy In Gaza Over Billboards Commemorating Him – January 10, 2022; Special Dispatch No. 9330 – Hamas, Islamic Jihad Officials: Iran Provides Our Missiles, Weapons, Funds, And Food, Our Gunmen ‘Were Trained By Our Brothers In The IRGC’; Without Iran’s Assistance, We Wouldn’t Be Able To Fire Rockets At Tel Aviv; Qassem Soleimani Personally Oversaw Transfer Of Rockets To Gaza – May 12, 2021; Special Dispatch No. 9123 – Marking Anniversary Of Killing Of IRGC Qods Force Commander Qassem Soleimani, Hamas Continues To Signal Loyalty To Iran, Resistance Axis – May 1, 2021; Special Dispatch No. 8767, IRGC Qods Force Commander Qassem Soleimani In Letter Sent Prior To His Death To Hamas Military Wing Commander Muhammad Deif: Despite The Pressures And Siege, Iran Will Never Abandon Palestine, May 26, 2020; Inquiry & Analysis Series No. 1461 – In Light Of Impasse In Indirect Iran-U.S. Negotiations, Upsurge In Iranian Terrorism Anticipated On Various Fronts – June 14, 2019; Special Dispatch No. 7339 – Hamas, Palestinian Factions In Response To Israel’s Airstrikes In Syria: ‘Any Israeli Attack, On Any Front, Will Be Answered With A Comprehensive War On All Fronts’ – February 15, 2018; Inquiry & Analysis No. 1366, Intensive Discussions In Resistance Axis Ahead Of Possible Joint Confrontation With Israel; Syrian Daily: A Confrontation Is Inevitable, January 1, 2018; Special Dispatch No. 7144 – Alongside Reconciliation With Fatah, Hamas Officials Tighten Relations With Iran, Call To ‘Wipe Israel Off The Map’ – October 23, 2017; Special Dispatch No. 6568 – Officials In Lebanese, Gazan Terror Organizations Confirm: Iran Funds Our Activity – August 11, 2016.
[5] Twitter.com/mosa_abumarzook, February 23, 2021.
[6] Twitter.com/hamadelregeb, June 15, 2022.
[7] Qudsn.co, October 18, 2022.
[8] Twitter.com/HusseinSheikhpl, February 23, 2021.
[9] Twitter.com/DAlhabbash, February 23, 2021.
[10] See Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (PA), February 25, 2021.
[11] Felesteen.news, September 13, 2022.
[12] Twitter.com/Alresalahpress, September 22, 2023.
[13] Alqassam.ps, September 21, 2022.
[14] Arabicpost.net, September 13, 2022.
[15] Arabicpost.net, September 13, 2022.
[16] Arabicpost.net, September 13, 2022.
[17] Felesteen.news, June 6, 2022.
[18] Al-Arabi Al-Jadid (London), April 7, 2022, June 2, 2022, and June 4, 2023.
[19] Al-Arabi Al-Jadid (London), December 2, 2022.
[20] Al-Arabi Al-Jadid (London) June 4, 2023.
[21] Several reports noted that it was a “lull” (tahdiya) that was spoken about, as opposed to a long-term truce (hudna).
[22] Al-Arabi Al-Jadid (London), June 4, 2023, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), June 6, 2023, independentarania.com, June 8, 2023.
[23] Al-Arabi Al-Jadid (London), June 4, 2023.
[24] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), June 18, 2023.
[25] Independentarabia.com, June 8, 2023.
[26] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), June 6, 2023.
[27] Almodon.com, June 6, 2023.
[28] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), June 9, 2023.
[29] Raialyoum.com, June 10, 2023.
[30] Alray.ps, June 12, 2023.
[31] The PIJ delegation, headed by secretary-general Ziyad Al-Nakhaleh, met on June 14 with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (HJhad.ps, June 14, 2023) and on June 18 with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, Foreign Minister Amir Hossein Abdollahian, National Security Committee secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian, and Majlis speaker Mohammad Baghr Qalibaf (Raialyoum.com, June 18, 2023; jehad.ps, June 17, 2023). In an interview with the Iranian Arabic-language channel Al-Alam, Al-Nakhaleh said that PIJ and Hamas delegations had met with IRGC Qods Force elements (jehad.ps, June 20, 2023). The Hamas delegation, headed by political bureau head Isma’il Haniya, met on June 19 with National Security Committee secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian (alresalah.ps, June 19, 2023), on June 20 with President Raisi and IRGC commander Hossein Salami (hamas.ps, June 20, 2023), and on June 21 with Supreme Leader Khamenei (felesteen.news, June 22, 2023).
[32] In a meeting with Haniya, President Raisi said that “all the evidence indicates that the resistance front today is stronger than ever” and that “the resistance front has changed the balance of powers, not only in the Palestinian arena but also in the regional and international arena.” Haniya, for his part, told Raisi: “We have arrived at advanced levels of strength and resistance. The resistance front continues to grow, not only in Gaza and the West Bank but also in all the territories occupied in 1948 [that is, inside Israel] (almayadeen.net, June 20, 2023).
[33] Twitter.com/khamenei_ir, June 21, 2023.
[34] Tasnim (Iran), June 23, 2023.
[35] Raialyoum.com, June 23, 2023.
[36] Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (PA), June 13, 2023.
[37] Raialyoum.com, Wafa.ps, June 8, 2023. It should be noted that two days later, on June 10, the op-ed was published by the PA daily Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, but the criticism against Fatah was omitted.
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