Trump's Middle East plan and a century of failed deals – Al Jazeera

 
On January 28, 2020, US President Donald Trump formally announced his long-awaited Middle East Peace Plan to resolve the seven-decade-long Israeli–Palestinian conflict.
He hailed it as “the deal of the century”.
But is this new plan any different from the many previous deals and declarations that have tried to determine the fate of the Palestinian people?
To find out, we read all 181 pages of Trump’s “Vision for Peace” and compared it to the most notable documents on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict starting with the Balfour Declaration of 1917.
The 29,000 word plan contains two parts:
Part A is a political framework which proposes:
Part B contains an economic framework which promises to “facilitate more than $50 billion in new investment over ten years”. This includes the construction of a tunnel between the West Bank and Gaza Strip and an artificial island off the coast of Gaza to develop a port and airport.
 
Topics:
Missing Topics:
Countries:
Hover over the small text below to read the full document:
Israelis and Palestinians have both suffered greatly from their long-standing and seemingly interminable conflict. For nearly a century, international leaders, diplomats, and scholars have debated the issues and attempted to resolve this conflict. The world has changed greatly during this period, as have the security challenges facing the Middle East. Many of the disputed issues have remained largely the same, and stubbornly intractable. The time has come to end the conflict, and unlock the vast human potential and economic opportunity that peace will bring to Israelis, Palestinians and the region as a whole. Over the decades, many proposals and ideas have been put forward, but elements of those plans were unachievable given the realities on the ground and in the broader Middle East. While no plan will give either side all of what it wants, what follows is our view of the best, most realistic and most achievable outcome for the parties.
Palestinians have aspirations that have not been realized, including self-determination, improvement of their standard of living, social betterment, and a respected place in the region, as well as among the nations of the world. Many Palestinians desire peace and recognize the enormous economic opportunities and social benefits that await them if relations with the State of Israel can be normalized. Gaza is a very complicated situation. It is under the control of Hamas, a terrorist organization, and, as a result of Hamas’ policies, is approaching a humanitarian crisis. It is time to help the Palestinians achieve a hopeful and prosperous future and enable them to join the community of nations.
The State of Israel has made peace with two of its neighbors. It made peace with the Arab Republic of Egypt in 1979 and it made peace with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1994, two countries with which the State of Israel had fought multiple wars and numerous border skirmishes. The State of Israel has also exchanged sizeable territories for the sake of peace, as it did when it withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula in exchange for peace with the Arab Republic of Egypt. While Israeli citizens have suffered greatly as a result of violence and terrorism, Israelis still desire peace. These two peace agreements, now 40 and 25 years old, have endured and bettered the lives of citizens in Israel, Jordan and Egypt.
The conflict between the State of Israel and the Palestinians has kept other Arab countries from normalizing their relationships and jointly pursuing a stable, secure, and prosperous region. One reason for the intractability of this problem is the conflation of two separate conflicts: a territorial, security and refugee dispute between Israel and the Palestinians and a religious dispute between Israel and the Muslim world regarding control over places of religious significance. The absence of formal relations between Israel and most Muslim and Arab countries has only exacerbated the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. We believe that if more Muslim and Arab countries normalize relations with Israel it will help advance a just and fair resolution to the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, and prevent radicals from using this conflict to destabilize the region.
In 1993, the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization reached the first of several interim agreements, known collectively as the Oslo Accords.
Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin, who signed the Oslo Accords and who in 1995 gave his life to the cause of peace, outlined in his last speech to the Israeli Knesset his vision regarding the ultimate resolution of the conflict. He envisioned Jerusalem remaining united under Israeli rule, the portions of the West Bank with large Jewish populations and the Jordan Valley being incorporated into Israel, and the remainder of the West Bank, along with Gaza, becoming subject to Palestinian civil autonomy in what he said would be something “less than a state.” Rabin’s vision was the basis upon which the Knesset approved the Oslo Accords, and it was not rejected by the Palestinian leadership at the time.
One of the most significant understandings within those agreements provided for security cooperation between the Israel Defense Forces (the “IDF”) and the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (the “PASF”). While not perfect, and subject to periodic disputes and even suspension, the security cooperation in recent years has greatly enhanced the stability of the West Bank for both Palestinian and Israeli residents. The ability of the IDF and the PASF to work cooperatively together provides hope that security challenges can be bridged in a final Israeli–Palestinian Peace Agreement.
The Oslo Accords, however, left numerous key issues unresolved pending the completion of permanent status negotiations, including, among other items, borders, security, refugees and Jerusalem. Those agreements did not create an effective path for neutralizing the kinds of crises that emerged during the implementation of Oslo, including waves of terror and violence. Many intelligent and dedicated people have devoted lifetimes in search of the “ultimate deal,” but what is required, a comprehensive agreement has been elusive, and waves of terror and violence have set back the process significantly. Only a comprehensive agreement, coupled with a strong economic plan for the Palestinians and others, has the capacity to bring lasting peace to the parties.
The principles set forth in this Vision for Peace, Prosperity and a Brighter Future (collectively, this “VISION”), are designed for the benefit of Palestinians, Israelis and the region as a whole. This Vision addresses today’s realities, and provides the Palestinians, who do not yet have a state, with a path to a dignified national life, respect, security and economic opportunity and, at the same time, safeguards Israel’s security.
A realistic solution would give the Palestinians all the power to govern themselves but not the powers to threaten Israel. This necessarily entails the limitations of certain sovereign powers in the Palestinian areas (henceforth referred to as the “Palestinian State”) such as maintenance of Israeli security responsibility and Israeli control of the airspace west of the Jordan River. This Vision creates a realistic Two-State solution in which a secure and prosperous State of Palestine is living peacefully alongside a secure and prosperous State of Israel in a secure and prosperous region.
Today, that concept seems so far from reality. Gaza and the West Bank are politically divided. Gaza is run by Hamas, a terror organization that has fired thousands of rockets at Israel and murdered hundreds of Israelis. In the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority is plagued by failed institutions and endemic corruption. Its laws incentivize terrorism and Palestinian Authority controlled media and schools promote a culture of incitement. It is because of the lack of accountability and bad governance that billions of dollars have been squandered and investment is unable to flow into these areas to allow the Palestinians to thrive.
The Palestinians deserve a better future and this Vision can help them achieve that future. Palestinian leaders must embrace peace by recognizing Israel as the Jewish state, rejecting terrorism in all its forms, allowing for special arrangements that address Israel’s and the region’s vital security needs, building effective institutions and choosing pragmatic solutions. If these steps are taken and the criteria set forth in this Vision are satisfied, then the United States will support the establishment of a Palestinian State.
This Vision is security-focused, and provides both self-determination and significant economic opportunity for Palestinians. We believe that this design will enable this Vision to be successfully implemented. This Vision also provides positive benefits to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Arab Republic of Egypt and countries throughout the region.
The Middle East has gone through dramatic shifts since the beginning of this conflict. In confronting common threats and in pursuing common interests, previously unimaginable opportunities and alliances are emerging. The threats posed by Iran’s radical regime for example, have led to a new reality, where the State of Israel and its Arab neighbors now share increasingly similar perceptions of the threats to their security. If peace can be achieved, the economic and security cooperation between the State of Israel and its Arab neighbors can create a prosperous Middle East that is connected by a common desire for security and economic opportunity. If implemented, this Vision can lead to direct flights between the State ofIsrael and its neighbors, the transport of people and commerce and the unlocking of opportunities for millions of people to visit religious sites sacred to their faiths.
We developed a detailed economic vision for what the future for the Palestinians could be if there were peace. There has been a false notion that the lack of opportunity for the Palestinian people is Israel’s sole responsibility. Solving the final status issues, in the manner described in this Vision, would create the necessary conditions for investment to start flowing into the region. We estimate that combining this political solution with the economic vision for investments and government reforms that we have laid out will lead to historic economic growth. We estimate that the Palestinian GDP, which has been stagnant, could double in 10 years, create over 1 million new jobs, reduce the unemployment rate below 10 percent, and reduce the poverty rate by 50 percent. This plan is ready to be implemented in the event that peace can be made on terms consistent with this Vision.
We do not believe that the parties in the region are fated to live in eternal conflict because of their different ethnicities and faiths. There have been many examples in history of Jews and Arabs, and Jews and Muslims and Christians, living in relative harmony in this region. Our hope is that this Vision inspires a future in which all the peoples in the region live together in peace and prosperity.
We have developed this Vision based on the belief that a peaceful and prosperous future can exist for Palestinians and Israelis alike. This Vision is intended for people to read, understand and imagine how its concepts will actually and dramatically improve their lives. We believe that both sides gain more than they give. Based on this approach, we encourage all to be intellectually honest, open to new ideas, willing to engage on this Vision and take courageous steps toward a better future for themselves and for future generations.
Learning from past efforts, and driven by pragmatic principles, we approach this conflict guided by the following points:
The conflict has grown old, the arguments have become worn, and the parties have failed to achieve peace. At this point, only a comprehensive answer to the critical issues has the potential to galvanize the parties to end this seemingly intractable conflict. Both parties must make significant and difficult compromises to achieve greater gains.
The peace agreement that will hopefully be negotiated on the basis of this Vision should be implemented through legally binding contracts and agreements (the “ISRAELI–PALESTINIAN PEACE AGREEMENT”).
It is also the hope of the United States that Arab nations within the region that have yet to achieve peace with the State of Israel will immediately begin to normalize relations with Israel and eventually negotiate peace agreements with Israel.
Each appendix attached to this Vision is an integral part of this Vision.
A conceptual map (the “CONCEPTUAL MAP”) is attached hereto based on the guiding principles set forward in this Vision.
The Conceptual Map has been designed to demonstrate the feasibility for a redrawing of boundaries in the spirit of UNSCR 242, and in a manner that:
The State of Israel and the United States do not believe the State of Israel is legally bound to provide the Palestinians with 100 percent of pre-1967 territory (a belief that is consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 242). This Vision is a fair compromise, and contemplates a Palestinian state that encompasses territory reasonably comparable in size to the territory of the West Bank and Gaza pre-1967.
This Vision also contemplates a Palestinian state that maximizes ease of travel within the State of Palestine through state-of-the-art infrastructure solutions comprised of bridges, roads and tunnels, and provides significant benefits well beyond the borders of the State of Palestine. For example, the State of Palestine will benefit from a high-speed transportation link that will enable efficient movement between the West Bank and Gaza, crossing over or under the State of Israel’s sovereign territory. This crossing, which didn’t exist before 1967, will greatly enhance the value of the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Agreement for the Palestinians, and will be designed to be a part of a new regional infrastructure linking Palestinians and Israelis to the broader Middle East, as described below.
Moreover, until such time as the State of Palestine may develop its own port (as described below), the State of Palestine will benefit from special access to certain designated facilities at the State of Israel’s Haifa and Ashdod ports, with an efficient means of exporting and importing goods into and out of the State of Palestine without compromising Israel’s security.
The State of Israel will benefit from having secure and recognized borders. It will not have to uproot any settlements, and will incorporate the vast majority of Israeli settlements into contiguous Israeli territory. Israeli enclaves located inside contiguous Palestinian territory will become part of the State of Israel and be connected to it through an effective transportation system.
The United States has designed the Conceptual Map to include the following features:
The United States recognizes the heightened sensitivity surrounding Jerusalem, a city that means so much to so many. Jerusalem is a city unique in the history of civilization. No other place on earth can claim significance to three major religions. Each day, Jews pray at the Western Wall, Muslims bow in prayer at the al-Aqsa Mosque and Christians worship at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.
Throughout history, Jerusalem has been subject to war and conquest. It has been used to divide people and to instigate conflict by those with evil intentions. But it does not have to be this way.
Jerusalem must remain a city that brings people of all faiths together to visit, to worship, to respect each other and to appreciate the majesty of history and the glory of God’s creation.
The approach of this Vision is to keep Jerusalem united, make it accessible to all and to acknowledge its holiness to all in a manner that is respectful to all.
We understand that theological interpretations differ within each religion. The descriptions below of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are not intended to be definitive theological interpretations. It is nevertheless clear that each of these three great faiths has its own connection to Jerusalem.
For Judaism, Jerusalem is where Mount Moriah is located. According to Jewish tradition, it was there that Abraham nearly sacrificed his son, Isaac, until God intervened. Centuries later, Jerusalem became the political center of the Jewish people when King David united the twelve tribes of Israel, making the city the capital and spiritual center of the Jewish people, which it has remained for nearly 3,000 years. King David’s son, King Solomon, built the First Temple on Mount Moriah. According to Jewish tradition, inside the Temple, within the Holy of Holies, were stored the original Ten Commandments, revealed by God to Moses at Mount Sinai. The First Temple was destroyed by the Babylonians in 586 B.C. The Second Temple was built atop the same mountain and stood until it was destroyed by the Romans in 70 A.D. However, Jerusalem never lost its holiness to the Jewish People: It remains the direction to which Jews throughout the world turn in prayer and the destination of Jewish pilgrimage. Every year, on the 9th day of the Jewish month of Av, Jews fast, mourn and commemorate the destruction of the two Temples. Although Jews pray today at the Western Wall, which was a retaining wall of the Second Temple, the Temple Mount itself is the holiest site in Judaism. There are nearly 700 separate references to Jerusalem in the Hebrew Bible. For 100 generations the hopes and dreams of the Jewish people have been encapsulated by the words “Next Year in Jerusalem.”
For Christianity, Jerusalem is where Jesus of Nazareth preached, was tried, crucified, resurrected, and ascended to Heaven. Immediately after the recognition of Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire by Constantine in the early 4th century, religious institutions were established at important sites such as the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the Mount of Olives. After the Islamic conquest of Jerusalem in 637, Christians longed to recover the holy city, which they finally achieved in 1099, although it was lost to them again in 1187. During the medieval period, Jerusalem remained the premier Christian pilgrimage site, and a steady stream of visitors followed the footsteps of Jesus through Jerusalem, despite the dangers and challenges inherent in such travel. Under the Ottoman Empire, Christians were granted legal rights to their holy sites by successive firmans in the 18th and 19th centuries, establishing the Christian “Status Quo,” which was re-affirmed in the 1993 Vatican-Israel Fundamental Agreement. Today, Jerusalem is home to more than a dozen Christian sects and a thriving Christian population.
For Islam, Jerusalem acquires prominence as stated in the Holy Koran: “Glory to Him who made His Servant go by night from the Sacred Mosque (al-Masjid al-Haram) to the Farthest Mosque (al-Masjid al-Aqsa) whose surroundings We have blessed, that We might show him some of Our signs.” According to Islamic tradtion, the verse refers to the Prophet Muhammad’s nocturnal journey from Mecca to Jerusalem (al-Isra’); he arrives at the area of the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, where he ascends to Heaven (al-Mi’raj), to meet the earlier prophets and receive the commandement of prayer, In early Islam, when Muhammad had taken his followers from Mecca to Medina, he established Jerusalem as the direction of Islamic prayer (the first Qiblah) before later changing the direction of prayer to Mecca. There have been Muslim rulers who also emphasized the religious importance of Jerusalem. The Ummayad Caliphate, based in Damascus, offered Jerusalem as an alternative place of pilgrimage when Mecca was controlled by a rival caliphate. The victory of Saladin over the Crusaders in 1187 led to a revival of Islamic interest in Jerusalem, and in 1517, Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent rebuilt its walls and religious sites. Today, it is widely considered the third holiest site in Islam.
After the Six Day War in 1967, when the State of Israel took control over all of Jerusalem, the State of Israel assumed responsibility for protecting all of the city’s holy sites. Those holy sites include, without limitation, the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, the Western Wall, the Muslim Holy Shrines, Church of St. Anne, Via Dolorosa (Stations of the Cross), Church of the Holy Sepulchre, Church of Viri Galilaei, Church of St. Stephen, Dormition Abbey, Tomb of the Virgin Mary, Room of the Last Supper, Augusta Victoria Church of Ascension, Garden of Gethsemane, Church of Mary Magdalene, Dominus Flevit Church, Pater Noster Church, Church of St. Peter in Gallicantu, Church of the Ascension, The Russian Church, Secours Catholique ‘House of Abraham,’ Mount Scopus, Hurva Synagogue, Tomb of Absalom, Tomb of Zechariah, Second Temple Pilgrimage Road, Tomb of the Prophets Haggai, Zechariah and Malachi, Gihon Spring, City of David, Mount of Olives, Sambuski Jewish Cemetery, and the Pool of Siloam.
Unlike many previous powers that had ruled Jerusalem, and had destroyed the holy sites of other faiths, the State of Israel is to be commended for safeguarding the religious sites of all and maintaining a religious status quo.
Given this commendable record for more than half a century, as well as the extreme sensitivity regarding some ofJerusalem’s holy sites, we believe that this practice should remain, and that all of Jerusalem’s holy sites should be subject to the same governance regimes that exist today. In particular the status quo at the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif should continue uninterrupted.
Jerusalem’s holy sites should remain open and available for peaceful worshippers and tourists of all faiths. People of every faith should be permitted to pray on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, in a manner that is fully respectful to their religion, taking into account the times of each religion’s prayers and holidays, as well as other religious factors.
One of the most complicated issues in achieving peace is resolving the question of the political status of Jerusalem. Prior to 1967, a divided Jerusalem was a source of great tension in the region, with Jordanian and Israeli forces separated by barbed wire and Israeli residents of Jerusalem endangered by sniper fire.
A division of Jerusalem would be inconsistent with the policy statements of the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995 of the United States. All former presidents who have been involved in the peace process have agreed that Jerusalem should not be physically divided again.
On December 6, 2017, on behalf of the United States of America, President Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. The President also made clear that the specific boundaries of Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem would be subject to final status negotiations between the parties.
We believe that returning to a divided Jerusalem, and in particular having two separate security forces in one of the most sensitive areas on earth, would be a grave mistake.
While a physical division of the city must be avoided, a security barrier currently exists that does not follow the municipal boundary and that already separates Arab neighborhoods (i.e., Kafr Aqab, and the eastern part of Shuafat) in Jerusalem from the rest of the neighborhoods in the city.
This physical barrier should remain in place and should serve as a border between the capitals of the two parties.
Jerusalem will remain the sovereign capital of the State of Israel, and it should remain an undivided city. The sovereign capital of the State of Palestine should be in the section of East Jerusalem located in all areas east and north of the existing security barrier, including Kafr Aqab, the eastern part of Shuafat and Abu Dis, and could be named Al Quds or another name as determined by the State of Palestine.
This Vision would allow the Arab residents of Israel’s capital, Jerusalem, beyond the 1949 armistice lines but inside the existing security barrier to choose one of three options:
Over the years, some Arab residents of these areas (approximately 6%) have chosen to become Israeli citizens, and that option should remain available to Arab residents of these areas in the future.
Other Arab residents of these areas may want to embrace a Palestinian political identity by choosing to become citizens of the State of Palestine, and that option should be available to them as well.
Many of the Arab residents of these areas may want to maintain a political identity that is separate from either Israel or Palestine, and which allows them to take pride in their unique identity and history. That option should remain available to them.
The privileges, benefits and obligations of Arab residents of these areas who choose to keep their status as permanent residents of Israel should remain the same.
The privileges, benefits and obligations of Arab residents of these areas who choose to become citizens of Palestine will be determined by the laws of the State of Palestine and the State of Israel, as applicable.
The residents of these areas who choose to become citizens of the State of Israel will have all the privileges, benefits and obligations of being citizens of the State of Israel. Residents of these areas, who today are citizens of Israel, will maintain the same privileges, benefits and obligations that they have today.
The State of Israel should allow for the development by the State of Palestine of a special tourism zone in Atarot, in a specific area to be agreed upon by the parties. We envision that this area should be a world class tourist zone that should support Muslim tourism to Jerusalem and its holy sites. We envision that this zone will become a thriving and vibrant tourism center that includes state-of-the-art public transportation that provides easy access to and from the holy sites.
To support this new development, the economic development program will identify financing for the construction of restaurants, shops, hotels, cultural centers, and other tourism facilities within this zone. Fast-track accessibility to the Muslim Holy Shrines should be developed and maintained. The specific details of this area, including, without limitation, taxation, and zoning should be negotiated between the parties.
Without derogating the State of Israel’s sovereignty, during the negotiation of the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Agreement, and subject to the State of Israel’s security requirements, the parties shall:
Jerusalem should be internationally recognized as the capital of the State of Israel. Al Quds (or another name selected by the State of Palestine) should be internationally recognized as the capital of the State of Palestine.
Neither party shall encourage or support efforts by other countries or persons to deny the legitimacy of the other party’s capital or its sovereignty. The mayors for each capital city will establish mechanisms for regular consultation and voluntary cooperation on matters of significance to the two capitals.
The embassy of the United States to the State of Israel will remain in Jerusalem. Following the signing of the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Agreement, the embassy of the United States to the State of Palestine will be in Al Quds at a location to be chosen by the United States, in agreement with the State of Palestine. The United States will recognize the State of Israel and the State of Palestine in their respective capitals and encourage other nations to relocate their embassies to Jerusalem and Al Quds, as applicable.
At the invitation of the Kingdom of Bahrain, this past June in Manama, the United States presented the administration’s Middle East Peace Economic Plan titled Peace to Prosperity: A New Vision for the Palestinian People.
The United States recognizes that the successful signing and implementation of the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Agreement will have a significant impact on the economic prospects of the region. In Bahrain, the international community stressed its commitment to the economic plan and its necessity, as well as its viability following the signing of a peace agreement.
The economic plan will empower the Palestinian people to build a prosperous and vibrant Palestinian society. It consists of three initiatives that will support distinct pillars of the Palestinian society: the economy, the people, and the government. With the potential to facilitate more than $50 billion in new investment over ten years, Peace to Prosperity represents the most ambitious and comprehensive international effort for the Palestinian people to date. It has the ability to fundamentally transform the West Bank and Gaza and to open a new chapter in Palestinian history, one defined, not by adversity and loss, but by opportunity and dignity.
The first initiative will unleash the economic potential of the Palestinian people. By developing property and contract rights, the rule of law, anti-corruption measures, capital markets, a pro-growth tax structure, and a low-tariff scheme with reduced trade barriers, this initiative envisions policy reforms coupled with strategic infrastructure investments that will improve the business environment and stimulate private-sector growth. Hospitals, schools, homes, and businesses will secure reliable access to affordable electricity, clean water, and digital services. Billions of dollars of new investment will flow into various sectors of the Palestinian economy. Businesses will have increased access to capital, and the markets of the West Bank and Gaza will be connected with key trading partners, including Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon. The resulting economic growth has the potential to end the current unemployment crisis and transform the West Bank and Gaza into a center of opportunity.
The second initiative will empower the Palestinian people to realize their ambitions. Through new data-driven, outcomes-based education options at home, expanded online education platforms, increased vocational and technical training, and the prospect of international exchanges, this initiative will enhance and expand a variety of programs that directly improve the well-being of the Palestinian people. It will strengthen the Palestinian educational system and ensure that students can fulfill their academic goals and be prepared for the workforce.
Equally important, access to quality healthcare will be dramatically improved, as Palestinian hospitals and clinics will be outfitted with the latest healthcare technology and equipment. In addition, new opportunities for cultural and recreational activities will improve the quality of life of the Palestinian people. From parks and cultural institutions to athletic facilities and libraries, this initiative’s projects will enrich public life throughout the West Bank and Gaza.
The third initiative will enhance Palestinian governance, improving the public sector’s ability to serve its citizens and enable private-sector growth. This initiative will support the public sector in undertaking the improvements and reforms necessary to achieve long-term economic success. A commitment to upholding property rights, improving the legal and regulatory framework for businesses, adopting a growth-oriented, enforceable tax structure, and developing robust capital markets will increase exports and foreign direct investment. A fair and independent judicial branch will ensure this pro-growth environment is protected and that civil society flourishes. New systems and policies will help bolster government transparency and accountability. International partners will work to eliminate the Palestinian public sector’s donor dependency and put the Palestinians on a trajectory to achieve long-term fiscal sustainability. Institutions will be modernized and made more efficient to facilitate the most effective delivery of essential services for the citizens. With the support of the Palestinian leadership, this initiative can usher in a new era of prosperity and opportunity for the Palestinian people and institutionalize the policies required for successful economic transformation.
These three initiatives are more than just a vision of a promising future for the Palestinian people. They are also the foundation for an implementable plan. Capital raised through this international effort will be placed into a new fund administered by an established multilateral development bank. Accountability, transparency, anti-corruption, and conditionality safeguards will protect investments and ensure that capital is allocated efficiently and effectively. The fund’s leadership will work with beneficiaries to outline annual investment guidelines, development goals, and governance reforms that will support project implementation in the areas identified within Peace to Prosperity. Grants, concessional loans, and other support will be distributed to projects that meet the defined criteria through a streamlined process that will enable both flexibility and accountability.
In addition to the requirement that the State of Palestine comply in all respects with the Israeli–Palestinian PeaceAgreement, Peace to Prosperity will be conditioned upon (i) the establishment by the State of Palestine of transparent, independent, and credit-worthy financial institutions capable of engaging in international market transactions in the same manner as financial institutions of western democracies, (ii) the establishment of appropriate governance to ensure the proper use of funds, and (iii) the establishment of a legal system that protects investments and addresses commercial expectations.
The United States will work with the Palestinian Authority to identify economic projects for Al Quds and incorporate such projects into Peace to Prosperity.
The economic plan will empower the Palestinian people to build the society that they have aspired to establish for generations. It will allow Palestinians to realize a better future and pursue their dreams. We are confident that the international community will support this plan. Ultimately, however, the power to implement it lies in the hands of the Palestinian people.
This Vision is designed to enable Israelis and Palestinians to live in peace and to reduce the risk of terrorism.
It is unrealistic to ask the State of Israel to make security compromises that could endanger the lives of its citizens. Appendix 2A provides a broad outline of some the acute security challenges facing the State of Israel. The goal of this Vision is to enable the parties to meet those security challenges and to enable the State of Palestine to assume as much of its security responsibilities as possible, as quickly as possible, throughout the State of Palestine.
This Vision contemplates facilitating close security coordination between the State of Israel and the State of Palestine, together with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Arab Republic of Egypt. This section sets forth the best path to realistically achieve this goal. If the proper level of security coordination cannot be achieved, then the security of the State of Israel is nevertheless protected under this Vision.
Every country spends a very significant sum of money on its defense from external threats. The State of Palestine will not be burdened with such costs, because it will be shouldered by the State of Israel. This is a significant benefit for the economy of the State of Palestine since funds that would otherwise be spent on defense can instead be directed towards healthcare, education, infrastructure and other matters to improve Palestinians’ well-being.
Upon signing the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Agreement, the State of Israel will maintain overriding security responsibility for the State of Palestine, with the aspiration that the Palestinians will be responsible for as much of their internal security as possible, subject to the provisions of this Vision. The State of Israel will work diligently to minimize its security footprint in the State of Palestine according to the principle that the more the State of Palestine does, the less the State of Israel will have to do. The State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will discuss to what extent, if any, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan can assist the State of Israel and the State of Palestine in connection with security in the State of Palestine.
The criteria for Palestinian security performance (the “SECURITY CRITERIA”) are generally outlined in Appendix 2B.
As the State of Palestine meets and maintains the Security Criteria, the State of Israel’s involvement in security within the State of Palestine will be reduced. Both the Israelis and Palestinians have a common interest in maximizing Palestinian capability as quickly as possible. The United States and Israel will continue their work to strengthen the capabilities of the PASF.
The State of Israel will work to increase joint-cooperation with the PASF to help build its terrorism prevention capabilities. Achieving that goal in a manner that enhances the security of both countries will necessitate the following:
Over many years, the United States has supported the Palestinian Authority’s efforts to counter terrorism. This partnership has established a foundation of trust that this Vision hopes to build upon. This Vision is based on the belief and expectation that the State of Palestine will continue such efforts and work towards enhancing such efforts. Once the State of Israeldetermines that the State of Palestine has demonstrated both a clear intention and a sustained capacity to fight terrorism, a pilot program will be initiated in an area of the West Bank portion of the State of Palestine, designated by the State of Israel, to determine if the State of Palestine is able to meet the Security Criteria. If the State of Palestine succeeds in maintaining the Security Criteria in the designated pilot area, then the pilot program will be expanded to other areas within the State of Palestine as well.
The United States will help support the State of Palestine to meet and maintain the Security Criteria. During the negotiations, the parties, in consultation with the United States, shall attempt to create acceptable initial non-binding metrics with respect to the initial pilot area which shall be acceptable to the State of Israel, and in no event less than the metrics used by either the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan or the Arab Republic of Egypt (whichever is stricter) with respect to the Security Criteria. Because security threats evolve, the metrics are intended to be used as a guide, and will not be binding. However, the establishment of such non-binding metrics takes into account regional minimum benchmarks and allows the State of Palestine to better understand the minimum goals it is expected to achieve.
Should the State of Palestine fail to meet all or any of the Security Criteria at any time, the State of Israel will have the right to reverse the process outlined above. The State of Israel’s security footprint in all or parts of the State of Palestine will then increase as a result of the State of Israel’s determination of its expanded security needs and the time needed to address them.
Under the new reality of peace, the parties will enhance their bilateral security coordination in order to maintain peace, stability and a smooth implementation of the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Agreement.
As a complementary measure to the bilateral security coordination, a security review committee (the “REVIEW COMMITTEE”) will be established that will consist of security representatives appointed by the State of Israel, the State of Palestine and the United States. The United States representative will be agreed to by the State of Israel and the State of Palestine. The Review Committee, which shall meet every 6 months, will serve as a forum to support the buildup and maintenance of the security capabilities of the State of Palestine toward meeting and maintaining the Security Criteria (see Appendix 2B), to review policy matters related to progress in implementing and maintaining the Security Criteria, and to facilitate necessary infrastructure changes and related investments (by the International Fund) on the ground.
The State of Israel, the State of Palestine, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Arab Republic of Egypt share a common interest in preventing all forms of militant, extremist, terrorist or criminal activity from gaining a base of operations or in any way from destabilizing the State of Palestine or its neighbors. A secure, demilitarized and peaceful State of Palestine will contribute to the security needs of both parties and to regional security, as well as to economic prosperity. In furtherance of their internal security and to advance their common interests, the State of Palestine, the State of Israel, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Arab Republic of Egypt will engage in comprehensive and enduring state-to-state cooperation. The United States recommends the establishment of a regional security committee (“RSC”). The RSC’s task would be to review regional counterterrorism policies and coordination. Ideally, the RSC would include security representatives from the United States, the State of Israel, the State of Palestine, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
The State of Israel will maintain at least one early-warning stations in the State of Palestine as designated on the Conceptual Map, which will be run by Israeli security forces. Uninterrupted Israeli security access to and from any early-warning station will be ensured.
To the extent reasonably possible, solely as determined by the State of Israel, the State of Israel will rely on blimps, drones and similar aerial equipment for security purposes in order to reduce the Israeli security footprint within the State ofPalestine.
Although each party will be in charge of setting zoning rules and issuing building permits in their own countries, zoning and planning of the State of Palestine in the areas adjacent to the border between the State of Israel and the State of Palestine, including without limitation, the border between Jerusalem and Al Quds, will be subject to the State of Israel’s overriding security responsibility.
The security plan outlined in this section results in billions of dollars in savings for international donors in lieu of creating a new multi-national security force composed of forces from the United States and/or other countries.
The parties will work together, in good faith, on security matters, to protect Israelis and Palestinians alike.
The threat of terrorism has reduced trust and slowed the movement of goods and people throughout the region. The goal of this vision is to have a rapid flow of goods and people through the borders in a dignified, extremely efficient system of crossings that does not compromise security.
The State of Israel will work closely with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Palestine to continue to improve the system for all border crossings. The system of border crossings will be implemented in a manner that keeps the visibility of the State of Israel’s security role to a minimum. As permitted by law, security personnel at these crossings shall wear civilian uniforms with no state designation.
A board of overseers (the “CROSSINGS BOARD”) comprised of three Israelis, three Palestinians and a United States representative shall meet quarterly to address concerns regarding the crossings. The United States representative will be agreed to by both the State of Palestine and the State of Israel. The purpose of the Crossings Board is not to interfere with the security measures at the crossings but rather to constructively find ways to improve the flow and treatment of people using the crossings. During the negotiations, the parties will develop a protocol pursuant to which people who have grievances with their treatment at the crossings that are not resolved between the parties will be addressed by the Crossings Board. The Crossings Board will develop goals and metrics by which to measure whether they are achieving its goals. Every year, the Crossings Board will provide, directly to the governments of each of the State of Palestine, the State of Israel the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, a report on performance and non-binding recommendations for improvements, along with goals for the following year.
All persons and goods will cross the borders into the State of Palestine through regulated border crossings, which will be monitored by the State of Israel. Israeli border crossing officials, using state of the art scanning and imaging technology, shall have the right to confirm that no weapons, dual-use or other security-risk related items will be allowed to enter into the State of Palestine. If an item is denied entry, the item will also be prohibited to be exported from the State of Israel into the State of Palestine in order to avoid creating a competitive advantage to Israeli businesses. To the extent any dispute related to whether or not a denial creates a competitive advantage, such dispute shall be referred to the Crossings Board. The State of Palestine will have the authority to set its own independent trade policy in order to deny import into the State of Palestine of any item for economic or legal purposes.
To combat terrorism while allowing maximum economic pursuit in the State of Palestine, all efforts will be made to mitigate the cost of production if a raw material or subcomponent of an end item is deemed dangerous and its import into the State of Palestine needs to be controlled. Rather than banning a dual use item, every effort should be made to develop transportation, storage and end-use monitoring measures to prevent the diversion of dangerous components to illicit use. Only security-vetted individuals and companies will be allowed to transport, store and utilize dual-use items and appropriate measures will be used to ensure that the dual-use raw materials or subcomponents are not used to produce weapons.
With respect to the processing of people at all crossings, during the negotiations, the parties, in consultation with the United States, shall attempt to create initial non-binding metrics acceptable to them and in no event less than the metrics used by either the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan or the Arab Republic of Egypt (whichever is stricter). Because security threats evolve, the metrics are intended to be used as a guide, and will not be binding. However, the establishment of such non-binding metrics will allow the parties to achieve a workable, efficient and secure processing of people at all crossings, and take into account regional minimum benchmarks. Nothing in this section shall undermine the principles set forth in Appendix 2C.
The people of Gaza have suffered for too long under the repressive rule of Hamas. They have been exploited as hostages and human shields, and bullied into submission. Hamas has failed the people of Gaza and has diverted money belonging to the Palestinians of Gaza, including funds provided by international donors, to attack the State of Israel, instead of using these funds to improve the lives of the people of Gaza.
Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza nearly 15 years ago was meant to advance peace. Instead, Hamas, an internationally recognized terrorist group, gained control over the territory, and increased attacks on Israel, including the launching of thousands of rockets. Under the leadership of Hamas, the residents of Gaza have suffered extreme poverty and deprivation. After years of no progress the the donor community is fatigued and reluctant to make additional investments so long as the governance structure in Gaza is run by terrorists who provoke confrontations that lead to more destruction and suffering for the people of Gaza. This cycle can be broken if the international community unites to pursue a new course.
The State of Israel will implement its obligations under the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Agreement only if:
During the negotiations, the parties will agree to a time frame for the compliance with items (A)(1) through (3) above.
The international community should be willing to provide compensation in the form of major investment for a complete and verifiable demilitarization of Gaza.
Once these criteria are met, the economic vision will be ready to be implemented in a phased approach whereby tranches of investment and state building aid will be released as milestones are achieved.
All of the criteria set forth in this section entitled “Gaza Criteria” are referred to in this Vision as the “GAZA CRITERIA.”
Subject to the agreement of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, a free-trade zone between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Palestine will be established to expedite economic cooperation between the two countries.
The location and size of the free-trade zone will be agreed upon by the parties so that the free trade zone will not interfere with current land use in the area and necessary security requirements. Goods from the free-trade zone will be exported using an airport located in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
The United States will continue to provide duty-free treatment to goods coming from all areas that enjoy such treatment today, and will negotiate a free trade agreement with the State of Palestine. The United States hopes that countries in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere will also pursue free trade agreements with the State of Palestine.
Transportation is critical for economic development, regional integration and integration into the world economic market. Currently, the cost of goods born by the Palestinian people is particularly high due to transportation challenges. The lack of ports has raised the costs of Palestinian economic activity. Though the State of Palestine will include Gaza, security challenges make the building of a port in Gaza problematic for the foreseeable future. This Vision hopes to enhancePalestinian economic activity, protect Israeli security and provide a path for the State of Palestine to have its own port in Gaza in the future.
The State of Israel will allow the State of Palestine to use and manage earmarked facilities at both the Haifa and Ashdod ports, without prejudice to the State of Israel’s undisputed sovereignty at both of these locations. The purpose of these earmarked port facilities will be for the State of Palestine to benefit economically from access to the Mediterranean Sea, without compromising the State of Israel’s security.
The role of the State of Israel at these earmarked port facilities will be limited to security functions that will ensure that all goods transported into and out of these earmarked port facilities do not pose a threat to the State of Israel. The security arrangements at these earmarked port facilities will be similar to those of other international border crossings managed by the State of Israel.
These earmarked port facilities will be used only by cargo ships. The State of Israel will help the State of Palestine establish a fast-track transportation system that will allow the State of Palestine to transport all cargo from the earmarked port facilities to the State of Palestine, subject to the State of Israel’s security considerations.
The State of Palestine will be responsible for charging and collecting all taxes associated with goods entering these earmarked port facilities. All taxes collected for goods to be transported into the State of Palestine will belong to the State of Palestine.
The State of Israel and the State of Palestine will cooperate in an equitable manner with one another with respect to the traffic into and out of the ports. The parties will also assist one another in connection with joint civilian operations when needed in case of emergencies (e.g., fire, floods, etc.).
The earmarked port facilities and all ships using the earmarked port facilities shall be subject to applicable Israeli laws, including but not limited to, environmental and labor laws, and shall not be in violation of any applicable tariff agreements.
The earmarked port facilities will utilize the existing Israeli harbor, as well as existing Israeli support facilities for refueling and repairing vessels. The State of Israel and the State of Palestine shall enter into an agreement pursuant to which the State of Palestine will be able to utilize these facilities in an equitable manner. The State of Palestine will pay its equitable share of costs to maintain and repair all the shared facilities. However, there will be no rental fees payable by the State ofPalestine to the State of Israel for use of, or relating to, these earmarked port facilities.
Subject to the consent of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the State of Palestine may use and manage an earmarked facility at the port of Aqaba, without prejudice to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s undisputed sovereignty at the port of Aqaba. The purpose of the earmarked port facility will be for the State of Palestine to benefit economically from access to the Red Sea, without compromising the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s security.
The role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan at the earmarked port facility will be limited to security functions that will ensure that all goods transported into and out of the earmarked port facility do not pose a threat to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The security arrangements at the earmarked port facility will be similar to those of other international border crossings managed by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
The earmarked port facility will be used only by cargo ships. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will help the State ofPalestine establish a fast-track transportation system that will allow the State of Palestine to transport all cargo from the earmarked port facility to the State of Palestine, subject to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s security considerations.
The State of Palestine will be responsible for charging and collecting all taxes associated with goods entering the earmarked port facility. All taxes collected for goods to be transported into the State of Palestine will belong to the State of Palestine. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Palestine will cooperate in an equitable manner with one another with respect to the traffic into and out of the port. The parties will also assist one another in connection with joint civilian operations when needed in case of emergencies (fire, floods, etc.).
The earmarked port facility and all ships using the earmarked port facility shall be subject to applicable Jordanian laws, including but not limited to, environmental and labor laws, and shall not be in violation of any applicable tariff agreements. The earmarked port facility will utilize the existing Jordanian harbor, as well as existing Jordanian support facilities for refueling and repairing vessels. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Palestine shall enter into an agreement pursuant to which the State of Palestine will be able to utilize these facilities in an equitable manner. The State of Palestine will pay its equitable share of costs to maintain and repair all the shared facilities. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan shall be entitled to charge an appropriate rental fee, payable by the State of Palestine to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for use of, and relating to, the earmarked port facility.
Five years following the signing of the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Agreement and assuming the full satisfaction of the Gaza Criteria, the State of Palestine shall have the right, subject to the satisfaction of State of Israel’s security and environmental requirements, to create an artificial island off the coast of Gaza to develop a port to serve Gaza (the “GAZA PORT “), as well as an airport for small aircraft. The specifics of this (or alternative locations for the Gaza port and small airport) will be determined during the negotiations. At such time, if any, as the Gaza Port is developed, the State of Palestine shall no longer have rights to utilize the earmarked port facilities in (i) Haifa and Ashdod, unless agreed to by the State of Israel, and (ii) Aqaba, unless agreed to by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
The State of Israel will allow the State of Palestine to develop a resort area in the North of the Dead Sea without prejudice to the State of Israel’s sovereignty at such location, including, without limitation, Israel’s sovereignty to the shoreline. The presence of the Palestinian resort area along the coast of the Dead Sea will not alter the distribution arrangements between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Israel for natural resources in the Dead Sea. The State of Israel and the State of Palestine will establish a road that will allow the Palestinians to travel from the State of Palestine to this resort area, subject to Israeli security considerations.
The parties recognize mutual water rights and agree to equitably share existing cross border water sources and cooperate in making additional sources available through existing and emerging technologies. Shared aquifers will be managed for sustainable use to prevent impairing the groundwater quality or damaging the aquifers through over-extraction.
Hydrological and climatic conditions, among other factors, will be considered when managing extraction. The parties will prioritize investing in desalination and other emerging technologies to produce substantial additional quantities of water for all uses and jointly seek to provide easily available, reasonably priced water to both parties. The parties agree to also focus investment in wastewater treatment and wastewater recycling and reuse to control and minimize pollution of the shared ground-waters. The parties will work together in good faith to manage the details with respect to water and wastewater treatment issues.
The Israeli–Palestinian Peace Agreement will provide for the release of Palestinian prisoners and administrative detainees held in Israeli prisons, except (i) those convicted of murder or attempted murder, (ii) those convicted of conspiracy to commit murder (in each case murder includes murder by terrorism) and (iii) Israeli citizens. The release of prisoners (other than those described in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii)) will be conducted in two phases to allow for orderly transfer and resettlement. All prisoners who are released will become citizens of the State of Palestine. For the avoidance of doubt, prisoners described under clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) above shall not be released under the terms of the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Agreement.
Each prisoner who is released shall have the right to seek asylum in a third country.
No Palestinian prisoners or administrative detainees will be released in accordance with this section if all Israeli captives and remains are not returned to the State of Israel.
The Arab-Israeli conflict created both a Palestinian and Jewish refugee problem. Nearly the same number of Jews and Arabs were displaced by the Arab/Israeli conflict. Nearly all of the Jews have since been accepted and permanently resettled in Israel or other countries around the world. The Arabs who were displaced have, in very significant numbers, been isolated and kept from living as citizens in the many Arab countries in the region. For example, after the Kuwaiti government returned, following liberation by the United States and its coalition, it began a systematic clearing of Palestinians from the country through violence and economic pressure. The population of Palestinians in Kuwait dropped from 400,000 before the invasion to about 25,000.
The Palestinians have collectively been cruelly and cynically held in limbo to keep the conflict alive. Their Arab brothers have the moral responsibility to integrate them into their countries as the Jews were integrated into the State of Israel. Keeping the Palestinian people in limbo is a widespread issue. For example, in Lebanon, Palestinians have been discriminated against and prevented from entering the labor market for decades, even those born in Lebanon. They are for the most part barred from owning property or entering desirable occupations, including law, medicine and engineering. To gain employment, Palestinians are required to receive government issued work permits, but remarkably few are ever given to Palestinian refugees.
We must recognize that of all the Arab countries, the Kingdom of Jordan has valiantly attempted to take care of thePalestinian people in Jordan.
Proposals that demand that the State of Israel agree to take in Palestinian refugees, or that promise tens of billions of dollars in compensation for the refugees, have never been realistic and a credible funding source has never been identified. In fact, the world struggles to find sufficient funds to support the over 70 million global refugees and displaced persons. Over the decades the United States has been committed to supporting the needs of Palestinian refugees, who have suffered greatly over the last 70 years. From 1950 until and including 2017, the United States contributed approximately $6.15 billion toUnited Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). In the last 10 years alone, the U.S. contributed approximately $2.99 billion ($3.16 billion in 2017 terms), which accounted for 28% of all contributions to UNRWA. Unfortunately, Palestinian refugees have been treated as pawns in the broader Middle East chessboard, and empty promises have been made to them and to their host countries. A just, fair and realistic solution to the Palestinian refugee issue must be found in order to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.
The Jewish refugees who were forced to flee Arab and Muslim countries also suffered. Most settled in the State of Israel and some settled elsewhere. The Jewish refugee issue, including compensation for lost assets, must also be addressed. Additionally, the State of Israel deserves compensation for the costs of absorbing Jewish refugees from those countries. A just, fair and realistic solution for the issues relating to Jewish refugees must be implemented through an appropriate international mechanism separate from the Israel–Palestinian Peace Agreement.
This Vision contemplates that the Palestinian refugee issue will be resolved along the following lines:
The Israeli–Palestinian Peace Agreement shall provide for a complete end and release of any and all claims relating to refugee or immigration status. There shall be no right of return by, or absorption of, any Palestinian refugee into the State of Israel.
To be eligible for any refugee rights under the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Agreement, individuals must be in Registered Refugee status by UNRWA, as of the date of release of this Vision. The reference to the UNRWA definition of refugees is being used solely to define the universe of claimants and to provide the Trustees (as defined below) of the Palestinian Refugee Trust (as defined below) the widest flexibility to determine the appropriate distribution methodology, but should not be construed as acceptance by the United States that, in the absence of the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Agreement, refugee status should be determined by reference to this definition, including on a multi-generational, perpetual manner. UNRWA’s mandate, and its multi-generational definition of who constitutes a refugee, has exacerbated the refugee crisis. Under any circumstance, individuals who have already resettled in a permanent location (to be further defined in theIsraeli–Palestinian Peace Agreement) will not be eligible for resettlement, and will be eligible only for compensation as described below.
This plan envisions three options for Palestinian refugees seeking a permanent place of residence:
The United States will work together with other countries to establish a framework for the implementation of such options, including taking into account current host countries’ concerns and limitations.
It is the view of the United States that while refugee compensation is important and desirable, funds will have a far greater impact on the State of Palestine’s economic and social viability and on the refugees themselves if used to implement the Trump Economic Plan. The State of Palestine will be receiving substantial assistance to develop all key economic and infrastructure sectors. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, which has admirably supported Palestinian refugees, will also receive benefits from the Trump Economic Plan. The Palestinian refugees already residing in the State of Palestine and those who relocate to the State of Palestine will be direct beneficiaries of this large-scale aid and investment package. Nevertheless, we will endeavor to raise a fund to provide some compensation to Palestinian refugees. Such funds will be placed in a trust (the “PALESTINIAN REFUGEE TRUST”) to be administered by two trustees (“TRUSTEES”) to be appointed by the State of Palestine and the United States. The Trustees will administer the Palestinian Refugee Trust in accordance with the principles to be established by the Trustees and approved by the State of Palestine and the United States. The Trustees will work in good faith to adopt a distribution methodology to fairly compensate refugees in accordance with the priorities established by the Trustees and within the total amount of the funds collected for the Palestinian Refugee Trust.
Once the Trustees have received and analyzed refugee claims, they will allocate the funds in the Palestinian Refugee Trust to claimants in a manner that reflects those priorities.
It must be stressed that many Palestinian refugees in the Middle East come from war torn countries, such as Syria and Lebanon that are extremely hostile toward the State of Israel. To address this concern, a committee of Israelis andPalestinians will be formed to address this issue and to resolve outstanding disputes over the entry in the State of Palestine of Palestinian refugees from any location. The rights of Palestinian refugees to immigrate to the State of Palestine shall be limited in accordance with agreed security arrangements.
Furthermore, the rate of movement of refugees from outside Gaza and the West Bank into the State of Palestine shall be agreed to by the parties and regulated by various factors, including economic forces and incentive structures, such that the rate of entry does not outpace or overwhelm the development of infrastructure and the economy of the State of Palestine, or increase security risks to the State of Israel. This rate of movement should be adjusted, as appropriate, with the passage of time.
Upon the signing of the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Agreement, Palestinian refugee status will cease to exist, and UNWRA will be terminated and its responsibilities transitioned to the relevant governments. Part of the Trump Economic Plan will go toward the replacement of refugee camps in the State of Palestine with new housing developments in the State of Palestine. Thus, the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Agreement will lead to the dismantling of all Palestinian refugee camps and the building of permanent housing.
The transition to statehood is complex and fraught with peril. The region cannot absorb another failed state, another state not committed to human rights or the rule of law. A Palestinian State, just like any other state, must combat all forms of terrorism and be accountable to its neighbors to be a productive and non-threatening member of the international community. For the sake of its future citizens and neighbors, it is critical that the State of Palestine have the necessary foundational elements to give it a high probability of succeeding.
The following criteria are a predicate to the formation of a Palestinian State and must be determined to have occurred by the State of Israel and the United States, jointly, acting in good faith, after consultation with the Palestinian Authority:
The United States, the State of Israel and all regional neighbors will work productively and in good faith with the Palestinian leadership to provide the necessary assistance to the achievement of the criteria listed above.
As it transitions to an era of state governance, the Palestinian leadership will benefit from international assistance in crafting the political and logistical instrumentalities of statehood.
The international community should mobilize a worldwide effort to assist the Palestinians to achieve proper governance. By virtue of territorial proximity, cultural affinity and family ties, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is well placed to play a distinctive role in providing this assistance in fields such as law, medicine, education, municipal services, historic preservation and institution building. In a manner consistent with the dignity and autonomy of a future State of Palestine, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will offer long-term, on-the-ground assistance in designing relevant institutions and procedures and training of relevant personnel. The objective of such assistance will be to help the Palestinians build strong and well governed institutions.
Other countries will be encouraged to provide assistance to the Palestinians in areas in which they have special experience or expertise. The international community recognizes that the implementation of this Vision will necessitate the expansion of the Palestinian government’s reach and capacity to provide services to additional people across a larger area. The international community will provide technical assistance across the spectrum of services that the Palestinian government will need to provide, including security. Donors will place particular emphasis on upgrading infrastructure, equipment, and mobility and communication capacity to ensure the Palestinian government can professionally police a future State of Palestine.
Once these measures are completed the United States will encourage other countries to welcome the State of Palestine as a full member in international organizations. However, the State of Palestine may not join any international organization if such membership would contradict commitments of the State of Palestine to demilitarization and cessation of political and judicial warfare against the State of Israel. Through such membership in international organizations, other countries will encourage the participation of the State of Palestine as a respected and responsible member of the international community.
The State of Palestine will be able to establish diplomatic relations with other countries.
As President Trump has said: “Peace can never take root in an environment where violence is tolerated, funded and even rewarded.” Therefore, it is very important that education focuses on peace to ensure that future generations are committed to peace and to ensure that the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Agreement can endure. Promoting a culture of peace will be an important element of the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Agreement with the goal of creating an environment that embraces the values of coexistence and mutual respect throughout the region.
The creation of a culture of peace should include an end to incitement, including in government-controlled media, as well as an end to the glorification of violence, terrorism and martyrdom. It should also prohibit hostile propaganda, as well as textbooks, curriculum and related materials contrary to the goal of the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Agreement, including the denial of one another’s right to exist.
A joint Commission on Acceptance and Tolerance will be created to focus on steps that can be taken help the people from both countries heal the wounds that have been created by this conflict and bring the people closer together through dialogue.
The decisions of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to sign peace treaties with the State of Israel were major historic breakthroughs. Nevertheless, significant and broader cooperation between these countries should be developed for the benefit of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and the State of Israel. The involvement of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Arab Peace Initiative increased the number of potential peace partners and introduced important concepts into the peace process. Much appreciation is owed to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for its role in the creation of the Arab Peace Initiative, which inspired some of the ideas contemplated by this Vision.
The goal of this Vision is to have the Arab states fully cooperate with the State of Israel for the benefit of all the countries in the region. For example, there should be flights between Arab countries and Israel to promote cross-tourism, and to better enable Arabs to visit Muslim and Christian holy sites in Israel.
The United States will strongly encourage Arab countries to begin to normalize their relations with the State of Israel and negotiate lasting peace agreements.
Economic ties between the State of Israel and its neighbors should be expanded in the interests of all sides, particularly given the interests of the Arab countries to move away from economies based on fossil fuels to economies based on new infrastructure and technology. By integrating their transportation infrastructure, the countries in the region can become a global hub for the movement of goods and services from Asia to Africa and Europe. Such integration between the State of Israel, the State of Palestine and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will allow all three countries to work together to help move goods from Europe to the Persian Gulf and vice versa. The State of Israel and the Arab countries, including the State of Palestine, should establish strong economic partnerships and trade agreements. There should be a particular focus on significantly improving the economic and tourism sectors of the State of Palestine, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Arab Republic of Egypt.
The emergence of this new reality of regional integration will require a fundamental change in international politics. In the diplomatic sphere, in particular, the Arab countries, along with the State of Palestine, should cease to support anti-Israel initiatives at the United Nations and in other multilateral bodies. In particular, they should not lend their support to any efforts intended to delegitimize the State of Israel. These countries are expected to end any boycott of the State of Israel and oppose the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (commonly referred to as BDS) movement and any other effort to boycott the State of Israel. The United States views the BDS movement as destructive towards peace, and will oppose any activity that advances BDS or other restrictive trade practices targeting Israel.
Revisionist initiatives that question the Jewish people’s authentic roots in the State of Israel should also cease. Those initiatives fly in the face of not only Jewish and Christian history, but Islamic history as well. An important goal of this Vision is for the State of Israel to be treated by all as a legitimate part of the international community.
In confronting common threats and in pursuing common interests, previously unimaginable opportunities and alliances are emerging.
The State of Israel, the State of Palestine and the Arab countries will work together to counter Hezbollah, ISIS, Hamas (if Hamas does not reorient in accordance with the Gaza Criteria), and all other terrorist groups and organizations, as well as other extremist groups.
The threats posed by Iran’s radical regime has led to a new reality where the State of Israel and its Arab neighbors now share increasingly similar perceptions of the threats to their security. Furthermore, Israel and its Arab neighbors increasingly share a vision of stability and economic prosperity for the region. Enhanced strategic cooperation between countries in the region would set the stage for diplomatic breakthroughs and a broader regional security architecture in the future.
The State of Israel is not a threat to the region whatsoever. Economic conditions and Iran’s malign activities, however, pose an existential threat to many of the region’s states. Integrating Israel into the region will allow it to assist across a wide range of economic challenges as well as counter the threats of Iran. The Iranian attack on Aramco facilities in Saudi Arabia in 2019, for example, shocked the world’s economy and makes clear the necessity for the countries of the region to work together on security.
The State of Israel and the Arab countries have already discovered their common interests in combating terrorist groups and organizations and the common danger posed by an expansionist Iran. These countries also face similar security challenges in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. They should work together, along with the United States, to protect the freedom of navigation through international straits that are increasingly subject to the threat of Iran, its proxy forces, and terrorist groups.
These shared interest in the region should be expressed in closer ties between the State of Israel and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Moreover, the State of Palestine, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Israel (and such additional countries in the region who wish to join) should form an Organization for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (the “OS C M E”), similar to the model used by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The OSCME mandate should include, among others, issues such as early warning of conflicts, conflict prevention, and crisis management.
The Israeli–Palestinian Peace Agreement will provide that the parties recognize the State of Palestine as the nation state of the Palestinian people and the State of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people.
The Israeli–Palestinian Peace Agreement will end the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, and end all claims between the parties. The foregoing will be proposed in (i) a new UN Security Council resolution, and (ii) a new UN General Assembly resolution.
We hope that the parties will seize the opportunity, embrace this vision and begin negotiations. During the negotiations the parties should conduct themselves in a manner that comports with this Vision, and in a way that prepares their respective peoples for peace.
During the peace negotiations, the parties are expected to do the following:
In areas of the West Bank that are not contemplated by this Vision to be part of the State of Israel, Israel will not:
In Palestinian enclaves referred to in Section 4, the legal status quo will prevail and the State of Israel will enable the development of those Palestinian communities within their current footprint.
The PLO and the Palestinian Authority shall:
Refrain from any attempt to join any international organization without the consent of the State of Israel;
To the extent permitted by law, the United States shall:
Since the moment of its establishment, the State of Israel has not known a single day of peace with all of its neighbors. It has fought numerous defensive wars, some existential in nature, as well as asymmetric battles with terrorist groups. The State of Israel remains in a state of war with two of its neighbors (Lebanon and Syria) and is exposed to extraordinary risk from the rocket and missile arsenals on its northern border. The State of Israel has repeatedly confronted indiscriminate rocket fire from the Gaza Strip, and the State of Israel faces a grave threat from Iranian ballistic missiles, including missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and belligerent public threats from Iran to wipe the State of Israel off the map.
Since the Six-Day War in 1967, the West Bank and Gaza have figured prominently in the State of Israel’s security, largely because of geo-strategic considerations. Looking at the West Bank alone, the area is adjacent to the State of Israel’s coastal plain, where 70% of the State of Israel’s population is concentrated along with roughly 80% of its industrial capacity.
Prior to 1967, Israel’s coastal plain was only 9 miles wide at its narrowest point. While the Israeli coastal plain is at sea level, the West Bank contains a north-south hill ridge providing any hostile force the ability to topographically dominate the most sensitive parts of Israel’s national infrastructure. This includes, for example, Ben Gurion Airport, Israel‘s high tech industries, and its north-south road networks that connect Tel Aviv to Haifa in the north and Jerusalem in the east.
The security portion of this Vision was developed based on our best understanding of the security requirements of the State of Israel, as presented by successive Israeli governments to the United States.
The Jordan River lies approximately 1,300 feet below sea level, but it is situated right next to a north-south hill ridge that reaches approximately 3,318 feet at its highest point. That means that the Jordan Valley provides a steep, approximately 4,600 foot physical barrier against an external attack from the east. Israeli forces deployed along the eastern slopes of the West Bank hill ridge could hold off a numerically superior army until the State of Israel completed its reserve mobilization, which could take 48 hours. The State of Israel does not currently have a security concern with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, with which it has had a peace treaty since 1994, but rather with other Middle Eastern powers that might seek to forcibly use Jordanian territory as a platform of attack against the State of Israel.
The Jordan Valley is not only significant with regard to conventional attacks against the State of Israel, but also with regard to terrorism. Following its unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the State of Israel learned the implications of losing control of the external perimeter of contested territory for counterinsurgency warfare. Gaza became a safe haven, not only for Hamas, but also for international Jihadi groups like the PIJ that undermined the security of Egypt in the Sinai. If such groups infiltrated the West Bank, they could create a chaotic security situation for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, as well as for the State of Israel.
If the State of Israel withdrew from the Jordan Valley, it would have significant implications for regional security in the Middle East.
The State of Israel must assure for itself secure lines of supply for its forces in the Jordan Valley and the ability to move its military personnel and material into and out of the region.
Israel’s main international airport, Ben Gurion Airport, is 5.9 miles away from the pre-1967 line. Among the threats to airport security today are shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles used by terrorist organizations. Known as Man-Portable Air Defense Systems or MANPADS, these systems are proliferating across the Middle East.
Special security standards for airport defense are necessary to prevent threats to Ben Gurion Airport and nearby air traffic.
Because of its narrow size, the State of Israel lacks the time and the space many other countries enjoy to address fast approaching threats, especially airborne threats. The distance from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean is approximately 40 miles. A modern combat aircraft can cover that distance in under three minutes. For the Israeli Air Force to scramble fighters takes approximately three minutes. If the State of Israel did not maintain control of the West Bank’s airspace, it would not have adequate time to defend against incoming hostile aircraft or missiles. For that reason, in any peace arrangement, the State of Israel must have operational control over the airspace west of the Jordan River.
The State of Israel has experienced the failure of international troops in Sinai (before 1967), Lebanon, Gaza, and the Golan. Given its experience, Israel’s first doctrine of security – that it must be able to defend itself by itself – is as salient as ever. It is a critical strategic interest of the United States that the State of Israel remain strong and secure protected by the IDF, and continue to remain an anchor of stability in the region.
In the last few years, Iran has become an influential factor in areas of the Middle East, which could impinge upon Israeli security. Iran’s strategy seeks to encircle Israel, using Lebanon, Syria and Gaza, and encircle the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Bahrain and Yemen. Iran hopes to establish a “land bridge” that stretches from the Iran-Iraq border to the Mediterranean Sea. All of Iran’s activity must be taken into account in determining the State of Israel’s security needs.
Specific Security Criteria shall include the following:
In addition to the overriding security responsibility over the State of Palestine, the State of Israel will be responsible for security at all international crossings into the State of Palestine. With respect to the Rafah crossing, specific arrangements will be agreed upon between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel to accomplish the security needs contemplated by this Vision.
The State of Israel will continue to maintain control over the airspace and the electromagnetic spectrum west of the Jordan river. During the negotiation period, the parties should negotiate in good faith relevant financial issues. The Israeli Navy will have the right to block prohibited weapons and weapon-making materials from entering the State of Palestine, including Gaza.
The State of Palestine will not have the right to forge military, intelligence or security agreements with any state or organization that adversely affect the State of Israel’s security, as determined by the State of Israel. The State of Palestine will not be able to develop military or paramilitary capabilities inside or outside of the State of Palestine.
A demilitarized State of Palestine will be prohibited from possessing capabilities that can threaten the State of Israel including: weapons systems such as combat aircraft (manned and unmanned); heavy armored vehicles; mines; missiles; rockets; heavy machine guns; laser/radiating weapons; anti-air; anti-armor; anti-ship; military intelligence; offensive cyber and electronic warfare capabilities; production facilities and procurement mechanisms for weapons systems; military infrastructure and training facilities; or any weapons of mass destruction.
Any expansion of Palestinian security capabilities beyond the capabilities existing on the date this Vision is released shall be subject to agreement with the State of Israel.
The State of Israel will maintain the right to dismantle and destroy any facility in the State of Palestine that is used for the production of prohibited weapons or for other hostile purposes. While the State of Israel will use its best efforts to minimize incursions into the State of Palestine, the State of Israel will retain the right to engage in necessary security measures to ensure that the State of Palestine remains demilitarized and non-threatening to the State of Israel, including from terrorist threats.
Generations of Palestinians have lived without knowing peace, and the West Bank and Gaza have fallen into a protracted crisis. Yet the Palestinian story will not end here. The Palestinian people continue their historic endeavor to build a better future for their children.
Peace to Prosperity is a vision to empower the Palestinian people to build a prosperous and vibrant Palestinian society. It consists of three initiatives that will support distinct pillars of the Palestinian society: the economy, the people, and the government. With the potential to facilitate more than $50 billion in new investment over ten years, Peace to Prosperity represents the most ambitious and comprehensive international effort for the Palestinian people to date. It has the ability to fundamentally transform the West Bank and Gaza and to open a new chapter in Palestinian history—one defined, not by adversity and loss, but by freedom and dignity.
The first initiative will UNLEASH THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL of the Palestinians. By developing property and contract rights, the rule of law, anti-corruption measures, capital markets, a pro-growth tax structure, and a low-tariff scheme with reduced trade barriers, this initiative envisions policy reforms coupled with strategic infrastructure investments that will improve the business environment and stimulate private-sector growth. Hospitals, schools, homes, and businesses will secure reliable access to affordable electricity, clean water, and digital services. Billions of dollars of new investment will flow into various sectors of the Palestinian economy; businesses will have access to capital; and the markets of the West Bank and Gaza will be connected with key trading partners, including Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon. The resulting economic growth has the potential to end the current unemployment crisis and transform the West Bank and Gaza into a center of opportunity.
The second initiative will EMPOWER THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE to realize their ambitions. Through new data-driven, outcomes-based education options at home, expanded online education platforms, increased vocational and technical training, and the prospect of international exchanges, this initiative will enhance and expand a variety of programs that directly improve the well-being of the Palestinian people. It will strengthen the Palestinian educational system and ensure that students can fulfill their academic goals and be prepared for the workforce. Equally important, access to quality healthcare will be dramatically improved, as Palestinian hospitals and clinics will be outfitted with the latest healthcare technology and equipment. In addition, new opportunities for cultural and recreational activities will improve the quality of life of the Palestinian people. From parks and cultural institutions, to athletic facilities and libraries, this initiative’s projects will enrich public life throughout the West Bank and Gaza.
The third initiative will ENHANCE PALESTINIAN GOVERNANCE, improving the public sector’s ability to serve its citizens and enable private-sector growth. This initiative will support the public sector in undertaking the improvements and reforms necessary to achieve long-term economic success. A commitment to upholding property rights, improving the legal and regulatory framework for businesses, adopting a growth-oriented, enforceable tax structure, and developing robust capital markets will increase exports and foreign direct investment. A fair and independent judicial branch will ensure this pro-growth environment is protected and that civil society flourishes. New systems and policies will help bolster government transparency and accountability. International partners will work to eliminate the Palestinian public sector’s donor dependency and put the Palestinians on a trajectory to achieve long-term fiscal sustainability. Institutions will be modernized and made more efficient to facilitate the most effective delivery of essential services for the citizens. With the support of the Palestinian leadership, this initiative can usher in a new era of freedom and opportunity for the Palestinianpeople and institutionalize the policies required for successful economic transformation.
These three initiatives are more than just a vision of a promising future for the Palestinian people—they are also the foundation for an implementable plan. Capital raised through this international effort will be placed into a new fund administered by an established multilateral development bank. Accountability, transparency, anti-corruption, and conditionality safeguards will protect investments and ensure that capital is allocated efficiently and effectively. The fund’s leadership will work with beneficiary countries to outline annual investment guidelines, development goals, and governance reforms that will support project implementation in the areas identified within Peace to Prosperity. Grants, concessional loans, and other support will be distributed to projects that meet the defined criteria through a streamlined process that will enable both flexibility and accountability.
If implemented, Peace to Prosperity will empower the Palestinian people to build the society that they have aspired to establish for generations. This vision will allow the Palestinians to see a better future and realize an opportunity to pursue their dreams. With the support of the international community, this vision is within reach. Ultimately, however, the power to unlock it lies in the hands of the Palestinian people. Only through peace can the Palestinians achieve prosperity.
A lasting peace agreement will ensure a future of economic opportunity for all Palestinians.
The first initiative of Peace to Prosperity will establish a new foundation for the Palestinian economy, generating rapid economic growth and job creation. This part of the plan is built around four core programs and will be supported by an institutional foundation for economic growth and business investment. Peace to Prosperity will create a business environment that provides investors with confidence that their assets will be secure by improving property rights, the rule of law, fiscal sustainability, capital markets, and anti-corruption policies.
The first program will reduce constraints on Palestinian economic growth by OPENING THE WEST BANK AND GAZA to regional and global markets. Major investments in transportation and infrastructure will help the West Bank and Gaza integrate with neighboring economies, increasing the competitiveness of Palestinian exports and reducing the complications of transport and travel. To complement these investments, this program will also support steps to improve Palestinian cooperation with Egypt, Israel, and Jordan, with the goal of reducing regulatory barriers to the movement of Palestinian goods and people.
The second program will support the Palestinian economy by CONSTRUCTING ESSENTIAL INFRASTRUCTURE that the Palestinian people and their businesses need to flourish. This program will facilitate billions of dollars of investment in the electricity, water, and telecommunications sectors, increasing generation capacity while creating efficient transmission and distribution networks. The applicable authorities will receive training and assistance to manage this infrastructure and to increase competition to keep costs low for consumers.
The third program focuses on PROMOTING PRIVATE-SECTOR GROWTH with the potential to reduce unemployment to nearly single digits and to create over a million new Palestinian jobs. Following the adoption of key policy reforms and the construction of essential infrastructure, Peace to Prosperity envisions extraordinary private-sector investment in entrepreneurship, small businesses, tourism, agriculture, housing, manufacturing, and natural resources. The goal of early-stage investment will be to remove constraints to growth and to target key projects that build momentum, generate jobs, and increase gross domestic product (GDP). From the father working in his shop to support his family, to the young college graduate building her first company, Palestinians working throughout the private sector will benefit from this program.
The fourth program encourages STRENGTHENING REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION, creates new opportunities for Palestinian businesses, and increases commerce with neighboring countries. This program will boost the economies of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon and reduce trade barriers across the region. Increased cooperation between trading partners will support companies in these countries, which are seeking to develop international business, particularly in the West Bank and Gaza. This program will help the Palestinian private sector capitalize on growth opportunities by improving access to strong, neighboring economies.
GOALS
Successful economic transformations draw from core principles to build critical institutions and implement policy reforms that attract business investment and sustain long-term, private-sector-driven growth. Thriving business-friendly countries like South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Japan built modern economies with an emphasis on investment-led growth, robust infrastructure development, and strong exports. In addition, property rights, the rule of law, fiscal responsibility and independence, capital markets, and anti-corruption safeguards are crucial elements in this vision’s strategy for growth. Peace to Prosperity embraces these fundamental principles and prioritizes their role in the Palestinian people’s journey toward sustained economic success. Advancing these core policy and regulatory reforms, along with supporting businesses and providing technical assistance, will create the business environment needed to foster an economic transformation capable of benefiting the generations to come.
PROJECT:
Startup Equity-Matching and Lending Facilities
LOCATION:
West Bank and Gaza
FINANCING:
$100 million in grant equity funding
$300 million in concessional financing
PROJECT OVERVIEW:
This project will support the creation of equity-matching and lending facilities focused on Palestinian startups and emerging technology companies. The equity-matching component will encourage venture capital and private equity firms to invest in Palestinian startups. The lending component will incentivize Palestinian banks to increase their lending to qualified startups. Together, these facilities will help Palestinian entrepreneurs attract the equity and debt capital they need to build the next generation of innovative Palestinian companies.
Creating the foundation for growth and business investment begins with the Palestinian people. Palestinians, like all people, dream of a better future for themselves and future generations and aspire to professional success. Peace to Prosperity offers a path to realize those dreams. Drawing from models used by Germany and Sweden, this program lays out a strategy for training, developing, and employing the next generation of Palestinian men and women business and civic leaders. It builds the base of human capital for the Palestinian economy and prioritizes investment in technical and vocational education; science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) programs; and workforce development training to better prepare Palestinians for the jobs of today and the economy of tomorrow. Businesses will have a greater confidence that Palestinians will have the skills necessary to fill the jobs they seek to create, which will lead to a virtuous cycle of new investment and the expansion of existing operations.
Entrepreneurship, innovation, and private-sector growth are the cornerstones of vibrant economies. The recent success of Palestinian startups proves that Palestinian entrepreneurs have an impressive ability to build inventive, value-creating companies. To capitalize on their momentum, an institutional framework for growth should be adopted to position additional Palestinian entrepreneurs and companies for success. The incubator ecosystem in neighboring countries currently remains untapped by the Palestinian people, and Palestinians from around the world offer a talent pool that could support a strong, local startup culture. This program will support emerging Palestinian startups by helping Palestinianentrepreneurs overcome impediments to growth and break through the resource constraints they face today. Working in partnership with growing Palestinian and international venture capital firms, this project will incentivize regional cooperation for, and private investment in, promising Palestinian startups. Coupled with other investments in education and digital services, this program will help empower the next generation of Palestinian entrepreneurs to innovate and build their own successful companies, creating a successful entrepreneurial environment in the West Bank and Gaza.
Palestinian Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), which today employ a majority of the Palestinian labor force, are critical to the success of the Palestinian economy. A thriving domestic business sector in the West Bank and Gaza will require access to credit and reforms to core laws, rules, policies, and regulations that create barriers to business and stagnate private-sector growth. Peace to Prosperity will ensure that all Palestinians —not just the wealthy and connected— share in the benefits of peace. A robust local business sector will create good-paying, high-quality jobs for working-class Palestinians and is ultimately the key driver of prosperity. In order to promote a job-creating environment for the working class, this project will encourage the Palestinians to build a new commercial framework that includes all key elements of a thriving business sector and that nurtures small- and medium-business growth. This program will support loans to small businesses in the West Bank and Gaza to ensure that these enterprises have access to the capital needed to reinvest in their operations and in the growth of their companies. Support to small and medium businesses will spur the growth of local enterprises, which can serve as partners to large international companies seeking to do business or make foreign direct investment. Prioritizing the creation of an institutionalized pro-growth policy framework will end the vicious cycle of poverty plaguing the Palestinianpeople and begin a transformation toward sustainable development and prosperity.
The Palestinian people routinely encounter logistical challenges in the West Bank and Gaza, impeding travel, stagnating economic growth, reducing exports, and stunting foreign direct investment. Peace to Prosperity presents an opportunity to physically integrate the Palestinian community through an efficient, modern transportation network. This project will support the construction of roads across the West Bank and Gaza. Additional investment will finance the development of a transportation corridor directly connecting the West Bank and Gaza through a major road and, potentially, a modern rail line. These improvements will reduce the complications of travel for Palestinians and remove impediments that delay or prevent goods from reaching end markets by directly connecting population centers and easing barriers to movement.
To sustain economic growth, Palestinian goods and people must be able to easily and securely move across borders. This project will provide financial and technical assistance to build the capacity of immigration and customs officials to operate and manage crossing points in coordination with neighboring states. This project will also upgrade facilities at key crossing points along borders and construct new ports of entry. Upgraded or newly constructed terminals will be equipped with the latest border crossing technology, and older terminals will be refurbished and improved with amenities for travelers to use while in transit. Ultimately, this project has the potential to unlock unprecedented levels of trade, grow exports, and increase foreign direct investment in the West Bank and Gaza and its neighbors—particularly Egypt, Israel, and Jordan.
PROJECT:
“Breaking Down Barriers” Border Crossing Points Upgrades.
LOCATION:
West Bank and Gaza
FINANCING:
Up to $900 million in grant funding
PROJECT OVERVIEW:
New cargo terminals, special access roads, and other infrastructure will be built at major crossing points. These funds will also support capacity-building programs to train Palestinian officials in best practices and to finance the deployment of new systems and technologies. These investments will reduce wait times and improve customer service at crossing points. The project will create hundreds of direct jobs in construction and crossing-point management and thousands of jobs across the Palestinian economy by reducing the costs of trade and travel.
The shortage of affordable electricity has had profound effects on the well-being of the Palestinian people, particularly in Gaza. In the near term, this project will focus on bringing the Gaza electricity crisis to a swift end—ensuring that Palestiniansin Gaza receive at least 16 hours of electricity per day within a year of project implementation. This objective will be accomplished through investments in grid upgrades, the Gaza Power Plant, and new renewable energy facilities. Additional investments in energy infrastructure will ensure Gaza has continuous access to electricity within five years and will reduce the cost of electricity in the West Bank by increasing domestic supply and improving grid infrastructure. Finally, this project will provide technical support to increase the capacity of Palestinian utilities to manage and service this sector.
PROJECT:
“Power Gaza” Power Plant Upgrade
LOCATION:
Gaza
FINANCING:
Up to $590 million in grants and concessional financing
PROJECT OVERVIEW:
Stage One of this project will provide up to $90 million in grant funding to support the conversion of the Gaza Power Plant from diesel fuel to natural gas and connect it to a Gaza natural gas supply. This will increase electricity supply in Gaza by approximately 70 megawatts (MW) and significantly reduce the cost of electricity for Palestinians. In Stage Two, an additional investment of $500 million will expand the production capacity of the Gaza Power Plant by an additional 400 MW. The project will create hundreds of jobs in construction. It will also support the creation of thousands of jobs by supplying businesses in Gaza with reliable and affordable electricity for the first time in years.
Access to water is a critical enabler of economic activity across many sectors of the Palestinian economy. By channeling significant investments into infrastructure that increases water supply, including desalination facilities, wells, and distribution networks, this project has the potential to double the amount of potable water available to Palestinians, per capita, within five years. Additional funding will support the development of new wastewater treatment facilities in the West Bank and Gaza, putting an end to the ongoing public-health risk posed by untreated wastewater. This treated water will be reused, creating vast supplies of affordable water for agricultural and industrial use.
While much of the world has experienced a digital technology revolution, digital services in the West Bank and Gaza are limited. This project will help the Palestinians leap a generation forward in digital services by providing financial incentives and technical expertise to support the Palestinian private sector in developing 4G LTE and 5G telecommunications services. To further expand internet access, other financial incentives will support Palestinian companies and municipalities in providing public high-speed wireless internet services. These investments will generate a digital transformation in the West Bank and Gaza and support economic growth across multiple sectors of the Palestinian economy.
Unique and exciting characteristics give the West Bank and Gaza the potential to transform into a successful global tourism destination. Very few places in the world are home to such remarkable historical and religious sites. In addition, over forty kilometers of coastline in Gaza along the Mediterranean Sea could develop into a modern metropolitan city overlooking the beach, drawing from examples like Beirut, Hong Kong, Lisbon, Rio de Janeiro, Singapore, and Tel Aviv. Equally promising, traditional Palestinian cuisine varies across regions and excites visitors. Each Palestinian city boasts its own trademark dishes and flavors, from Ramallah’s Rukab ice cream to the famed knafeh of Nablus. Together, these attractions endow the West Bank and Gaza with rich potential tourism opportunities. To unlock the benefits of increased tourism in the West Bank and Gaza, this project will support investment in hotels, food and beverage establishments, and other tourism-related industries. Additional funding will be used to improve hospitality training and to renovate and upgrade tourist sites. Finally, this project will also finance a major international marketing campaign to highlight tourism attractions in the West Bank and Gaza to audiences around the world. Through these and other investments, the Palestinians will gain access to the resources they need to build a thriving tourism industry—one with the potential to bring tens of thousands of visitors a year to the West Bank and Gaza and to stimulate economic growth across multiple sectors of the Palestinian economy.
PROJECT:
Tourism Lending Facility and Site Rehabilitation
LOCATION:
West Bank and Gaza
FINANCING:
Up to $750 million in concessional financing
Up to $200 million in grant funding
PROJECT OVERVIEW:
To fully develop the Palestinian tourism industry, new investments are needed to improve accommodations and attractions close to popular tourist sites. This project will provide hoteliers and tourism companies with access to low-interest loans through a new lending facility managed in conjunction with Palestinian banks. Up to $375 million of loan capacity will be available for the five-year life of the program, ensuringPalestinians have access to the capital required to quickly develop this sector. After five years, this facility could be extended and expanded for an additional five years. Separately, an additional $200 million in grant funding will support the rehabilitation and development of potential tourism sites.
While agriculture accounts for approximately eight percent of Palestinian employment, this sector has not met its potential due to limited access of Palestinian farmers to land, water, and technology. An improved business environment in the West Bank and Gaza and access to more land will create an enormous opportunity for farmers to expand their operations. At the same time, this project will support farmers who seek to secure financing from local banks and work with financial technology (FinTech) innovators. With increased access to capital, farmers will have the opportunity to purchase new seeds and fertilizers while developing greenhouses, irrigation systems, and other infrastructure. Other funding will help to rehabilitate arable land and build a new educational center to enhance agricultural education and training. These improvements will grow the capability of Palestinian farmers to shift their efforts to producing higher-value crops and afford them the opportunity to use modern farming techniques, further benefiting their businesses and, ultimately, their families.
High real estate prices across the West Bank and Gaza have made it difficult for many Palestinians to purchase a home. Peacewill increase construction in the West Bank and Gaza and drive down property costs. The ability to access new housing stock, supported by mortgages from Palestinian banks to qualified homebuyers, will support a growing housing market, improve the quality of life for average Palestinians, and help build strong communities. As property rights strengthen, Palestinianhomeowners also will be able to utilize their home assets as loan collateral, which may be used for small business borrowing or capital investment, further stimulating the Palestinian economy and increasing employment.
From olive-wood carvings to exquisite embroidery, Palestinian craftsmanship has been in international demand for hundreds of years. Today, Palestinians have the opportunity to revive their legacy of high-quality manufacturing in the West Bank and Gaza. This program will support the development of state-of-the-art industrial zones and other manufacturing facilities in which Palestinian companies will benefit from tax and financing incentives that will lower the cost of doing business. Further, these specialized zones will provide companies with on-site services and training facilities in order to increase competitiveness and productivity. Part of the funding provided by this project will be dedicated to the development of joint facilities with neighboring countries, which will help enable the Palestinians and their neighbors to pool resources for their mutual benefit. Through this program, products made by Palestinians will be known for quality and value and have the potential fill the shelves of stores and warehouses around the world.
The West Bank and Gaza have significant endowments of stone and marble, hydrocarbons, and other minerals. This project will provide support for the development of major resource reserves, such as the Gaza Marine natural gas field, oil fields, and quarrying sites in the West Bank. It will also provide technical assistance to develop a regulatory framework for natural resource exploitation, including for shared resources along border areas. These resources have the potential to generate billions of dollars in revenue and create thousands of high-quality and good-paying Palestinian jobs.
The long-term economic outlook for the West Bank and Gaza is correlated to the economic strength and stability of neighboring countries. Presently, Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon—important markets for the Palestinians—face distinct economic challenges. This project will draw upon these countries’ national development plans to help them overcome obstacles to their economic growth by supporting efforts to provide reliable domestic electricity, improve water delivery, bolster private-sector businesses, strengthen financial institutions, and modernize public-sector services. These investments will reduce the risk of regional economic instability and create a significant opportunity for the Palestinians to increase exports, grow foreign direct investment, and build new business partnerships with companies in the region.
Regional integration and cooperation have the potential to create significant new economic opportunities for the Palestinianpeople. Just as Dubai and Singapore have benefited from their strategic locations and flourished as regional financial hubs, the West Bank and Gaza can ultimately develop into a regional trading center. This project will encourage the construction of new infrastructure to facilitate trade and transportation across the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, Egypt, Israel, and Lebanon. From the improvement of neighboring countries’ airports and seaports to the development of a regional natural gas trading hub in Egypt, this project will improve mobility in the region and unlock new trade opportunities for the Palestinian private sector.
To improve the economic prospects of the region as a whole, attention must be devoted to igniting organic growth in the private sectors of neighboring countries. Drawing from the lessons of Poland in the 1990s and Egypt and Tunisia after the Arab Spring in 2011, enterprise funds have had proven success in promoting growth by using public-sector seed money for investment funds targeting private equity and credit. Jordan, and possibly Lebanon and others, could benefit tremendously from new enterprise funds that support domestic companies. Such funds could invest equity capital into early-stage, promising private-sector businesses in these countries, create tens of thousands of new direct and indirect jobs for their citizens, and facilitate partnerships with employees and their companies and experts in industries around the world. Successful new enterprise funds in the Middle East region would benefit the West Bank and Gaza, and could provide the basis for larger regional enterprise funds or a dedicated West Bank and Gaza enterprise fund in the future.
From water pollution to electricity shortages, the countries of the region face many shared challenges. New developments along border areas between the West Bank and Gaza, Egypt, Israel, and Jordan can address many of these issues while generating new economic activity. This project will support the development of major wastewater treatment plants, desalination facilities, and power plants in and for this region. These improvements will provide necessary services to people in need, while also facilitating collaboration, integration, and cooperation between the governments of countries in the region.
The Palestinian tourism industry would benefit significantly from increased tourism activity in neighboring countries. Building on the appeal of attractions like the Egyptian Pyramids, the archaeological wonders of Petra in Jordan, and the beaches of Lebanon, the neighbors of West Bank and Gaza have immense potential to grow their tourism industries. This project will support private companies or public-private partnerships to develop tourism sites, transportation options, and hotel and restaurant accommodations across Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon. In tandem with these investments, this project envisions that these countries, in collaboration with the Palestinians, will develop a cohesive regional tourism strategy, including shared investment plans, marketing campaigns, and regional tourism packages.
PROJECT:
Regional Tourism
LOCATION:
West Bank and Gaza, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon
FINANCING:
Up to $1.5 billion in concessional financing
Up to $500 million in grants
PROJECT OVERVIEW:
With its culture, natural beauty, and historical and religious sites, the region has extraordinary tourism potential. This project will support private-sector domestic businesses and public-private partnerships to develop tourism sites and infrastructure in West Bank and Gaza, Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon. Additional funding will be allocated to develop a regional-tourism strategy and marketing campaign focused on increasing the number of tourists that travel to multiple countries in the region within a single trip. These investments have the potential to increase tourism to the region as a whole and attract tens of thousands of additional tourists to the West Bank and Gaza each year.
The greatest resource of every nation is its people.
The second initiative of Peace to Prosperity will unlock the vast potential of the Palestinian people by empowering them to pursue their goals and ambitions. This part of the vision will support the Palestinian people through four core programs.
The first program will ENHANCE THE QUALITY OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEM in the West Bank and Gaza and ensure that no Palestinian is disadvantaged by inadequate educational opportunity. This program will support the development and training of Palestinian educators while expanding access to educational opportunities to underserved communities and demographics. Other projects will help encourage educational reforms and innovation. By providing financial incentives to support the development of improved academic standards and curricula, this program will help turn the West Bank and Gaza into a center of educational excellence.
The second program will STRENGTHEN WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, reducing unemployment rates and increasing the occupational mobility of the Palestinian workforce. By supporting apprenticeships, career counseling, and job placement services, this program will help ensure Palestinian youth are fully prepared to enter the job market and achieve their professional goals. Additional projects will help employed workers receive the training they need to enhance their skills or change careers. Ultimately, this program will ensure that all Palestinians have access to the tools they need to compete in the global economy and take full advantage of the opportunities offered by this vision.
The third program will provide new resources and incentives to TRANSFORM THE PALESTINIAN HEALTHCARE SECTOR and ensure the Palestinian people have access to the care they need within the West Bank and Gaza. This program will rapidly increase the capacity of Palestinian hospitals by ensuring that they have the supplies, medicines, vaccines, and equipment to provide top-quality care and protect against health emergencies. Other funds will help improve services and standards in Palestinian healthcare facilities. Through targeted investments in new facilities, educational opportunities for medical staff and aspiring healthcare professionals, and public awareness campaigns to improve preventative care, this program will significantly improve health outcomes throughout the West Bank and Gaza.
The fourth program will support projects that IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF LIFE for the Palestinian people. From investments in new cultural institutions to financial support for Palestinian artists and musicians, this program will help the next generation of Palestinians explore their creativity and hone their talents. It will also support improved municipal services and the development of new public spaces across the West Bank and Gaza. These developments will help turn the West Bank and Gaza into a cultural and recreational center to the benefit of all Palestinians.
GOALS
From Birzeit to Bethlehem, strong academic programs exist in the West Bank and Gaza to educate Palestinians, yet the quality of education varies widely between institutions. This project will enhance educational quality and consistency throughout the West Bank and Gaza by focusing on educational outcomes. It will also provide financial incentives to public and privatePalestinian academic institutions to meet certain benchmarks, such as raising standards, improving curricula, and increasing post-graduation employment rates. In addition, expanding pre-service and in-service teacher training and certification opportunities will help ensure Palestinian teachers have the tools they need to help the next generation of Palestinians realize their full potential. Finally, this project will identify financial awards to recognize the accomplishments of Palestinian teachers and educational administrators who demonstrate success as measured by adopted metrics and standards.
PROJECT:
New Palestinian University
LOCATION:
West Bank and Gaza
FINANCING:
Up to $500 million in grants
PROJECT OVERVIEW:
To prepare Palestinian students to join the workforce of the 21st century, this project envisions the construction and development of a new flagship liberal arts and sciences university in the West Bank and Gaza. The project will incorporate input from Palestinianacademic leaders to construct facilities that use the latest technology to deliver the highest-quality education. Top teachers and administrators will be recruited to impact the lives of Palestinians who are eager to learn and succeed academically. This project will also develop partnerships between the new university and top institutions abroad, which will incentivize academic exchanges and distance learning programs forPalestinian students and teachers. A separate Educational Affordability program will help ensure this university remains accessible to the general Palestinian public.
While Palestinians have among the highest graduation rates in the region, many Palestinian schools are stretched beyond their capacity, with too few teachers and classrooms to support their students. To ensure all Palestinians have access to quality education, priority will be placed on expanding the capacity of early childhood, primary, and secondary schools, with a focus on supporting schools operating in underserved communities. This project will enable schools to expand their infrastructure and hire new teachers. To improve higher education, this project will support the creation of a new university in the West Bank and Gaza. Modeled after successful initiatives in the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, this new landmark institution will provide Palestinian students with direct access to a top international institution without leaving home.
Like many students around the world, young Palestinians often encounter financial constraints that limit their educational opportunities. This project will reduce the financial burden on Palestinian students by expanding the resources available to finance their education. Peace to Prosperity will support a scholarship program whereby colleges and universities from around the world are encouraged to provide full and partial scholarships for Palestinian students to study abroad and obtain a world-class education. Palestinian banks will be offered technical assistance to support responsible student-lending, which will provide Palestinians options to supplement their scholarships and enroll in a quality academic program. Following graduation, these students would be expected to return home, as is typical in other countries with similar programs, to become a core element of the future generation of leaders in the West Bank and Gaza.
Whether for a recent female tech graduate or a craftsman with 20 years of experience, building a brighter future in the West Bank and Gaza will require the contributions of all Palestinians. Unfortunately, Palestinians currently experience one of the highest youth-unemployment rates in the world. Equally problematic, while Palestinian women achieve higher levels of educational attainment than Palestinian men, Palestinian women constitute only a small percentage of the Palestinianworkforce. By providing the Palestinian public sector with policy advice on best practices, encouraging private-sector attention to this problem, and promoting a comprehensive strategy to empower youth and women, more women and youth will join the Palestinian labor force. Peace to Prosperity envisions a West Bank and Gaza where youth and women become entrepreneurs and business owners, have access to capital, and learn the skills needed to succeed. This project will increase job placement rates for Palestinian youth and women by providing them with career counseling, specialized training, and job placement services in a concentrated effort to employ them in higher-wage, high-growth occupations.
PROJECT:
Career Counseling and Job Placement
LOCATION:
West Bank and Gaza
FINANCING:
Up to $30 million in grants
PROJECT OVERVIEW:
Peace to Prosperity envisions women within the West Bank and Gaza receiving the financing, market opportunities, and workforce training to succeed as entrepreneurs and private businessowners. As a part of promoting the adoption of a comprehensive strategy to advance economic opportunities for women, this project will support the development of a central institution to facilitate career counseling and job-placement services for women and young Palestinians throughout the West Bank and Gaza. This institution will be connected to Palestinian universities and local chambers of commerce to coordinate with career services centers and recommend curriculum improvements. It will also serve as a job portal, providing Palestinian youth and women access to listings for potential jobs, as well as resume guidance and other services.
For hundreds of years, the Arab world was the global center of science and mathematics. But, in modern times, neither the West Bank nor Gaza has kept pace with the leaders in these fields. Peace to Prosperity will support the Palestinian scientific community by generating research and employment opportunities in the West Bank and Gaza. This program will sponsor research and development partnerships between Palestinian and international companies and global research institutions, while also encouraging international firms to partner with Palestinians in the development of new commercial technologies and scientific research. Those efforts should create many more opportunities for Palestinian science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) students.
From students who graduate without the training and skills to perform the jobs companies need, to employers who seek well-taught, workforce-ready employees, more and better technical and vocational education is both sought and needed in the West Bank and Gaza. Drawing from successful models such as those deployed in Germany and Sweden, and using the tools of community college and distance-learning programs, this project expands overall enrollment capacity in technical and vocational institutions and tailors educational training to improve marketability and employability for students. This project also supports the development of new partnerships between these institutions and Palestinian companies to ensure students coming out of school have a relevant knowledge of the workplace, a better understanding of employers’ expectations, and a higher likelihood of success entering the workforce.
Peace to Prosperity seeks to expand opportunities for on-the-job training and pre-graduation work experience for Palestinianstudents, with a particular focus on STEM fields. By partnering with the Palestinian public sector, the private sector, and non-profit organizations to develop new internship and apprenticeship programs for Palestinian students, this program will help Palestinian students gain work experience, identify gaps in their skill sets, and adjust their coursework accordingly. The goal of this project is to ensure that all Palestinians enrolled in universities and vocational schools have opportunities to intern or train at an institution that matches with their career goals, thereby increasing the likelihood they develop the skills needed for the jobs of the future and secure post-graduation gainful employment.
To improve productivity and occupational mobility, employed Palestinians need access to training and educational opportunities that will help them develop new skills and advance their careers. This project will provide financial incentives to private-sector companies to develop training centers for their employees. These new facilities will be housed within industrial zones, which will be areas within the West Bank and Gaza designed to encourage investment and employment through preferential tax treatment. This project will also support Palestinians seeking to change careers by providing scholarships and fellowships to empower them to pursue new training and educational opportunities in Palestinianuniversities and vocational schools.
Deficiencies of staff, medicine, equipment, and supplies in Palestinian medical facilities cause gaps in the Palestinianhealthcare system and force many Palestinians to forgo care or travel abroad to receive the care they need. In the near term, this project will support the deployment of more mobile and neighborhood clinics to meet the healthcare needs of underservedPalestinian communities and provide financial support to ensure hospitals and clinics receive medicine and equipment to improve treatment for those most in need of care. Other, later-stage projects will outfit public hospitals with new, state-of-the-art equipment to improve their ability to treat a variety of ailments and diseases—reducing both wait times and the number of Palestinians that must be referred to hospitals abroad for treatment.
PROJECT:
Strengthening Palestinian Hospitals and Clinics
LOCATION:
West Bank and Gaza
FINANCING:
Up to $300 million in grant funding
Up to $600 million in concessional financing
PROJECT OVERVIEW:
The Palestinian healthcare system requires better medical facilities to enhance treatment capabilities. This project envisions the development of new private specialized treatment centers, ensuring Palestinians are able to receive quality treatment for a wide range of illnesses and conditions within the West Bank and Gaza, while partnering with Palestinian health offcials to focus on cost-control and afordability reforms.
The shortage of resources within the Palestinian healthcare system has made it challenging for healthcare professionals to fully focus on improving quality standards and for Palestinian medical institutions to meet the highest standards and achieve international accreditation. This project will support technical and private-sector experts assisting hospitals and clinics in identifying areas for improvement and provide them with the resources to address existing needs. To further improve quality of care, this project will encourage doctors, nurses, and other medical staff to pursue international certifications, trainings, and research opportunities. These skilled professionals and modernized facilities can provide the foundation for the long-term quality of healthcare in the West Bank and Gaza.
The threat of non-communicable diseases in the West Bank and Gaza is growing and made worse by the lack of primary and secondary prevention programs. This project will help Palestinian healthcare facilities expand the availability of services like vaccines, family-health-history assessments, and regular physical and mental-health checkups. This project will also finance a public-awareness campaign to inform the people about healthcare risks and the resources available to them within thePalestinian healthcare system. These efforts will reduce long-term healthcare costs and help the Palestinian people lead longer, healthier lives.
From ancient to modern times, the West Bank and Gaza have been a center of arts and culture. They are home to many of the region’s most renowned artists and poets and are steeped in historic traditions, like the annual Nabi Musa festival. This great cultural legacy should be celebrated and supported. Working with Palestinian cultural institutions, this project will lift up the next generation of great Palestinian artists, musicians, and writers. Palestinians will have the opportunity to apply for year-long fellowships to study, train, and work in artistic and cultural fields at home and abroad. Other grants will finance the development of new cultural centers and museums across the West Bank and Gaza. These institutions will showcase the richness of Palestinian history and culture for thousands of local and international visitors each day.
In addition to improving public health, sports and athletics can help Palestinian youth foster new ties with their peers and within their communities, and Palestinian teams can be a source of entertainment and pride for all Palestinians. This project will expand options for competitive, healthy activities for Palestinians through the construction of public athletic facilities in the West Bank and Gaza. This project seeks to inspire the next generation of Palestinian athletes dreaming to be on, and training for, future Palestinian teams competing on the world stage.
PROJECT:
Urban Renewal
LOCATION:
West Bank and Gaza
FINANCING:
Up to $200 million in grant funding
PROJECT OVERVIEW:
Working with top Palestinian urban planners, this project will assist Palestinian municipalities in developing and rehabilitating infrastructure which will improve the quality of life within Palestinian urban areas. These funds will finance the development of sidewalks, libraries, parks, and other public spaces in cities and towns. They will also support the renovation of public buildings and other revitalization projects that beautify and improve urban areas across the West Bank and Gaza.
Palestinian municipalities lack the resources to deliver the basic services their citizens require to thrive. This project will improve services in Palestinian cities and towns by providing short-term funding to municipalities and non-governmental organizations focused on improving the lives of local citizens. These funds will allow local governments and institutions to improve basic services, including trash collection, emergency assistance, and traffic management. This funding will be linked to a series of reforms that will put Palestinian municipalities on a path toward independently funding and sustainably providing public services. Other funding will support the development of public spaces across the West Bank and Gaza, givingPalestinians more opportunities to spend time outdoors with their families and friends while also helping attract tourism to the West Bank and Gaza.
While implementing Peace to Prosperity will require significant international support, no vision for the Palestinians can be realized without the full support of thePalestinian people and their leadership.
The third and final initiative of Peace to Prosperity seeks to encourage the Palestinian public sector to provide the services and administration necessary for the Palestinian people to have a better future. If the government realizes its potential by investing in its people and adopting the foundational elements identified in Peace to Prosperity, job growth will ensue and the Palestinian people and their economy will thrive. This vision establishes a path that, in partnership with the Palestinianpublic sector, will enable prosperity through three programs.
The first program of this initiative will help the Palestinian public sector TRANSFORM THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT through private property rights; safeguards against corruption; access to credit; functioning capital markets along with pro-growth policies and regulations; and certainty and predictability for investors that result in economic growth, private-sector job creation, and increased exports and foreign direct investment. Just as the Japanese, South Korean, and Singaporean governments rose to meet the daunting challenges their societies faced at critical times in their respective histories, so too can the Palestinian leadership chart a new course for its people. This program identifies and addresses the requirements for developing human capital, igniting innovation, creating and growing small and medium businesses, and attracting international companies that will invest in the future of the West Bank and Gaza.
The second program will invest in projects that BUILD THE INSTITUTIONS of the Palestinian public sector and enhance government responsiveness to the people. Through this program, government attention will be directed to increase judicial independence and grow civil society organizations. A stronger court system will better protect and secure the rights and property of the citizens. More government transparency will help foster trust from Palestinians—and outside investors—that court decisions are made fairly, contracts are awarded and enforced honestly, and business investments are safe.
The final program will IMPROVE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS and the provision of services to the Palestinian people. In line with successful private-sector models, the Palestinian public sector must strive to be fiscally stable, financially independent, caring to its workers, and efficient in providing services to its citizens. This program will work to eliminate public-sector arrears and implement a budgeting and tax plan that promotes long-term fiscal sustainability, without the need for budget support or donor funds. It will also assist with the adoption of new technologies that can providePalestinian citizens the ability to directly request and access government support and services. The program will offer new training and opportunities for civil servants to improve their productivity, help prepare them to meet governance challenges, and make it easier for them to perform their jobs. And, finally, this program aims to provide government services at low cost and high efficiency, which will facilitate private-sector growth.
GOALS
Private property rights and legal protections for business owners are prerequisites for sustainable economic development. Through this program, the Palestinian public sector will receive assistance in creating and improving the legal frameworks that advance systems of commercial law, competition law, bankruptcy law, and contract law. This program will work with thePalestinian public sector to clearly define private property rights, develop institutional protections for property owners, and register land ownership in a national database. Land registration is a critical step in the transformation of the Palestinianeconomy, which will unlock property for use as collateral for capital and eliminate many existing barriers to development. Ultimately, Peace to Prosperity envisions Palestinians having the opportunity to develop and modernize cities, villages, industrial areas, and agricultural lands, potentially generating billions of dollars in new economic activity. Strong property rights are critical to realizing this future.
Long-term economic growth requires a legal and tax framework that supports the private sector and attracts investment. This project will provide technical and financial assistance to the Palestinian public sector to transition toward a pro-growth tax structure, install improved anti-corruption measures, open capital markets, and develop regulatory reforms that support economic growth. By developing new laws and regulations that increase competition, protect intellectual property and contract rights, and ensure legal recourse, this project will help give businesses the confidence they need to make new investments and expand existing operations. This project will also support ongoing efforts to develop a one-stop-shop forPalestinian business registration, which could dramatically reduce the cost and time required to start a company. These reforms will help ensure all Palestinians—not just major corporations—are able to take full advantage of the opportunities created by this vision.
PROJECT:
Land Registration
LOCATION:
West Bank and Gaza
FINANCING:
Up to $30 million in grant funding
PROJECT OVERVIEW:
This program will help Palestinian property owners quickly register their land assets in a single database. Implemented in partnership with development institutions and thePalestinian public sector, it will help resolve contestedland ownership claims and clearly define private property rights. Reinforcing private property rights provides the security necessary for productive investments, while ensuring that owners are able to gain access to capital by mortgaging or selling their property.
The Palestinian financial sector will be a critical partner in the implementation of Peace to Prosperity. This program will bolster the capacity of the financial authorities and private sector Palestinian banks to promote the health of the domestic financial system while facilitating an increase in productive lending, particularly to small and medium businesses. Palestinian banking authorities must be able to work with domestic banks to expand their capabilities to support a growing Palestinian business sector and to be effective channels for foreign investment and capital flows. Specifically, technical assistance will support efforts to preserve correspondent banking relations, optimize bank-lending practices, and build the capacity of financial authorities to regulate the banking sector and manage a portfolio of securities.
In addition to infrastructure expansion, increasing Palestinian exports will require the development of new trade policies. Under this program, robust technical support will help the applicable Palestinian authorities to establish a fair and reciprocal trade regime, manage commercial crossing points, and implement regulatory reforms that attract new trading partners. In parallel with these efforts, this project will bring multinational corporate leaders to the West Bank and Gaza and facilitate international investor conferences that raise awareness of opportunities to partner with, and invest in, Palestinian companies. Technical experts will also work with Palestinian officials to help them develop beneficial free trade agreements. ExpandedPalestinian regional and international trade will be central to the long-term growth of the Palestinian economy, and a focus onPalestinian exports will compel domestic companies to increase efficiency and quality to compete successfully in international markets.
In accord with the principles of rule of law and separation of powers, the independence of the Palestinian judicial branch must be reassessed and strengthened. A strong judiciary and reliable court system allow businesses to know that their investments will be secure and that their companies and the products they create will be protected from unfair treatment. Confidence in legal matters is a critical element of business risk reduction, which attracts private capital and foreign investment. To this end, this project will partner with the Palestinian authorities to encourage laws and regulations that secure the independence of the judicial system. It will invest in building the capacity of the courts, with a particular focus on enhancing their ability to handle cases covering potential government abuse. In addition, this program will promote legal education, which will, among other things, help leaders better identify legal and regulatory reforms that would improve the government procurement process and the overall business environment.
PROJECT:
Palestinian E-Governance
LOCATION:
West Bank and Gaza
FINANCING:
Up to $300 million in grant funding
PROJECT OVERVIEW:
This project will fund the development of a central online e-government system. Modeled after similar systems implemented in countries like Estonia, this portal will empower government ministries and everyday Palestinian citizens to share information and communicate in real time. Through this system, Palestinians will be able to request information from public-sector institutions regarding decisions and policies. This system will also allow Palestinians to request public-sector services, as discussed in the Service Delivery project.
Good governance requires rigorous systems that empower people to hold institutions accountable. Palestinians contribute tax revenue with the expectation that their government will spend it responsibly to provide services efficiently and effectively.Palestinians should have more and better avenues to seek accountability for allegations of government waste, fraud, and abuse; episodes of government corruption; instances of unfair or atypical decisions in criminal cases; and unnecessary obstacles to the creation or growth of a business. In order for the Palestinian people to build confidence in their government, they need mechanisms to express their concerns and see actions in response. This project will enhance the capacity ofPalestinian anti-corruption institutions, including their capability to investigate allegations of corruption and mismanagement and to refer findings to competent domestic authorities without interference. This program will also provide technical and financial assistance to expand the capacity of the internal government auditor—empowering it to review public-sector expenditures and investigate anomalies in a timely and transparent manner.
For the people to hold their government accountable, government policy decisions, the legislative process, and public-sector actions regarding procurement, contracts, licenses, and hiring need to be transparent. Palestinians should know how their government spends taxpayer money, and the government can improve its performance by making better use of the internet and digital platforms. New technologies have allowed and encouraged governments worldwide to improve transparency and accountability measures to the benefit of their citizens. This project will support the Palestinian institutions in adopting enhancements that improve public-sector transparency and communication directly with the Palestinian people. In order to sustain a future of prosperity, the Palestinian leadership owes its people a commitment to transparent governance, which inspires confidence in a bright future of opportunity.
Robust civil society institutions and a free press are important parts of any well-functioning democracy. Preserving and expanding these important institutions within the West Bank and Gaza will require new laws and practices that protect their independence and improve their capacity. To support these efforts, this project will provide training to Palestinian officials to help them enhance protections for civil society and ensure the freedom of the press. It will also support civil society organizations by identifying the resources needed to perform their important functions.
To promote the long-term health of the Palestinian economy, the Palestinian public sector must have a fiscally-sustainable budget. Under this project, technical experts will advise the Palestinian financial authorities on developing a plan to put the government on a path towards fiscal sustainability, with focuses on ending reliance on donor aid, efficiently raising domestic tax revenue, and increasing capacity to manage a portfolio of government securities. To support this effort, this project will provide short-term financial support to the Palestinian public sector to pay off its arrears to the private sector. It will support the deployment of new systems that build in accountability and transparency and that enable the applicable Palestinianauthorities to manage revenue collection at all commercial crossings and other ports of entry. The project will require thePalestinian public sector to implement systems that improve the efficiency, accountability, and transparency of payment collections for services such as electricity and water, which will help to reduce the long-term costs for consumers and encourage private investment.
PROJECT:
Attracting Global Expertise
LOCATION:
West Bank and Gaza
FINANCING:
Up to $100 million in grant funding
PROJECT OVERVIEW:
The Palestinian diaspora ofers a tremendous potential source of talent for the Palestinian economy. Peace to Prosperity will require a significant increase in human capital capacity, and this project will support eforts to bring together and empower talented Palestinians and other experts from around the world to implement it.
Good Palestinian governance requires commitment to its customers: the Palestinian people. Government’s core missions, top goals, and strategic objectives should be developed and aligned to increase the prosperity of the citizenry. To improve the quality of government employees in the West Bank and Gaza, this project will support the development of new educational programs and leadership training for civil servants, with a rigorous curriculum that focuses on being responsive to the needs of the people and providing excellent customer service. These programs will provide the next generation of Palestinian officials with skills in leadership, teamwork, negotiations, financial management, policy-making, and communications, while also promoting a culture of service and accountability. Performance metrics will be identified and career advancement will be rewarded based on measurable results. Leaders will learn to identify, prioritize, and showcase the government’s most important goals—and metrics for those goals—to best produce outcomes that will improve life in the West Bank and Gaza and grow the economy. Progress against baselines will be measured, tracked, and produced on the internet for the citizens to hold their government accountable for success. Measurements for growth in exports, foreign direct investment, and job growth are examples of metrics that can easily be evaluated and published.
A revitalized Palestinian economy will require modernized Palestinian public-sector services and institutions. This project will assist the applicable Palestinian authorities in implementing a comprehensive strategy to ensure the efficient delivery of services to its people. This effort will expand online government services, including payment services, utility management, school registration, and passport applications. These same systems will allow Palestinians to track the status of their requests and other performance indicators. To further boost the delivery of services, this project will work with the government to identify opportunities for public-private partnerships and to privatize services for which the private sector has a stronger, proven performance record.
Peace to Prosperity lays out a vision for a prosperous Palestinian society supported by a robust private sector, an empowered people, and an effective government. It shows what is possible with peace plus investment, and how success is achievable through specific programs supported by a portfolio of realizable projects.
Peace to Prosperity is a realistic and achievable plan that can be implemented by the Palestinians, with the support of the international community, to build a better future for the Palestinians and their children. Through this vision, the West Bank and Gaza can provide a future of dignity and opportunity for the Palestinian people.
 
To better understand how language has shaped the political discourse, we also read through seven of the most notable documents that have featured in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Within each document, we used text summarisation techniques to count the number of times key topics were mentioned and, perhaps more interestingly, – not mentioned.
The result is a series of graphics that reveal how the use of key topics has changed over the past century.
 
Prior to the creation of Israel in 1948, “Palestine” and the “Government of Palestine” were used several times to refer to the Palestinian state.
There is no mention of Palestine as a state in either UN resolution 242 (1967), Resolution 478 (1980), or the Oslo Accords (1993). In fact, it was only in 2002 – in the Arab peace initiative – that The Council of the League of Arab States called for the “establishment of a Sovereign Independent Palestinian State”.
Trump’s new plan says the “United States will support the establishment of a Palestinian State” but only under a long list of preconditions.
 
The first mention of “Israel” in these documents was in UN resolution 242 (1967) which called for the “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict”.
In 1967, Israel completely occupied Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.
Trump’s new plan repeatedly refers to the “State of Israel” and “the Palestinians”, further highlighting the disparity between the two.
 
Jerusalem, the holy city shared by Muslims, Christians and Jews, features prominently in UN Security Council Resolution 478 (1980).
The resolution rejected Israel’s claim to Jerusalem as the “complete and united” capital of Israel and was adopted with 14 votes to none, with the United States abstaining.
Trump’s 2020 plan contradicts Resolution 478 by calling for Jerusalem to “remain the sovereign capital of the State of Israel”.
 
Hundreds of thousands of refugees fled to neighbouring Arab states in 1948 and again in after the war in 1967.
According to UN Resolution 194 (1948): “Refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so.”
Under Trump’s new plan, the “Right of Return” of Palestinian refugees, which is a universally recognised right in international refugee law, is mentioned once but only to say – “there shall be no right of return”.
 
The Israeli occupation is the largest and longest-lasting occupation of modern times.
Israel militarily occupied the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, in June 1967.
The term “occupation” is strikingly missing from Trump’s 2020 plan. The only mention of the word is as a synonym for job or profession.
 
Israel’s building of settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories is illegal under international law.
By 2018, there were 611,000 Israeli settlers living in 250 settlements in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem.
Trump’s 2020 plan legitimises these settlements and says that Israel “will not have to uproot any settlements, and will incorporate the vast majority of Israeli settlements into contiguous Israeli territory.”
 
Trump’s plan repeatedly describes Israel as the “Jewish State”.
This language has not been used to refer to the State of Israel since prior to its founding in 1948.
The Balfour Declaration (1917), which was a public pledge by Britain, promised the establishment of “a national home for the Jewish people” in Palestine.
 
The international community as represented by the UN has overwhelmingly condemned Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian Territories.
In 1947, the UN General Assembly voted in favour of partitioning Palestine between Jews (with control of 55% of the land) and Palestinians (with 45%).
Trump’s new conceptual map would annex huge parts of the occupied West Bank and give Palestinians control of only 15% of historical Palestine.

The Balfour Declaration was a 67-word letter written by British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour on behalf of Britain’s government, promising the “establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people”. The letter was addressed to British Jewish community leader, Lord Lionel Walter Rothschild. The letter affirmed that “nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine”, without any mention of political rights.
Topics:
Missing Topics:
Countries:
Hover over the small text below to read the full document:
November 2nd, 1917
Dear Lord Rothschild,
I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty’s Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.
“His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.”
I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.
Yours sincerely,
Arthur James Balfour
UN General Assembly Resolution 181 was the resolution that adopted the partition plan for Palestine (see map below). The resolution recommended the withdrawal of Britain and the termination of the Mandate, leaving behind two states in the county: Arab and Jewish. This plan was never implemented on the ground.
Topics:
Missing Topics:
Countries:
Hover over the small text below to read the full document:
November 29, 1947
The General Assembly, Having met in special session at the request of the mandatory Power to constitute and instruct a Special Committee to prepare for the consideration of the question of the future Government of Palestine at the second regular session;
Having constituted a Special Committee and instructed it to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine, and to prepare proposals for the solution of the problem, and
Having received and examined the report of the Special Committee (document A/364)(1) including a number of unanimous recommendations and a plan of partition with economic union approved by the majority of the Special Committee,
Considers that the present situation in Palestine is one which is likely to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations;
Takes note of the declaration by the mandatory Power that it plans to complete its evacuation of Palestine by August 1948;
Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future Government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out below;
Requests that
The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation;
The Security Council consider, if circumstances during the transitional period require such consideration, whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace. If it decides that such a threat exists, and in order to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council should supplement the authorization of the General Assembly by taking measures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to empower the United Nations Commission, as provided in this resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to it by this resolution;
The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution;
The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsibilities envisaged for it in this plan;
Calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put this plan into effect;
Appeals to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking any action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations, and
Authorizes the Secretary-General to reimburse travel and subsistence expenses of the members of the Commission referred to in Part 1, Section B, Paragraph I below, on such basis and in such form as he may determine most appropriate in the circumstances, and to provide the Commission with the necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to the Commission by the General Assembly.*
The General Assembly,
Authorizes the Secretary-General to draw from the Working Capital Fund a sum not to exceed 2,000,000 dollars for the purposes set forth in the last paragraph of the resolution on the future government of Palestine.
PLAN OF PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION
The Mandate for Palestine shall terminate as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.
The armed forces of the mandatory Power shall be progressively withdrawn from Palestine, the withdrawal to be completed as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.
The mandatory Power shall advise the Commission, as far in advance as possible, of its intention to terminate the mandate and to evacuate each area. The mandatory Power shall use its best endeavours to ensure that an area situated in the territory of the Jewish State, including a seaport and hinterland adequate to provide facilities for a substantial immigration, shall be evacuated at the earliest possible date and in any event not later than 1 February 1948.
Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in Part III of this Plan, shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory Power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948. The boundaries of the Arab State, the Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem shall be as described in Parts II and III below.
The period between the adoption by the General Assembly of its recommendation on the question of Palestine and the establishment of the independence of the Arab and Jewish States shall be a transitional period.
A Commission shall be set up consisting of one representative of each of five Member States. The Members represented on the Commission shall be elected by the General Assembly on as broad a basis, geographically and otherwise, as possible.
The administration of Palestine shall, as the mandatory Power withdraws its armed forces, be progressively turned over to the Commission, which shall act in conformity with the recommendations of the General Assembly, under the guidance of the Security Council. The mandatory Power shall to the fullest possible extent coordinate its plans for withdrawal with the plans of the Commission to take over and administer areas which have been evacuated.
In the discharge of this administrative responsibility the Commission shall have authority to issue necessary regulations and take other measures as required.
The mandatory Power shall not take any action to prevent, obstruct or delay the implementation by the Commission of the measures recommended by the General Assembly.
On its arrival in Palestine the Commission shall proceed to carry out measures for the establishment of the frontiers of the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem in accordance with the general lines of the recommendations of the General Assembly on the partition of Palestine. Nevertheless, the boundaries as described in Part II of this Plan are to be modified in such a way that village areas as a rule will not be divided by state boundaries unless pressing reasons make that necessary.
The Commission, after consultation with the democratic parties and other public organizations of the Arab and Jewish States, shall select and establish in each State as rapidly as possible a Provisional Council of Government. The activities of both the Arab and Jewish Provisional Councils of Government shall be carried out under the general direction of the Commission.
If by 1 April 1948 a Provisional Council of Government cannot be selected for either of the States, or, if selected, cannot carry out its functions, the Commission shall communicate that fact to the Security Council for such action with respect to that State as the Security Council may deem proper, and to the Secretary-General for communication to the Members of the United Nations.
Subject to the provisions of these recommendations, during the transitional period the Provisional Councils of Government, acting under the Commission, shall have full authority in the areas under their control including authority over matters of immigration and land regulation.
The Provisional Council of Government of each State, acting under the Commission, shall progressively receive from the Commission full responsibility for the administration of that State in the period between the termination of the Mandate and the establishment of the State’s independence.
The Commission shall instruct the Provisional Councils of Government of both the Arab and Jewish States, after their formation, to proceed to the establishment of administrative organs of government, central and local.
The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, within the shortest time possible, recruit an armed militia from the residents of that State, sufficient in number to maintain internal order and to prevent frontier clashes.
This armed militia in each State shall, for operational purposes, be under the command of Jewish or Arab officers resident in that State, but general political and military control, including the choice of the militia’s High Command, shall be exercised by the Commission.
The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, not later than two months after the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, hold elections to the Constituent Assembly which shall be conducted on democratic lines.
The election regulations in each State shall be drawn up by the Provisional Council of Government and approved by the Commission. Qualified voters for each State for this election shall be persons over eighteen years of age who are (a) Palestinian citizens residing in that State; and (b) Arabs and Jews residing in the State, although not Palestinian citizens, who, before voting, have signed a notice of intention to become citizens of such State.
Arabs and Jews residing in the City of Jerusalem who have signed a notice of intention to become citizens, the Arabs of the Arab State and the Jews of the Jewish State, shall be entitled to vote in the Arab and Jewish States respectively.
Women may vote and be elected to the Constituent Assemblies.
During the transitional period no Jew shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Arab State, and no Arab shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Jewish State, except by special leave of the Commission.
The Constituent Assembly of each State shall draft a democratic constitution for its State and choose a provisional government to succeed the Provisional Council of Government appointed by the Commission. The Constitutions of the States shall embody Chapters 1 and 2 of the Declaration provided for in section C below and include, inter alia, provisions for:
Establishing in each State a legislative body elected by universal suffrage and by secret ballot on the basis of proportional representation, and an executive body responsible to the legislature;
Settling all international disputes in which the State may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;
Accepting the obligation of the State to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations;
Guaranteeing to all persons equal and non-discriminatory rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion, language, speech and publication, education, assembly and association;
Preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents and citizens of the other State in Palestine and the City of Jerusalem, subject to considerations of national security, provided that each State shall control residence within its borders.
The Commission shall appoint a preparatory economic commission of three members to make whatever arrangements are possible for economic co-operation, with a view to establishing, as soon as practicable, the Economic Union and the Joint Economic Board, as provided in section D below.
During the period between the adoption of the recommendations on the question of Palestine by the General Assembly and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power in Palestine shall maintain full responsibility for administration in areas from which it has not withdrawn its armed forces. The Commission shall assist the mandatory Power in the carrying out of these functions. Similarly the mandatory Power shall co-operate with the Commission in the execution of its functions.
With a view to ensuring that there shall be continuity in the functioning of administrative services and that, on the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, the whole administration shall be in the charge of the Provisional Councils and the Joint Economic Board, respectively, acting under the Commission, there shall be a progressive transfer, from the mandatory Power to the Commission, of responsibility for all the functions of government, including that of maintaining law and order in the areas from which the forces of the mandatory Power have been withdrawn.
The Commission shall be guided in its activities by the recommendations of the General Assembly and by such instructions as the Security Council may consider necessary to issue.
The measures taken by the Commission, within the recommendations of the General Assembly, shall become immediately effective unless the Commission has previously received contrary instructions from the Security Council.
The Commission shall render periodic monthly progress reports, or more frequently if desirable, to the Security Council.
The Commission shall make its final report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to the Security Council simultaneously.
A declaration shall be made to the United Nations by the Provisional Government of each proposed State before independence. It shall contain, inter alia, the following clauses:
The stipulations contained in the Declaration are recognized as fundamental laws of the State and no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.
Chapter 1: Holy Places, Religious Buildings and Sites
Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.
In so far as Holy Places are concerned, the liberty of access, visit, and transit shall be guaranteed, in conformity with existing rights, to all residents and citizen of the other State and of the City of Jerusalem, as well as to aliens, without distinction as to nationality, subject to requirements of national security, public order and decorum.
Similarly, freedom of worship shall be guaranteed in conformity with existing rights, subject to the maintenance of public order and decorum.
Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in an way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Government that any particular Holy Place, religious, building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Government may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Government may carry it out itself at the expense of the community or community concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.
No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the State.
No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly’s recommendations.
The Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall have the right to determine whether the provisions of the Constitution of the State in relation to Holy Places, religious buildings and sites within the borders of the State and the religious rights appertaining thereto, are being properly applied and respected, and to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community with respect to such places, buildings and sites. He shall receive full co-operation and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of his functions in the State.
Chapter 2: Religious and Minority Rights
Freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, shall be ensured to all.
No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the ground of race, religion, language or sex.
All persons within the jurisdiction of the State shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.
The family law and personal status of the various minorities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.
Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.
The State shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish minority, respectively, in its own language and its cultural traditions.
The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the State may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.
No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any citizen of the State of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.(3)
No expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the Jewish State (by a Jew in the Arab State)(4) shall be allowed except for public purposes. In all cases of expropriation full compensation as fixed by the Supreme Court shall be said previous to dispossession.
Chapter 3: Citizenship, International Conventions and Financial Obligations
1. Citizenship Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, reside in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem shall, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they are resident and enjoy full civil and political rights. Persons over the age of eighteen years may opt, within one year from the date of recognition of independence of the State in which they reside, for citizenship of the other State, providing that no Arab residing in the area of the proposed Arab State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Jewish State and no Jew residing in the proposed Jewish State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Arab State. The exercise of this right of option will be taken to include the wives and children under eighteen years of age of persons so opting.
Arabs residing in the area of the proposed Jewish State and Jews residing in the area of the proposed Arab State who have signed a notice of intention to opt for citizenship of the other State shall be eligible to vote in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of that State, but not in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of the State in which they reside.
2. International conventions
The State shall be bound by all the international agreements and conventions, both general and special, to which Palestine has become a party. Subject to any right of denunciation provided for therein, such agreements and conventions shall be respected by the State throughout the period for which they were concluded.
Any dispute about the applicability and continued validity of international conventions or treaties signed or adhered to by the mandatory Power on behalf of Palestine shall be referred to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.
3. Financial obligations
The State shall respect and fulfil all financial obligations of whatever nature assumed on behalf of Palestine by the mandatory Power during the exercise of the Mandate and recognized by the State. This provision includes the right of public servants to pensions, compensation or gratuities.
These obligations shall be fulfilled through participation in the Joint Economic Board in respect of those obligations applicable to Palestine as a whole, and individually in respect of those applicable to, and fairly apportionable between, the States.
A Court of Claims, affiliated with the Joint Economic Board, and composed of one member appointed by the United Nations, one representative of the United Kingdom and one representative of the State concerned, should be established. Any dispute between the United Kingdom and the State respecting claims not recognized by the latter should be referred to that Court.
Commercial concessions granted in respect of any part of Palestine prior to the adoption of the resolution by the General Assembly shall continue to be valid according to their terms, unless modified by agreement between the concession-holders and the State.
Chapter 4: Miscellaneous Provisions
The provisions of chapters 1 and 2 of the declaration shall be under the guarantee of the United Nations, and no modifications shall be made in them without the assent of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Any Member of the United Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the General Assembly any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these stipulations, and the General Assembly may thereupon make such recommendations as it may deem proper in the circumstances.
Any dispute relating to the application or interpretation of this declaration shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.
The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall enter into an undertaking with respect to Economic Union and Transit. This undertaking shall be drafted by the Commission provided for in section B, paragraph 1, utilizing to the greatest possible extent the advice and cooperation of representative organizations and bodies from each of the proposed States. It shall contain provisions to establish the Economic Union of Palestine and provide for other matters of common interest. If by 1 April 1948 the Provisional Councils of Government have not entered into the undertaking, the undertaking shall be put into force by the Commission.
The Economic Union of Palestine
The objectives of the Economic Union of Palestine shall be:
A joint currency system providing for a single foreign exchange rate;
Operation in the common interest on a non-discriminatory basis of railways inter-State highways; postal, telephone and telegraphic services and ports and airports involved in international trade and commerce;
Joint economic development, especially in respect of irrigation, land reclamation and soil conservation;
Access for both States and for the City of Jerusalem on a non-discriminatory basis to water and power facilities.
There shall be established a Joint Economic Board, which shall consist of three representatives of each of the two States and three foreign members appointed by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The foreign members shall be appointed in the first instance for a term of three years; they shall serve as individuals and not as representatives of States.
The functions of the Joint Economic Board shall be to implement either directly or by delegation the measures necessary to realize the objectives of the Economic Union. It shall have all powers of organization and administration necessary to fulfil its functions.
The States shall bind themselves to put into effect the decisions of the Joint Economic Board. The Board’s decisions shall be taken by a majority vote.
In the event of failure of a State to take the necessary action the Board may, by a vote of six members, decide to withhold an appropriate portion of the part of the customs revenue to which the State in question is entitled under the Economic Union. Should the State persist in its failure to cooperate, the Board may decide by a simple majority vote upon such further sanctions, including disposition of funds which it has withheld, as it may deem appropriate.
In relation to economic development, the functions of the Board shall be planning, investigation and encouragement of joint development projects, but it shall not undertake such projects except with the assent of both States and the City of Jerusalem, in the event that Jerusalem is directly involved in the development project.
In regard to the joint currency system, the currencies circulating in the two States and the City of Jerusalem shall be issued under the authority of the Joint Economic Board, which shall be the sole issuing authority and which shall determine the reserves to be held against such currencies.
So far as is consistent with paragraph 2(b) above, each State may operate its own central bank, control its own fiscal and credit policy, its foreign exchange receipts and expenditures, the grant of import licences, and may conduct international financial operations on its own faith and credit. During the first two years after the termination of the Mandate, the Joint Economic Board shall have the authority to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that – to the extent that the total foreign exchange revenues of the two States from the export of goods and services permit, and provided that each State takes appropriate measures to conserve its own foreign exchange resources – each State shall have available, in any twelve months’ period, foreign exchange sufficient to assure the supply of quantities of imported goods and services for consumption in its territory equivalent to the quantities of such goods and services consumed in that territory in the twelve months’ period ending 31 December 1947.
All economic authority not specifically vested in the Joint Economic Board is reserved to each State.
There shall be a common customs tariff with complete freedom of trade between the States, and between the States and the City of Jerusalem.
The tariff schedules shall be drawn up by a Tariff Commission, consisting of representatives of each of the States in equal numbers, and shall be submitted to the Joint Economic Board for approval by a majority vote. In case of disagreement in the Tariff Commission, the Joint Economic Board shall arbitrate the points of difference. In the event that the Tariff Commission fails to draw up any schedule by a date to be fixed, the Joint Economic Board shall determine the tariff schedule.
The following items shall be a first charge on the customs and other common revenue of the Joint Economic Board:
The expenses of the customs service and of the operation of the joint services;
The administrative expenses of the Joint Economic Board;
The financial obligations of the Administration of Palestine, consisting of:
The service of the outstanding public debt;
The cost of superannuation benefits, now being paid or falling due in the future, in accordance with the rules and to the extent established by paragraph 3 of chapter 3 above.
After these obligations have been met in full, the surplus revenue from the customs and other common services shall be divided in the following manner: not less than 5 per cent and not more than 10 per cent to the City of Jerusalem; the residue shall be allocated to each State by the Joint Economic Board equitably, with the objective of maintaining a sufficient and suitable level of government and social services in each State, except that the share of either State shall not exceed the amount of that State’s contribution to the revenues of the Economic Union by more than approximately four million pounds in any year. The amount granted may be adjusted by the Board according to the price level in relation to the prices prevailing at the time of the establishment of the Union. After five years, the principles of the distribution of the joint revenue may be revised by the Joint Economic Board on a basis of equity.
All international conventions and treaties affecting customs tariff rates, and those communications services under the jurisdiction of the Joint Economic Board, shall be entered into by both States. In these matters, the two States shall be bound to act in accordance with the majority of the Joint Economic Board.
The Joint Economic Board shall endeavour to secure for Palestine’s exports fair and equal access to world markets.
All enterprises operated by the Joint Economic Board shall pay fair wages on a uniform basis.
The undertaking shall contain provisions preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents or citizens of both States and of the City of Jerusalem, subject to security considerations; provided that each State and the City shall control residence within its borders.
Termination, Modification and Interpretation of the Undertaking
The undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall remain in force for a period of ten years. It shall continue in force until notice of termination, to take effect two years thereafter, is given by either of the parties.
During the initial ten-year period, the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom may not be modified except by consent of both parties and with the approval of the General Assembly.
Any dispute relating to the application or the interpretation of the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the International Court Of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.
The movable assets of the Administration of Palestine shall be allocated to the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem on an equitable basis. Allocations should be made by the United Nations Commission referred to iii section B, paragraph 1, above. Immovable assets shall become the property of the government of the territory in which they are situated.
During the period between the appointment of the United Nations Commission and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power shall, except in respect of ordinary operations, consult with the Commission on any measure which it may contemplate involving the liquidation, disposal or encumbering of the assets of the Palestine Government, such as the accumulated treasury surplus, the proceeds of Government bond issues, State lands or any other asset.
When the independence of either the Arab or the Jewish State as envisaged in this plan has become effective and the declaration and undertaking, as envisaged in this plan, have been signed by either of them, sympathetic consideration should be given to its application for admission to membership in the United Nations in accordance with article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations.
The area of the Arab State in Western Galilee is bounded on the west by the Mediterranean and on the north by the frontier of the Lebanon from Ras en Naqura to a point north of Saliha. From there the boundary proceeds southwards, leaving the built-up area of Saliha in the Arab State, to join the southernmost point of this village. There it follows the western boundary line of the villages of ‘Alma, Rihaniya and Teitaba, thence following the northern boundary line of Meirun village to join the Acre-Safad Sub-District boundary line. It follows this line to a point west of Es Sammu’i village and joins it again at the northernmost point of Farradiya. Thence it follows the sub-district boundary line to the Acre-Safad main road. From here it follows the western boundary of Kafr-I’nan village until it reaches the Tiberias-Acre Sub-District boundary line, passing to the west of the junction of the Acre-Safad and Lubiya-Kafr-I’nan roads. From the south-west corner of Kafr-I’nan village the boundary line follows the western boundary of the Tiberias Sub-District to a point close to the boundary line between the villages of Maghar and ‘Eilabun, thence bulging out to the west to include as much of the eastern part of the plain of Battuf as is necessary for the reservoir proposed by the Jewish Agency for the irrigation of lands to the south and east.
The boundary rejoins the Tiberias Sub-District boundary at a point on the Nazareth-Tiberias road south-east of the built-up area of Tur’an; thence it runs southwards, at first following the sub-district boundary and then passing between the Kadoorie Agricultural School and Mount Tabor, to a point due south at the base of Mount Tabor. From here it runs due west, parallel to the horizontal grid line 230, to the north-east corner of the village lands of Tel Adashim. It then runs to the northwest corner of these lands, whence it turns south and west so as to include in the Arab State the sources of the Nazareth water supply in Yafa village. On reaching Ginneiger it follows the eastern, northern and western boundaries of the lands of this village to their south-west comer, whence it proceeds in a straight line to a point on the Haifa-Afula railway on the boundary between the villages of Sarid and El-Mujeidil. This is the point of intersection. The south-western boundary of the area of the Arab State in Galilee takes a line from this point, passing northwards along the eastern boundaries of Sarid and Gevat to the north-eastern corner of Nahalal, proceeding thence across the land of Kefar ha Horesh to a central point on the southern boundary of the village of ‘Ilut, thence westwards along that village boundary to the eastern boundary of Beit Lahm, thence northwards and north-eastwards along its western boundary to the north-eastern corner of Waldheim and thence north-westwards across the village lands of Shafa ‘Amr to the southeastern corner of Ramat Yohanan. From here it runs due north-north-east to a point on the Shafa ‘Amr-Haifa road, west of its junction with the road of I’billin. From there it proceeds north-east to a point on the southern boundary of I’billin situated to the west of the I’billin-Birwa road. Thence along that boundary to its westernmost point, whence it turns to the north, follows across the village land of Tamra to the north-westernmost corner and along the western boundary of Julis until it reaches the Acre-Safad road. It then runs westwards along the southern side of the Safad-Acre road to the Galilee-Haifa District boundary, from which point it follows that boundary to the sea.
The boundary of the hill country of Samaria and Judea starts on the Jordan River at the Wadi Malih south-east of Beisan and runs due west to meet the Beisan-Jericho road and then follows the western side of that road in a north-westerly direction to the junction of the boundaries of the Sub-Districts of Beisan, Nablus, and Jenin. From that point it follows the Nablus-Jenin sub-District boundary westwards for a distance of about three kilometres and then turns north-westwards, passing to the east of the built-up areas of the villages of Jalbun and Faqqu’a, to the boundary of the Sub-Districts of Jenin and Beisan at a point northeast of Nuris. Thence it proceeds first northwestwards to a point due north of the built-up area of Zie’in and then westwards to the Afula-Jenin railway, thence north-westwards along the District boundary line to the point of intersection on the Hejaz railway. From here the boundary runs southwestwards, including the built-up area and some of the land of the village of Kh. Lid in the Arab State to cross the Haifa-Jenin road at a point on the district boundary between Haifa and Samaria west of El- Mansi. It follows this boundary to the southernmost point of the village of El-Buteimat. From here it follows the northern and eastern boundaries of the village of Ar’ara rejoining the Haifa-Samaria district boundary at Wadi ‘Ara, and thence proceeding south-south-westwards in an approximately straight line joining up with the western boundary of Qaqun to a point east of the railway line on the eastern boundary of Qaqun village. From here it runs along the railway line some distance to the east of it to a point just east of the Tulkarm railway station. Thence the boundary follows a line half-way between the railway and the Tulkarm-Qalqiliya-Jaljuliya and Ras El-Ein road to a point just east of Ras El-Ein station, whence it proceeds along the railway some distance to the east of it to the point on the railway line south of the junction of the Haifa-Lydda and Beit Nabala lines, whence it proceeds along the southern border of Lydda airport to its south-west corner, thence in a south-westerly direction to a point just west of the built-up area of Sarafand El ‘Amar, whence it turns south, passing just to the west of the built-up area of Abu El-Fadil to the north-east corner of the lands of Beer Ya’aqov. (The boundary line should be so demarcated as to allow direct access from the Arab State to the airport.) Thence the boundary line follows the western and southern boundaries of Ramle village, to the north-east corner of El Na’ana village, thence in a straight line to the southernmost point of El Barriya, along the eastern boundary of that village and the southern boundary of ‘Innaba village. Thence it turns north to follow the southern side of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road until El-Qubab, whence it follows the road to the boundary of Abu-Shusha. It runs along the eastern boundaries of Abu Shusha, Seidun, Hulda to the southernmost point of Hulda, thence westwards in a straight line to the north-eastern corner of Umm Kalkha, thence following the northern boundaries of Umm Kalkha, Qazaza and the northern and western boundaries of Mukhezin to the Gaza District boundary and thence runs across the village lands of El-Mismiya El-Kabira, and Yasur to the southern point of intersection, which is midway between the built-up areas of Yasur and Batani Sharqi.
From the southern point of intersection the boundary lines run north-westwards between the villages of Gan Yavne and Barqa to the sea at a point half way between Nabi Yunis and Minat El-Qila, and south-eastwards to a point west of Qastina, whence it turns in a south-westerly direction, passing to the east of the built-up areas of Es Sawafir Esh Sharqiya and ‘Ibdis. From the south-east corner of ‘Ibdis village it runs to a point southwest of the built-up area of Beit ‘Affa, crossing the Hebron-El-Majdal road just to the west of the built-up area of ‘Iraq Suweidan. Thence it proceeds southward along the western village boundary of El-Faluja to the Beersheba Sub-District boundary. It then runs across the tribal lands of ‘Arab El-Jubarat to a point on the boundary between the Sub-Districts of Beersheba and Hebron north of Kh. Khuweilifa, whence it proceeds in a south-westerly direction to a point on the Beersheba-Gaza main road two kilometres to the north-west of the town. It then turns south-eastwards to reach Wadi Sab’ at a point situated one kilometer to the west of it. From here it turns north-eastwards and proceeds along Wadi Sab’ and along the Beersheba-Hebron road for a distance of one kilometer, whence it turns eastwards and runs in a straight line to Kh. Kuseifa to join the Beersheba-Hebron Sub-District boundary. It then follows the Beersheba-Hebron boundary eastwards to a point north of Ras Ez-Zuweira, only departing from it so as to cut across the base of the indentation between vertical grid lines 150 and 160.
About five kilometres north-east of Ras Ez-Zuweira it turns north, excluding from the Arab State a strip along the coast of the Dead Sea not more than seven kilometres in depth, as far as ‘Ein Geddi, whence it turns due east to join the Transjordan frontier in the Dead Sea.
The northern boundary of the Arab section of the coastal plain runs from a point between Minat El-Qila and Nabi Yunis, passing between the built-up areas of Gan Yavne and Barqa to the point of intersection. From here it turns south-westwards, running across the lands of Batani Sharqi, along the eastern boundary of the lands of Beit Daras and across the lands of Julis, leaving the built-up areas of Batani Sharqi and Julis to the westwards, as far as the north-west corner of the lands of Beit-Tima. Thence it runs east of El-Jiya across the village lands of El-Barbara along the eastern boundaries of the villages of Beit Jirja, Deir Suneid and Dimra. From the south-east corner of Dimra the boundary passes across the lands of Beit Hanun, leaving the Jewish lands of Nir-Am to the eastwards. From the south-east corner of Beit Hanun the line runs south-west to a point south of the parallel grid line 100, then turns north-west for two kilometres, turning again in a southwesterly direction and continuing in an almost straight line to the north-west corner of the village lands of Kirbet Ikhza’a. From there it follows the boundary line of this village to its southernmost point. It then runs in a southerly direction along the vertical grid line 90 to its junction with the horizontal grid line 70. It then turns south-eastwards to Kh. El-Ruheiba and then proceeds in a southerly direction to a point known as El-Baha, beyond which it crosses the Beersheba-EI ‘Auja main road to the west of Kh. El-Mushrifa. From there it joins Wadi El-Zaiyatin just to the west of El-Subeita. From there it turns to the north-east and then to the south-east following this Wadi and passes to the east of ‘Abda to join Wadi Nafkh. It then bulges to the south-west along Wadi Nafkh, Wadi ‘Ajrim and Wadi Lassan to the point where Wadi Lassan crosses the Egyptian frontier.
The area of the Arab enclave of Jaffa consists of that part of the town-planning area of Jaffa which lies to the west of the Jewish quarters lying south of Tel-Aviv, to the west of the continuation of Herzl street up to its junction with the Jaffa-Jerusalem road, to the south-west of the section of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road lying south-east of that junction, to the west of Miqve Yisrael lands, to the northwest of Holon local council area, to the north of the line linking up the north-west corner of Holon with the northeast corner of Bat Yam local council area and to the north of Bat Yam local council area. The question of Karton quarter will be decided by the Boundary Commission, bearing in mind among other considerations the desirability of including the smallest possible number of its Arab inhabitants and the largest possible number of its Jewish inhabitants in the Jewish State.
The north-eastern sector of the Jewish State (Eastern Galilee) is bounded on the north and west by the Lebanese frontier and on the east by the frontiers of Syria and Trans-jordan. It includes the whole of the Huleh Basin, Lake Tiberias, the whole of the Beisan Sub-District, the boundary line being extended to the crest of the Gilboa mountains and the Wadi Malih. From there the Jewish State extends north-west, following the boundary described in respect of the Arab State. The Jewish section of the coastal plain extends from a point between Minat El-Qila and Nabi Yunis in the Gaza Sub-District and includes the towns of Haifa and Tel-Aviv, leaving Jaffa as an enclave of the Arab State. The eastern frontier of the Jewish State follows the boundary described in respect of the Arab State.
The Beersheba area comprises the whole of the Beersheba Sub-District, including the Negeb and the eastern part of the Gaza Sub-District, but excluding the town of Beersheba and those areas described in respect of the Arab State. It includes also a strip of land along the Dead Sea stretching from the Beersheba-Hebron Sub-District boundary line to ‘Ein Geddi, as described in respect of the Arab State.
The boundaries of the City of Jerusalem are as defined in the recommendations on the City of Jerusalem. (See Part III, section B, below).
The City of Jerusalem shall be established as a corpus separatum under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations. The Trusteeship Council shall be designated to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering Authority on behalf of the United Nations.
The City of Jerusalem shall include the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, ‘Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern Shu’fat, as indicated on the attached sketch-map (annex B).
The Trusteeship Council shall, within five months of the approval of the present plan, elaborate and approve a detailed statute of the City which shall contain, inter alia, the substance of the following provisions:
Government machinery; special objectives. The Administering Authority in discharging its administrative obligations shall pursue the following special objectives:
To protect and to preserve the unique spiritual and religious interests located in the city of the three great monotheistic faiths throughout the world, Christian, Jewish and Moslem; to this end to ensure that order and peace, and especially religious peace, reign in Jerusalem;
To foster cooperation among all the inhabitants of the city in their own interests as well as in order to encourage and support the peaceful development of the mutual relations between the two Palestinian peoples throughout the Holy Land; to promote the security, well-being and any constructive measures of development of the residents having regard to the special circumstances and customs of the various peoples and communities.
Governor and Administrative staff. A Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall be appointed by the Trusteeship Council and shall be responsible to it. He shall be selected on the basis of special qualifications and without regard to nationality. He shall not, however, be a citizen of either State in Palestine.
The Governor shall represent the United Nations in the City and shall exercise on their behalf all powers of administration, including the conduct of external affairs. He shall be assisted by an administrative staff classed as international officers in the meaning of Article 100 of the Charter and chosen whenever practicable from the residents of the city and of the rest of Palestine on a non-discriminatory basis. A detailed plan for the organization of the administration of the city shall be submitted by the Governor to the Trusteeship Council and duly approved by it.
The existing local autonomous units in the territory of the city (villages, townships and municipalities) shall enjoy wide powers of local government and administration.
The Governor shall study and submit for the consideration and decision of the Trusteeship Council a plan for the establishment of special town units consisting, respectively, of the Jewish and Arab sections of new Jerusalem. The new town units shall continue to form part the present municipality of Jerusalem.
The City of Jerusalem shall be demilitarized; neutrality shall be declared and preserved, and no para-military formations, exercises or activities shall be permitted within its borders.
Should the administration of the City of Jerusalem be seriously obstructed or prevented by the non-cooperation or interference of one or more sections of the population the Governor shall have authority to take such measures as may be necessary to restore the effective functioning of administration.
To assist in the maintenance of internal law and order, especially for the protection of the Holy Places and religious buildings and sites in the city, the Governor shall organize a special police force of adequate strength, the members of which shall be recruited outside of Palestine. The Governor shall be empowered to direct such budgetary provision as may be necessary for the maintenance of this force.
A Legislative Council, elected by adult residents of the city irrespective of nationality on the basis of universal and secret suffrage and proportional representation, shall have powers of legislation and taxation. No legislative measures shall, however, conflict or interfere with the provisions which will be set forth in the Statute of the City, nor shall any law, regulation, or official action prevail over them. The Statute shall grant to the Governor a right of vetoing bills inconsistent with the provisions referred to in the preceding sentence. It shall also empower him to promulgate temporary ordinances in case the Council fails to adopt in time a bill deemed essential to the normal functioning of the administration.
The Statute shall provide for the establishment of an independent judiciary system, including a court of appeal. All the inhabitants of the city shall be subject to it.
The City of Jerusalem shall be included in the Economic Union of Palestine and be bound by all stipulations of the undertaking and of any treaties issued therefrom, as well as by the decisions of the Joint Economic Board. The headquarters of the Economic Board shall be established in the territory City. The Statute shall provide for the regulation of economic matters not falling within the regime of the Economic Union, on the basis of equal treatment and non-discrimination for all members of thc United Nations and their nationals.
Freedom of Transit and Visit: Control of residents.
Subject to considerations of security, and of economic welfare as determined by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council, freedom of entry into, and residence within the borders of the City shall be guaranteed for the residents or citizens of the Arab and Jewish States. Immigration into, and residence within, the borders of the city for nationals of other States shall be controlled by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council.
Relations with Arab and Jewish States. Representatives of the Arab and Jewish States shall be accredited to the Governor of the City and charged with the protection of the interests of their States and nationals in connection with the international administration of thc City.
Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of the city. This will not preclude the adoption of one or more additional working languages, as may be required.
All the residents shall become ipso facto citizens of the City of Jerusalem unless they opt for citizenship of the State of which they have been citizens or, if Arabs or Jews, have filed notice of intention to become citizens of the Arab or Jewish State respectively, according to Part 1, section B, paragraph 9, of this Plan.
The Trusteeship Council shall make arrangements for consular protection of the citizens of the City outside its territory.
Subject only to the requirements of public order and morals, the inhabitants of the City shall be ensured the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of conscience, religion and worship, language, education, speech and press, assembly and association, and petition.
No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the grounds of race, religion, language or sex.
All persons within the City shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.
The family law and personal status of the various persons and communities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.
Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.
The City shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish communities respectively, in their own languages and in accordance with their cultural traditions.
The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the City may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.
No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any inhabitant of the City of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.
Holy Places Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.
Free access to the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites and the free exercise of worship shall be secured in conformity with existing rights and subject to the requirements of public order and decorum.
Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Governor that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Governor may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Governor may carry it out himself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.
No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the City. No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly’s recommendations.
Special powers of the Governor in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in the City and in any part of Palestine.
The protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites located in the City of Jerusalem shall be a special concern of the Governor. With relation to such places, buildings and sites in Palestine outside the city, the Governor shall determine, on the ground of powers granted to him by the Constitution of both States, whether the provisions of the Constitution of the Arab and Jewish States in Palestine dealing therewith and the religious rights appertaining thereto are being properly applied and respected.
The Governor shall also be empowered to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in any part of Palestine.
In this task he may be assisted by a consultative council of representatives of different denominations acting in an advisory capacity.
The Statute elaborated by the Trusteeship Council the aforementioned principles shall come into force not later than 1 October 1948. It shall remain in force in the first instance for a period of ten years, unless the Trusteeship Council finds it necessary to undertake a re-examination of these provisions at an earlier date. After the expiration of this period the whole scheme shall be subject to examination by the Trusteeship Council in the light of experience acquired with its functioning. The residents the City shall be then free to express by means of a referendum their wishes as to possible modifications of regime of the City.
States whose nationals have in the past enjoyed in Palestine the privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection, as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are invited to renounce any right pertaining to them to the re-establishment of such privileges and immunities in the proposed Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem.
UN Resolution 194, adopted in December 1948, established a Conciliation Commission, which was tasked with facilitating peace. The resolution also affirmed Palestinians’ Right of Return. Neither Palestinians nor Israelis were given an opportunity to vote on the resolution.
Topics:
Missing Topics:
Countries:
Hover over the small text below to read the full document:
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
HAVING CONSIDERED FURTHER the situation in Palestine,
Extends its thanks to the Acting Mediator and his staff for their continued efforts and devotion to duty in Palestine:
(a) To assume, insofar as it considers necessary in existing circumstances, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine by the resolution of the General Assembly of 14 May 1948;
(b) To carry out the specific functions and directives given to it by the present resolution and such additional functions and directives as may be given to it by the General Assembly or by the Security Council;
(c) To undertake, upon the request of the Security Council, any of the functions now assigned to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine or to the United Nations Truce Commission by resolutions of the Security Council; upon such request to the Conciliation Commission by the Security Council with respect to all the remaining functions of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine under Security Council resolutions, the office of the Mediator shall be terminated;
Requests the Security Council to take further steps to ensure the demilitarization of Jerusalem at the earliest possible date;
Instructs the Conciliation Commission to present to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area which will provide for the maximum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the special international status of the Jerusalem area;
The Conciliation Commission is authorized to appoint a United Nations representative who shall co-operate with the local authorities with respect to the interim administration of the Jerusalem area;
Instructs the Conciliation Commission to report immediately to the Security Council, for appropriate action by that organ, any attempt by any party to impede such access;
Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;
The Conciliation Commission will have its official headquarters at Jerusalem. The authorities responsible for maintaining order in Jerusalem will be responsible for taking all measures necessary to ensure the security of the Commission. The Secretary-General will provide a limited number of guards for the protection of the staff and premises of the Commission;
Following the June 1967 War, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 242, requesting Israel to withdraw from “territories” it occupied in the war. At the time, the UN had two working languages, English and French. The French version of the same resolution specified “the territories” which has led to major disputes over whether this meant some or all of the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. The resolution advocated for a just settlement of the refugee problem.
Topics:
Missing Topics:
Countries:
Hover over the small text below to read the full document:
NOVEMBER 22, 1967
The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,
Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
Affirms further the necessity
For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;
Requests the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.
Resolution 478 was adopted by the UN Security Council, rejecting Israel’s claim to Jerusalem as the “complete and united” capital of Israel. The resolution considered the claim illegal and a serious violation of international law.
Topics:
Missing Topics:
Countries:
Hover over the small text below to read the full document:
The Security Council, Recalling its resolution 476 (1980), Reaffirming again that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible, Deeply concerned over the enactment of a “basic law” in the Israeli Knesset proclaiming a change in the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, with its implications for peace and security, Noting that Israel has not complied with resolution 476 (1980), Reaffirming its determination to examine practical ways and means, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to secure the full implementation of its resolution 476 (1980), in the event of non-compliance by Israel,
1. Censures in the strongest terms the enactment by Israel of the “basic law” on Jerusalem and the refusal to comply with relevant Security Council resolutions;
2. Affirms that the enactment of the “basic law” by Israel constitutes a violation of international law and does not affect the continued application of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since June 1967, including Jerusalem;
3. Determines that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which have altered or purport to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and in particular the recent “basic law” on Jerusalem, are null and void and must be rescinded forthwith;
4. Affirms also that this action constitutes a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East;
5. Decides not to recognize the “basic law” and such other actions by Israel that, as a result of this law, seek to alter the character and status of Jerusalem and calls upon: (a) All Member States to accept this decision; (b) Those States that have established diplomatic missions at Jerusalem to withdraw such missions from the Holy City;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution before 15 November 1980;
7. Decides to remain seized of this serious situation.
Adopted at the 2245th meeting by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (United States of America).
The Oslo Accords represented the first direct Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement. In the Accords, Palestinian representatives recognised the State of Israel and its right to exist, and Israel recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative body of the Palestinian people, affirming their right to self-government. The accords also included the withdrawal of Israeli forces from parts of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Oslo was followed by many peace talks on issues regarding Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements and Jerusalem.
Topics:
Missing Topics:
Countries:
Hover over the small text below to read the full document:
The Government of the State of Israel and the Palestinian team representing the Palestinian people agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the two sides agree to the following principles.
The aim of the Israeli Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council, (the “Council”) for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 and 338.
The agreed framework for the interim period is set in this declaration of principles.
1. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while Palestinian police will insure public order.
2. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles.
3. The elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.
Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.
1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza strip and Jericho area.
2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives.
3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, border, relations and cooperation with their neighbors, and other issues of common interest.
4. The two parties agreed that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.
1. Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and withdrawal from the Gaza and Jericho area, a transfer of authority from Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the authorized Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council.
2. Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, with the view of promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians on the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism, the Palestinian side will commence in building the Palestinian police, as agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.
1. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim period (the “Interim Agreement”).
2. The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the Council, the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement shall also specify the Council’s executive authority, legislative authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs.
3. The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements, to be implemented upon the inauguration of the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of the powers and responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with Article VI above.
4. In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, and any other authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim Agreement that will specify their powers and responsibilities.
5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.
In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.
1. The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it.
2. Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in remaining spheres.
In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, a Joint Israeli–Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established in order to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes.
Recognizing the mutual benefit of cooperation in promoting the development of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an Israeli– Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols attached as Annex III and Annex IV.
The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives on one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. These arrangements will include the constitution of a Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by the Committee.
1. After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.
2. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas.
3. Further redeployments to specified location will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.
Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex II.
1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of the Declaration of Principles, or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be tablished pursuant to Article X above.
2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be solved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.
3. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes lating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through reconciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.
Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a “Marshall Plan,” the for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol attached as Annex IV.
1. This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its signing.
2. All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.
The Government of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereinafter “the PLO”), the representative of the Palestinian people;
PREAMBLE
WITHIN the framework of the Middle East peace process initiated at Madrid in October 1991;
REAFFIRMING their determination to put an end to decades of confrontation and to live in peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and security, while recognizing their mutual legitimate and political rights;
REAFFIRMING their desire to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process;
RECOGNIZING that the peace process and the new era that it has created, as well as the new relationship established between the two Parties as described above, are irreversible, and the determination of the two Parties to maintain, sustain and continue the peace process;
RECOGNIZING that the aim of the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, i.e. the elected Council (hereinafter “the Council” or “the Palestinian Council”), and the elected Ra’ees of the Executive Authority, for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years from the date of signing the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (hereinafter “the Gaza-Jericho Agreement”) on May 4, 1994, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338;
REAFFIRMING their understanding that the interim self-government arrangements contained in this Agreement are an integral part of the whole peace process, that the negotiations on the permanent status, that will start as soon as possible but not later than May 4, 1996, will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and that the Interim Agreement shall settle all the issues of the interim period and that no such issues will be deferred to the agenda of the permanent status negotiations;
REAFFIRMING their adherence to the mutual recognition and commitments expressed in the letters dated September 9, 1993, signed by and exchanged between the Prime Minister of Israel and the Chairman of the PLO;
DESIROUS of putting into effect the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements signed at Washington, DC on September 13, 1993, and the Agreed Minutes thereto (hereinafter “the DOP”) and in particular Article III and Annex I concerning the holding of direct, free and general political elections for the Council and the Ra’ees of the Executive Authority in order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip may democratically elect accountable representatives;
RECOGNIZING that these elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements and will provide a democratic basis for the establishment of Palestinian institutions;
REAFFIRMING their mutual commitment to act, in accordance with this Agreement, immediately, efficiently and effectively against acts or threats of terrorism, violence or incitement, whether committed by Palestinians or Israelis;
FOLLOWING the Gaza-Jericho Agreement; the Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities signed at Erez on August 29, 1994 (hereinafter “the Preparatory Transfer Agreement”); and the Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities signed at Cairo on August 27, 1995 (hereinafter “the Further Transfer Protocol”); which three agreements will be superseded by this Agreement;
HEREBY AGREE as follows:
Transfer of Authority
Israel shall transfer powers and responsibilities as specified in this Agreement from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council in accordance with this Agreement. Israel shall continue to exercise powers and responsibilities not so transfer.
Pending the inauguration of the Council, the powers and responsibilities transferred to the Council shall be exercised by the Palestinian Authority established in accordance with the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, which shall also have all the rights, liabilities and obligations to be assumed by the Council in this regard. Accordingly, the term “Council” throughout this Agreement shall, pending the inauguration of the Council, be construed as meaning the Palestinian Authority.
The transfer of powers and responsibilities to the police force established by the Palestinian Council in accordance with Article XIV below (hereinafter “the Palestinian Police”) shall be accomplished in a phased manner, as detailed in this Agreement and in the Protocol concerning Redeployment and Security Arrangements attached as Annex I to this Agreement (hereinafter “Annex I”).
As regards the transfer and assumption of authority in civil spheres, powers and responsibilities shall be transferred and assumed as set out in the Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs attached as Annex III to this Agreement (hereinafter “Annex III”).
After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration in the West Bank will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government shall be withdrawn. The withdrawal of the military government shall not prevent it from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.
A Joint Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee (hereinafter “the CAC”), Joint Regional Civil Affairs Subcommittees, one for the Gaza Strip and the other for the West Bank, and District Civil Liaison Offices in the West Bank shall be established in order to provide for coordination and cooperation in civil affairs between the Council and Israel, as detailed in Annex III.
The offices of the Council, and the offices of its Ra’ees and its Executive Authority and other committees, shall be located in areas under Palestinian territorial jurisdiction in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Elections
In order that the Palestinian people of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council and the Ra’ees of the Executive Authority of the Council in accordance with the provisions set out in the Protocol concerning Elections attached as Annex II to this Agreement (hereinafter “Annex II”).
These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step towards the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements and will provide a democratic basis for the establishment of Palestinian institutions.
Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there may participate in the election process in accordance with the provisions contained in this Article and in Article VI of Annex II (Election Arrangements concerning Jerusalem).
The elections shall be called by the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority immediately following the signing of this Agreement to take place at the earliest practicable date following the redeployment of Israeli forces in accordance with Annex I, and consistent with the requirements of the election timetable as provided in Annex II, the Election Law and the Election Regulations, as defined in Article I of Annex II.
Structure of the Palestinian Council
The Palestinian Council and the Ra’ees of the Executive Authority of the Council constitute the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, which will be elected by the Palestinian people of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip for the transitional period agreed in Article I of the DOP.
The Council shall possess both legislative power and executive power, in accordance with Articles VII and IX of the DOP. The Council shall carry out and be responsible for all the legislative and executive powers and responsibilities transferred to it under this Agreement. The exercise of legislative powers shall be in accordance with Article XVIII of this Agreement (Legislative Powers of the Council).
The Council and the Ra’ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall be directly and simultaneously elected by the Palestinian people of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and the Election Law and Regulations, which shall not be contrary to the provisions of this Agreement.
The Council and the Ra’ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall be elected for a transitional period not exceeding five years from the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement on May 4, 1994.
Immediately upon its inauguration, the Council will elect from among its members a Speaker. The Speaker will preside over the meetings of the Council, administer the Council and its committees, decide on the agenda of each meeting, and lay before the Council proposals for voting and declare their results.
The jurisdiction of the Council shall be as determined in Article XVII of this Agreement (Jurisdiction).
The organization, structure and functioning of the Council shall be in accordance with this Agreement and the Basic Law for the Palestinian Interim Self- Government Authority, which Law shall be adopted by the Council. The Basic Law and any regulations made under it shall not be contrary to the provisions of this Agreement.
The Council shall be responsible under its executive powers for the offices, services and departments transferred to it and may establish, within its jurisdiction, ministries and subordinate bodies, as necessary for the fulfillment of its responsibilities.
The Speaker will present for the Council’s approval proposed internal procedures that will regulate, among other things, the decision-making processes of the Council.
Size of the Council The Palestinian Council shall be composed of 82 representatives and the Ra’ees of the Executive Authority, who will be directly and simultaneously elected by the Palestinian people of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.
The Executive Authority of the Council
The Council will have a committee that will exercise the executive authority of the Council, formed in accordance with paragraph 4 below (hereinafter “the Executive Authority”).
The Executive Authority shall be bestowed with the executive authority of the Council and will exercise it on behalf of the Council. It shall determine its own internal procedures and decision making processes.
The Council will publish the names of the members of the Executive Authority immediately upon their initial appointment and subsequent to any changes.
The Ra’ees of the Executive Authority shall be an ex officio member of the Executive Authority.
All of the other members of the Executive Authority, except as provided in subparagraph c. below, shall be members of the Council, chosen and proposed to the Council by the Ra’ees of the Executive Authority and approved by the Council.
The Ra’ees of the Executive Authority shall have the right to appoint some persons, in number not exceeding twenty percent of the total membership of the Executive Authority, who are not members of the Council, to exercise executive authority and participate in government tasks. Such appointed members may not vote in meetings of the Council.
Non-elected members of the Executive Authority must have a valid address in an area under the jurisdiction of the Council.
Other Committees of the Council
The Council may form small committees to simplify the proceedings of the Council and to assist in controlling the activity of its Executive Authority.
Each committee shall establish its own decision-making processes within the general framework of the organization and structure of the Council.
Open Government
All meetings of the Council and of its committees, other than the Executive Authority, shall be open to the public, except upon a resolution of the Council or the relevant committee on the grounds of security, or commercial or personal confidentiality.
Participation in the deliberations of the Council, its committees and the Executive Authority shall be limited to their respective members only. Experts may be invited to such meetings to address specific issues on an ad hoc basis.
Judicial Review Any person or organization affected by any act or decision of the Ra’ees of the Executive Authority of the Council or of any member of the Executive Authority, who believes that such act or decision exceeds the authority of the Ra’ees or of such member, or is otherwise incorrect in law or procedure, may apply to the relevant Palestinian Court of Justice for a review of such activity or decision.
Powers and Responsibilities of the Council
Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the Council will, within its jurisdiction, have legislative powers as set out in Article XVIII of this Agreement, as well as executive powers.
The executive power of the Palestinian Council shall extend to all matters within its jurisdiction under this Agreement or any future agreement that may be reached between the two Parties during the interim period. It shall include the power to formulate and conduct Palestinian policies and to supervise their implementation, to issue any rule or regulation under powers given in approved legislation and administrative decisions necessary for the realization of Palestinian self-government, the power to employ staff, sue and be sued and conclude contracts, and the power to keep and administer registers and records of the population, and issue certificates, licenses and documents.
The Palestinian Council’s executive decisions and acts shall be consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
The Palestinian Council may adopt all necessary measures in order to enforce the law and any of its decisions, and bring proceedings before the Palestinian courts and tribunals.
In accordance with the DOP, the Council will not have powers and responsibilities in the sphere of foreign relations, which sphere includes the establishment abroad of embassies, consulates or other types of foreign missions and posts or permitting their establishment in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, the appointment of or admission of diplomatic and consular staff, and the exercise of diplomatic functions.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this paragraph, the PLO may conduct negotiations and sign agreements with states or international organizations for the benefit of the Council in the following cases only:
Dealings between the Council and representatives of foreign states and international organizations, as well as the establishment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of representative offices other than those described in subparagraph 5.a above, for the purpose of implementing the agreements referred to in subparagraph 5.b above, shall not be considered foreign relations. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the Council shall, within its jurisdiction, have an independent judicial system composed of independent Palestinian courts and tribunals.
Redeployment of Israeli Military Forces
The first phase of the Israeli military forces redeployment will cover populated areas in the West Bank – cities, towns, villages, refugee camps and hamlets – as set out in Annex I, and will be completed prior to the eve of the Palestinian elections, i.e., 22 days before the day of the elections.
Further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military locations will commence after the inauguration of the Council and will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian Police, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council as detailed in Articles XI (Land) and XIII (Security), below and in Annex I.
The Palestinian Police shall be deployed and shall assume responsibility for public order and internal security for Palestinians in a phased manner in accordance with Article XIII (Security) below and Annex I.
Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility for external security, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.
For the purpose of this Agreement, “Israeli military forces” includes Israel Police and other Israeli security forces.
Land
The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, the integrity and status of which will be preserved during the interim period.
The two sides agree that West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will come under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Council in a phased manner, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council, as specified below:
Land in populated areas (Areas A and B), including government and Al Waqf land, will come under the jurisdiction of the Council during the first phase of redeployment.
All civil powers and responsibilities, including planning and zoning, in Areas A and B, set out in Annex III, will be transferred to and assumed by the Council during the first phase of redeployment.
In Area C, during the first phase of redeployment Israel will transfer to the Council civil powers and responsibilities not relating to territory, as set out in Annex III.
The further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military locations will be gradually implemented in accordance with the DOP in three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, after the inauguration of the Council, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.
During the further redeployment phases to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council, powers and responsibilities relating to territory will be transferred gradually to Palestinian jurisdiction that will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.
The specified military locations referred to in Article X, paragraph 2 above will be determined in the further redeployment phases, within the specified time-frame ending not later than 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council, and will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.
MAP 1
For the purpose of this Agreement and until the completion of the first phase of the further redeployments:
“Area A” means the populated areas delineated by a red line and shaded in brown on attached map No. 1;
“Area B” means the populated areas delineated by a red line and shaded in yellow on attached map No. 1, and the built-up area of the hamlets listed in Appendix 6 to Annex I; and
“Area C” means areas of the West Bank outside Areas A and B, which, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will be gradually transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction in accordance with this Agreement.
Arrangements for Security and Public Order
In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council shall establish a strong police force as set out in Article XIV below. Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility for defense against external threats, including the responsibility for protecting the Egyptian and Jordanian borders, and for defense against external threats from the sea and from the air, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis and Settlements, for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order, and will have all the powers to take the steps necessary to meet this responsibility.
Agreed security arrangements and coordination mechanisms are specified in Annex I.
MAP 2
A Joint Coordination and Cooperation Committee for Mutual Security Purposes (hereinafter “the JSC”), as well as Joint Regional Security Committees (hereinafter “RSCs”) and Joint District Coordination Offices (hereinafter “DCOs”), are hereby established as provided for in Annex I.
The security arrangements provided for in this Agreement and in Annex I may be reviewed at the request of either Party and may be amended by mutual agreement of the Parties. Specific review arrangements are included in Annex I.
For the purpose of this Agreement, “the Settlements” means, in the West Bank – the settlements in Area C; and in the Gaza Strip – the Gush Katif and Erez settlement areas, as well as the other settlements in the Gaza Strip, as shown on attached map No. 2.
Security
The Council will, upon completion of the redeployment of Israeli military forces in each district, as set out in Appendix 1 to Annex I, assume the powers and responsibilities for internal security and public order in Area A in that district.
There will be a complete redeployment of Israeli military forces from Area B. Israel will transfer to the Council and the Council will assume responsibility for public order for Palestinians. Israel shall have the overriding responsibility for security for the purpose of protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism.
In Area B the Palestinian Police shall assume the responsibility for public order for Palestinians and shall be deployed in order to accommodate the Palestinian needs and requirements in the following manner:
The Palestinian Police shall establish 25 police stations and posts in towns, villages, and other places listed in Appendix 2 to Annex I and as delineated on map No. 3. The West Bank RSC may agree on the establishment of additional police stations and posts, if required.
The Palestinian Police shall be responsible for handling public order incidents in which only Palestinians are involved. The Palestinian Police shall operate freely in populated places where police stations and posts are located, as set out in paragraph b(1) above. While the movement of uniformed Palestinian policemen in Area B outside places where there is a Palestinian police station or post will be carried out after coordination and confirmation through the relevant DCO, three months after the completion of redeployment from Area B, the DCOs may decide that movement of Palestinian policemen from the police stations in Area B to Palestinian towns and villages in Area B on roads that are used only by Palestinian traffic will take place after notifying the DCO.
The coordination of such planned movement prior to confirmation through the relevant DCO shall include a scheduled plan, including the number of policemen, as well as the type and number of weapons and vehicles intended to take part. It shall also include details of arrangements for ensuring continued coordination through appropriate communication links, the exact schedule of movement to the area of the planned operation, including the destination and routes thereto, its proposed duration and the schedule for returning to the police station or post.
The Israeli side of the DCO will provide the Palestinian side with its response, following a request for movement of policemen in accordance with this paragraph, in normal or routine cases within one day and in emergency cases no later than 2 hours.
The Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces will conduct joint security activities on the main roads as set out in Annex 1.
The Palestinian Police will notify the West Bank RSC of the names of the policemen, number plates of police vehicles and serial numbers of weapons, with respect to each police station and post in Area B.
Further redeployments from Area C and transfer of internal security responsibility to the Palestinian Police in Areas B and C will be carried out in three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, to be completed 18 months after the inauguration of the Council, except for the issues of permanent status negotiations and of Israel‘s overall responsibility for Israelis and borders.
The procedures detailed in this paragraph will be reviewed within six months of the completion of the first phase of redeployment
The Palestinian Police
The Council shall establish a strong police force. The duties, functions, structure, deployment and composition of the Palestinian Police, together with provisions regarding its equipment and operation, as well as rules of conduct, are set out in Annex I.
The Palestinian police force established under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement will be fully integrated into the Palestinian Police and will be subject to the provisions of this Agreement
Except for the Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces, no other armed forces shall be established or operate in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Except for the arms, ammunition and equipment of the Palestinian Police described in Annex I, and those of the Israeli military forces, no organization, group or individual in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall manufacture, sell, acquire, possess, import or otherwise introduce into the West Bank or the Gaza Strip any firearms, ammunition, weapons, explosives, gunpowder or any related equipment, unless otherwise provided for in Annex I.
Prevention of Hostile Acts
Both sides shall take all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities directed against each other, against individuals falling under the other’s authority and against their property, and shall take legal measures against offenders.
Specific provisions for the implementation of this Article are set out in Annex I.
Confidence Building Measures With a view to fostering a positive and supportive public atmosphere to accompany the implementation of this Agreement, to establish a solid basis of mutual trust and good faith, and in order to facilitate the anticipated cooperation and new relations between the two peoples, both Parties agree to carry out confidence building measures as detailed herewith:
Israel will release or turn over to the Palestinian side, Palestinian detainees and prisoners, residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The first stage of release of these prisoners and detainees will take place on the signing of this Agreement and the second stage will take place prior to the date of the elections. There will be a third stage of release of detainees and prisoners. Detainees and prisoners will be released from among categories detailed in Annex VII (Release of Palestinian Prisoners and Detainees). Those released will be free to return to their homes in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Palestinians who have maintained contact with the Israeli authorities will not be subjected to acts of harassment, violence, retribution or prosecution. Appropriate ongoing measures will be taken, in coordination with Israel, in order to ensure their protection.
Palestinians from abroad whose entry into the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is approved pursuant to this Agreement, and to whom the provisions of this Article are applicable, will not be prosecuted for offenses committed prior to September 13, 1993.
Jurisdiction
In accordance with the DOP, the jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory as a single territorial unit, except for: issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, specified military locations, Palestinian refugees, borders, foreign relations and Israelis; and powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.
Accordingly, the authority of the Council encompasses all matters that fall within its territorial, functional and personal jurisdiction, as follows
The territorial jurisdiction of the Council shall encompass Gaza Strip territory, except for the Settlements and the Military Installation Area shown on map No. 2, and West Bank territory, except for Area C which, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will be gradually transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction in three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, to be completed 18 months after the inauguration of the Council. At this time, the jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.
Territorial jurisdiction includes land, subsoil and territorial waters, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.
The functional jurisdiction of the Council extends to all powers and responsibilities transferred to the Council, as specified in this Agreement or in any future agreements that may be reached between the Parties during the interim period.
The territorial and functional jurisdiction of the Council will apply to all persons, except for Israelis, unless otherwise provided in this Agreement.
Notwithstanding subparagraph a. above, the Council shall have functional jurisdiction in Area C, as detailed in Article IV of Annex III.
The Council has, within its authority, legislative, executive and judicial powers and responsibilities, as provided for in this Agreement.
Israel, through its military government, has the authority over areas that are not under the territorial jurisdiction of the Council, powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council and Israelis.
To this end, the Israeli military government shall retain the necessary legislative, judicial and executive powers and responsibilities, in accordance with international law. This provision shall not derogate from Israel‘s applicable legislation over Israelis in personam.
The exercise of authority with regard to the electromagnetic sphere and air space shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.
Without derogating from the provisions of this Article, legal arrangements detailed in the Protocol Concerning Legal Matters attached as Annex IV to this Agreement (hereinafter “Annex IV”) shall be observed. Israel and the Council may negotiate further legal arrangements.
Israel and the Council shall cooperate on matters of legal assistance in criminal and civil matters through a legal committee (hereinafter “the Legal Committee”), hereby established.
The Council’s jurisdiction will extend gradually to cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for the issues to be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, through a series of redeployments of the Israeli military forces. The first phase of the redeployment of Israeli military forces will cover populated areas in the West Bank – cities, towns, refugee camps and hamlets, as set out in Annex I – and will be completed prior to the eve of the Palestinian elections, i.e. 22 days before the day of the elections. Further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military locations will commence immediately upon the inauguration of the Council and will be effected in three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, to be concluded no later than eighteen months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.
Legislative Powers of the Council
For the purposes of this Article, legislation shall mean any primary and secondary legislation, including basic laws, laws, regulations and other legislative acts.
The Council has the power, within its jurisdiction as defined in Article XVII of this Agreement, to adopt legislation.
While the primary legislative power shall lie in the hands of the Council as a whole, the Ra’ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall have the following legislative powers: the power to initiate legislation or to present proposed legislation to the Council; the power to promulgate legislation adopted by the Council; and the power to issue secondary legislation, including regulations, relating to any matters specified and within the scope laid down in any primary legislation adopted by the Council.
Legislation, including legislation which amends or abrogates existing laws or military orders, which exceeds the jurisdiction of the Council or which is otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of the DOP, this Agreement, or of any other agreement that may be reached between the two sides during the interim period, shall have no effect and shall be void ab initio.
The Ra’ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall not promulgate legislation adopted by the Council if such legislation falls under the provisions of this paragraph.
All legislation shall be communicated to the Israeli side of the Legal Committee.
Without derogating from the provisions of paragraph 4 above, the Israeli side of the Legal Committee may refer for the attention of the Committee any legislation regarding which Israel considers the provisions of paragraph 4 apply, in order to discuss issues arising from such legislation. The Legal Committee will consider the legislation referred to it at the earliest opportunity.
Human Rights and the Rule of Law Israel and the Council shall exercise their powers and responsibilities pursuant to this Agreement with due regard to internationally-accepted norms and principles of human rights and the rule of law.
Rights, Liabilities and Obligations
The transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its civil administration to the Council, as detailed in Annex III, includes all related rights, liabilities and obligations arising with regard to acts or omissions which occurred prior to such transfer. Israel will cease to bear any financial responsibility regarding such acts or omissions and the Council will bear all financial responsibility for these and for its own functioning.
Any financial claim made in this regard against Israel will be referred to the Council.
Israel shall provide the Council with the information it has regarding pending and anticipated claims brought before any court or tribunal against Israel in this regard.
Where legal proceedings are brought in respect of such a claim, Israel will notify the Council and enable it to participate in defending the claim and raise any arguments on its behalf.
In the event that an award is made against Israel by any court or tribunal in respect of such a claim, the Council shall immediately reimburse Israel the full amount of the award.
Without prejudice to the above, where a court or tribunal hearing such a claim finds that liability rests solely with an employee or agent who acted beyond the scope of the powers assigned to him or her, unlawfully or with willful malfeasance, the Council shall not bear financial responsibility.
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1.d through 1.f above, each side may take the necessary measures, including promulgation of legislation, in order to ensure that such claims by Palestinians, including pending claims in which the hearing of evidence has not yet begun, are brought only before Palestinian courts or tribunals in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and are not brought before or heard by Israeli courts or tribunals.
Where a new claim has been brought before a Palestinian court or tribunal subsequent to the dismissal of the claim pursuant to subparagraph a. above, the Council shall defend it and, in accordance with subparagraph 1.a above, in the event that an award is made for the plaintiff, shall pay the amount of the award.
The Legal Committee shall agree on arrangements for the transfer of all materials and information needed to enable the Palestinian courts or tribunals to hear such claims as referred to in subparagraph b. above, and, when necessary, for the provision of legal assistance by Israel to the Council in defending such claims. The transfer of authority in itself shall not affect rights, liabilities and obligations of any person or legal entity, in existence at the date of signing of this Agreement.
The Council, upon its inauguration, will assume all the rights, liabilities and obligations of the Palestinian Authority.
For the purpose of this Agreement, “Israelis” also includes Israeli statutory agencies and corporations registered in Israel.
Settlement of Differences and Disputes Any difference relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred to the appropriate coordination and cooperation mechanism established under this Agreement. The provisions of Article XV of the DOP shall apply to any such difference which is not settled through the appropriate coordination and cooperation mechanism, namely:
Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Agreement or any related agreements pertaining to the interim period shall be settled through the Liaison Committee. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be settled by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed between the Parties.
The Parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both Parties, the Parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.
Relations between Israel and the Council
Israel and the Council shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and shall accordingly abstain from incitement, including hostile propaganda, against each other and, without derogating from the principle of freedom of expression, shall take legal measures to prevent such incitement by any organizations, groups or individuals within their jurisdiction.
Israel and the Council will ensure that their respective educational systems contribute to the peace between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples and to peace in the entire region, and will refrain from the introduction of any motifs that could adversely affect the process of reconciliation.
Without derogating from the other provisions of this Agreement, Israel and the Council shall cooperate in combating criminal activity which may affect both sides, including offenses related to trafficking in illegal drugs and psychotropic substances, smuggling, and offenses against property, including offenses related to vehicles.
Cooperation with Regard to Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities In order to ensure a smooth, peaceful and orderly transfer of powers and responsibilities, the two sides will cooperate with regard to the transfer of security powers and responsibilities in accordance with the provisions of Annex I, and the transfer of civil powers and responsibilities in accordance with the provisions of Annex III.
Economic Relations The economic relations between the two sides are set out in the Protocol on Economic Relations, signed in Paris on April 29, 1994, and the Appendices thereto, and the Supplement to the Protocol on Economic Relations, all attached as Annex V, and will be governed by the relevant provisions of this Agreement and its Annexes.
Cooperation Programs
The Parties agree to establish a mechanism to develop programs of cooperation between them. Details of such cooperation are set out in Annex VI.
A Standing Cooperation Committee to deal with issues arising in the context of this cooperation is hereby established as provided for in Annex VI.
The Joint Israeli–Palestinian Liaison Committee
The Liaison Committee established pursuant to Article X of the DOP shall ensure the smooth implementation of this Agreement. It shall deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest and disputes.
The Liaison Committee shall be composed of an equal number of members from each Party. It may add other technicians and experts as necessary.
The Liaison Committee shall adopt its rules of procedures, including the frequency and place or places of its meetings.
The Liaison Committee shall reach its decisions by agreement.
The Liaison Committee shall establish a subcommittee that will monitor and steer the implementation of this Agreement (hereinafter “the Monitoring and Steering Committee”). It will function as follows:
The Monitoring and Steering Committee will, on an ongoing basis, monitor the implementation of this Agreement, with a view to enhancing the cooperation and fostering the peaceful relations between the two sides.
The Monitoring and Steering Committee will steer the activities of the various joint committees established in this Agreement (the JSC, the CAC, the Legal Committee, the Joint Economic Committee and the Standing Cooperation Committee) concerning the ongoing implementation of the Agreement, and will report to the Liaison Committee.
The Monitoring and Steering Committee will be composed of the heads of the various committees mentioned above.
The two heads of the Monitoring and Steering Committee will establish its rules of procedures, including the frequency and places of its meetings.
Liaison and Cooperation with Jordan and Egypt
Pursuant to Article XII of the DOP, the two Parties have invited the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. As part of these arrangements a Continuing Committee has been constituted and has commenced its deliberations.
The Continuing Committee shall decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder.
The Continuing Committee shall also deal with other matters of common concern.
Missing Persons
Israel and the Council shall cooperate by providing each other with all necessary assistance in the conduct of searches for missing persons and bodies of persons which have not been recovered, as well as by providing information about missing persons.
The PLO undertakes to cooperate with Israel and to assist it in its efforts to locate and to return to Israel Israeli soldiers who are missing in action and the bodies of soldiers which have not been recovered.
Safe Passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip Arrangements for safe passage of persons and transportation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are set out in Annex I.
Passages Arrangements for coordination between Israel and the Council regarding passage to and from Egypt and Jordan, as well as any other agreed international crossings, are set out in Annex I.
Final Clauses
This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signing.
The Gaza-Jericho Agreement, the Preparatory Transfer Agreement and the Further Transfer Protocol will be superseded by this Agreement.
The Council, upon its inauguration, shall replace the Palestinian Authority and shall assume all the undertakings and obligations of the Palestinian Authority under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, the Preparatory Transfer Agreement, and the Further Transfer Protocol.
The two sides shall pass all necessary legislation to implement this Agreement. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than May 4, 1996, between the Parties. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.
Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice or preempt the outcome of the negotiations on the permanent status to be conducted pursuant to the DOP. Neither Party shall be deemed, by virtue of having entered into this Agreement, to have renounced or waived any of its existing rights, claims or positions.
Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.
The two Parties view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, the integrity and status of which will be preserved during the interim period.
The PLO undertakes that, within two months of the date of the inauguration of the Council, the Palestinian National Council will convene and formally approve the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant, as undertaken in the letters signed by the Chairman of the PLO and addressed to the Prime Minister of Israel, dated September 9, 1993 and May 4, 1994.
Pursuant to Annex I, Article IX of this Agreement, Israel confirms that the permanent checkpoints on the roads leading to and from the Jericho Area (except those related to the access road leading from Mousa Alami to the Allenby Bridge) will be removed upon the completion of the first phase of redeployment.
Prisoners who, pursuant to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, were turned over to the Palestinian Authority on the condition that they remain in the Jericho Area for the remainder of their sentence, will be free to return to their homes in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip upon the completion of the first phase of redeployment.
As regards relations between Israel and the PLO, and without derogating from the commitments contained in the letters signed by and exchanged between the Prime Minister of Israel and the Chairman of the PLO, dated September 9, 1993 and May 4, 1994, the two sides will apply between them the provisions contained in Article XXII, paragraph 1, with the necessary changes.
The Preamble to this Agreement, and all Annexes, Appendices and maps attached hereto, shall constitute an integral part hereof.
The Parties agree that the maps attached to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement as: map No. 1 (The Gaza Strip), an exact copy of which is attached to this Agreement as map No. 2 (in this Agreement “map No. 2”);
map No. 4 (Deployment of Palestinian Police in the Gaza Strip), an exact copy of which is attached to this Agreement as map No. 5 (in this Agreement “map No. 5”); and
map No. 6 (Maritime Activity Zones), an exact copy of which is attached to this Agreement as map No. 8 (in this Agreement “map No. 8”); are an integral part hereof and will remain in effect for the duration of this Agreement
While the Jeftlik area will come under the functional and personal jurisdiction of the Council in the first phase of redeployment, the area’s transfer to the territorial jurisdiction of the Council will be considered by the Israeli side in the first phase of the further redeployment phases.
Done at Washington DC, this 28th day of September, 1995.
Yitzhak Rabin – For the Government of the State of Israel
Yasser Arafat – For the PLO
Witnessed by:
Bill Clinton
The United States of America
The Russian Federation
The Arab Republic of Egypt
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
The Kingdom of Norway
The European Union
The Arab Peace Initiative was a Saudi-led initiative to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. The initiative called for a complete withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories, reaching a just solution to the issue of Palestinian refugees, and accepting the establishment of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state. In turn, the Arabs would consider the Arab-Israeli conflict over, sign a peace agreement with Israel, and establish normal relations with Israel.
Topics:
Missing Topics:
Countries:
Hover over the small text below to read the full document:
The Arab Peace Initiative
The Council of the League of Arab States at the Summit Level, at its 14th Ordinary Session, Reaffirms the resolution taken in June 1996 at the Cairo extraordinary Arab summit that a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East is the strategic option of the Arab countries, to be achieved in accordance with international legality, and which would require a comparable commitment on the part of the Israeli government.
Having listened to the statement made by his royal highness Prince Abdullah Bin Abdullaziz, the crown prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in which his highness presented his initiative, calling for full Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967, in implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, reaffirmed by the Madrid Conference of 1991 and the land for peace principle, and Israel‘s acceptance of an independent Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital, in return for the establishment of normal relations in the context of a comprehensive peace with Israel.
Emanating from the conviction of the Arab countries that a military solution to the conflict will not achieve peace or provide security for the parties, the council:
1. Requests Israel to reconsider its policies and declare that a just peace is its strategic option as well.
2. Further calls upon Israel to affirm: a. Full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967, including the Syrian Golan Heights to the lines of June 4, 1967 as well as the remaining occupied Lebanese territories in the south of Lebanon. b. Achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194. c. The acceptance of the establishment of a Sovereign Independent Palestinian State on the Palestinian territories occupied since the 4th of June 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza strip, with east Jerusalem as its capital.
3. Consequently, the Arab countries affirm the following: a. Consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended, and enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and provide security for all the states of the region. b. Establish normal relations with Israel in the context of this comprehensive peace.
4. Assures the rejection of all forms of Palestinian patriation which conflict with the special circumstances of the Arab host countries.
5. Calls upon the government of Israel and all Israelis to accept this initiative in order to safeguard the prospects for peace and stop the further shedding of blood, enabling the Arab Countries and Israel to live in peace and good neighborliness and provide future generations with security, stability, and prosperity.
6. Invites the international community and all countries and organizations to support this initiative.
7. Requests the chairman of the summit to form a special committee composed of some of its concerned member states and the secretary general of the League of Arab States to pursue the necessary contacts to gain support for this initiative at all levels, particularly from the United Nations, the security council, the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the Muslim States and the European Union.
What do you think of Trump’s new plan?
 

© 2020 Al Jazeera Media Network.
Produced by: Mohammed Haddad for @AJLabs
Videos: Adam Baheej Adada and Seena Khalil

source