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In Myanmar, there is great discrimination against the ethnic Rohingya. The Rohingya are an ethnic minority whose citizenship is not recognized by the Myanmar government. They are treated like illegal immigrants and are subjected to constant violence by Myanmar’s military and security forces. The Rohingya ethnic group experienced serious human rights violations where many of them were killed and their homes destroyed, so they had to flee to a safer place. Myanmar, which was formerly known as Burma, is a country whose population is dominated by descendants of the Buddhist Mongol race. Discrimination against the Rohingya ethnic group has a long history, starting in 1962 under the leadership of President U Nay Win. At that time, the president carried out several actions aimed at forcibly expelling the Rohingya ethnic group from Myanmar, these actions included extra judicial killings, arbitrary arrests, property expropriation, rape, anti-Rohingya and anti-Muslim propaganda, forced labor, restrictions on employment, and prohibition of religious practice. Then in 1982 the Myanmar Citizenship Law (Burma Citizenship Law 1982) was issued. It removed the Rohingya ethnicity from the list of recognized ethnicities in Myanmar, both in the main ethnic category which contains eight ethnic groups and the minor ethnic category which contains one hundred and thirty-five minor ethnic groups of Myanmar. For Myanmar, the Rohingya ethnicity is an ethnic Bengali or ethnic Bangladeshi who illegally entered Myanmar’s territory (Mangku, 2021). The absence of citizenship marks the absence of legal guarantees for the fulfillment of basic rights. The Rohingya people have lost access to health, employment and formal education.
The beginning of the discrimination faced by the Rohingya Muslims can be traced back to the British occupation of Myanmar in 1824. At that time, the Rohingya loyally supported the British. On the other hand, the Myanmar nationalist camp sided with Japan. It is because of these differences that the Myanmar government, until now, considers the Rohingya ethnic group has hampered the struggle for Myanmar’s independence and refused to grant them citizenship status. Nationalist groups along with Buddhists think that the Rohingya have received many benefits from the British government, which has fueled hatred against the Rohingya (Setiawan & Suryanti, 2021). In June 2012, the government of Myanmar destroyed and burned almost all the mosques in the capital city of Arakan. In addition, many madrassas were also closed. The freedom of the Rohingya Muslims to carry out their worship is revoked. If they are caught praying, it means they are subject to punishment (Mangku, 2021). From October 2016 to August 2017, the Myanmar military carried out a massive military operation in Rakhine, an area inhabited by ethnic Rohingya. This operation is considered as Myanmar’s systematic effort to erase the ethnic identity of the Rohingya and eliminate them from Myanmar. This was done through mass killings, rape and burning of their homes. No less than 700,000 Rohingya fled to neighboring countries during the military operation (BBC, 2019).
Indonesia began welcoming Rohingya refugees in 2009. In that year, 391 Rohingya refugees came to Indonesia. In 2015, there were 792 Rohingya refugees living in Indonesia. Some of them were accommodated by Indonesia Immigration Detention Centers (Rudenim) that located in Belawan, Tanjung Pinang and Manado, while some others were facilitated by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and lived spread across several cities such as Bogor, Jakarta, Makassar and Medan (Budaya, 2017). As of February 2023, according to UNHCR data, there were 1,161 refugees from Myanmar in Indonesia. Refugees from Myanmar are the third largest number of refugees in Indonesia after refugees from Afghanistan and Somalia (UNHCR, 2023).
In analyzing Indonesia’s response to the Rohingya refugee crisis, two concepts will be used, namely moral cosmopolitanism and political cosmopolitanism. In simple terms, moral cosmopolitanism is respect for fellow human beings. This type of cosmopolitanism views that all people have the same right, regardless of their identity; nationality, race, religion, class and others. Humans are universal beings and all are citizens of the world. Moral cosmopolitanism underlines the equal moral status of individuals and obliges us to consider the good of all human beings in our actions (Nussbaum, 1997). Therefore, moral cosmopolitanism focuses on recognizing and protecting basic human rights. Basic human rights and human welfare, including the right to be free from torture, the right to be free from discrimination, and the right to livelihood resources, must be protected (Buchanan, 2004). In moral cosmopolitanism, we have a moral burden that comes from the heart to help the poor, sick and hungry around the world (not limited to geographical location, closeness of kinship, ethnic differences and others). The real manifestation of moral cosmopolitanism is humanitarian assistance provided by individuals directly or through certain institutions.
Political cosmopolitanism or some call it ‘legal cosmopolitanism’ is an extension of moral cosmopolitanism in which the spirit of human equality is manifested in a commitment to certain policies. Out of this cosmopolitanism emerged the concept of a ‘world state’ which includes all human beings, which weighed heavily on the focus on ‘world citizenship’. Basically, the world state is still the ideal for political cosmopolitanism, or it can be said as a mega project that still has a very long way to go to be realized. Before arriving at the stage of the formation of a world state, a more practical application of political cosmopolitanism is the formation of global governance institutions that carry the values of justice and human equality, and the support for open borders (Etinson, 2010).
In terms of moral cosmopolitanism, Indonesia has done many things to help the Rohingya people affected by the conflict in Myanmar. Humanitarian aid is frequently sent by Indonesia for Rohingya refugees, for example in 2017 when Indonesia sent 30 tons of rice, 14,000 blankets, 2,004 ready-to-eat food packages, 20 units of large tents, 10 units of flexible water tanks, 900 packages of clothing and one ton of sugar to the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh (BBC, 2017). Indonesia has also built a hospital in Rakhine State. Rumah Sakit Bantuan Indonesia (Indonesian Assistance Hospital) is precisely located in Myaung Bwe, Mrauk U, Rakhine State. The construction of this hospital lasted for two years and was handed over technically to the government of Myanmar in 2019. Apart from being a symbol of friendship between Indonesia and Myanmar, this hospital is also expected to promote peace in the conflict area of Rakhine State. It is hoped that this hospital can be utilized by both Muslim and Buddhist in Myanmar. This hospital is funded by the Indonesian government, the Indonesian people, the Indonesian Muslim community, and the Indonesian Buddhist community especially WALUBI or Indonesian Buddhist Representatives (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Indonesia, 2019). This hospital is a reflection of Indonesia’s moral cosmopolitanism; providing inclusive humanitarian assistance regardless of differences in ethnicity, religion and other backgrounds. Indonesia, represented by Mrs. Retno Marsuadi as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, is also consistently involved in intensive communication with Myanmar and other parties such as the United Nations to encourage an end to human rights violations that is occurring in Myanmar.
The value of moral cosmopolitanism is also carried out by the people of Aceh. Aceh is the entry point for Rohingya refugees in Indonesia. Since 2015, Rohingya refugees arriving by boats have been rescued and assisted by local fishermen even though they were ordered not to get involved by the authorities. However, fishermen continue to search for Rohingya refugee boats based on humanitarian reasons (VOA, 2015).
Although Indonesia implements the values of moral cosmopolitanism very well, Indonesia has not been able to implement the values of political cosmopolitanism due to several limitations. Indonesia cannot be said to support open borders because it has not ratified the Refugee Convention 1951 and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugee (1967 Protocol). Thus, legally Indonesia does not have to be responsible for the problem of refugees and has the status of a transit country for refugees, including Rohingya refugees. In 2010, the Indonesian Directorate General of Immigration issued a policy stating that Rohingya refugees were categorized as illegal immigrants, but they were allowed to settle in Indonesia temporarily on condition that they must be recognized as refugees by UNHCR (Crock, 2014). This policy was later strengthened by Presidential Regulation no. 125 of 2016. This regulation confirms Indonesia’s willingness to temporarily accommodate refugees. It also contains national standards for the treatment of refugees in Indonesia. Article 2 of this regulation stated that the handling of refugees is carried out based on cooperation between the central government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Indonesia and/or international organizations.
The Indonesian government has several reasons for not ratifying the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol regarding refugees. There are several provisions in the 1951 Convention which are considered quite difficult and are still not possible for Indonesia to carry out at this time. For example, Articles 13, 14 and 30 oblige the state to facilitate the transfer of refugees’ property and assets; Articles 17, 18 and 19 allow refugees to get paid work, they are also allowed to establish private company; Article 22 oblige the state to give of the right to education for refugees; Articles 21 and 24 oblige the state to provide welfare rights for refugees in the form of housing and allowances (Liliansa & Jayadi, 2015). These articles are a dilemma for the Indonesian government because they can create gaps for Indonesian citizens. The Indonesian government is still trying to ensure its own citizens have enough jobs and have equitable access to education.
Indonesia is a country that has high concern for humanitarian issues. Indonesia keeps an eye for communities in other countries whose human rights are suppressed, including the Rohingya ethnic group. Indonesia, both the government and its citizens, implements cosmopolitan moral values. However, Indonesia still has not implemented political cosmopolitanism because there is a dilemma regarding the priority of the welfare of its own citizens which may clash if the state fulfills the welfare of refugees. The same dilemma is also felt by other countries in the world, even countries that have ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention so they have a tendency to close their borders or tighten the requirements for the entry of refugees into their territory. This makes the refugee problem complex; refugees in any part of the world are like floating objects because their basic rights are generally not fulfilled in transit countries and can only depend on philanthropy, which is very far from the idea of cosmopolitanism, both moral and political. The most important thing is to solve the problem from its root; stop conflicts that force refugees to move to safer places. A ‘world state’ does not have to be formed slowly from open borders because countries have to accept refugees. A world state should be formed naturally as a result of globalization, without people who need to enter an area because they are escaping from torture.
The AUKUS Submarine Deal: Tectonic Shift in the U.S.-Australia Alliance
Meilisa Anggraeni is currently pursuing her postgraduate education in International Relations program at Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia. She is interested in peace and human rights studies.
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In September 2021, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia signed a new three security agreement that gave Australia permission to buy nuclear- submarines and advance its space program. On March 2023, final agreement was disclosed by Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. According to this agreement, United States to sell Australia three to five Virginia-class submarines starting in 2032; the co-development by the United Kingdom and Australia of a new AUKUS-class submarine to enter service around 2040; and a multibillion-dollar commitment by all three nations to increase the capacity of a trilateral submarine industrial base.
AUKUS is an alliance of a bigger strategic transformation that is taking place in the Indo-Pacific as a result of different actions taken by U.S. allies and partners to increase their capabilities and collaborate more closely.
The Motive of originating such an alliance will be in the US favor to broaden its influence in the Indo-Pacific area. This alliance, according to President Joe Biden, is about investing in our greatest source of strength, our alliances, and updating them to better meet the threats of today and tomorrow. Maintaining the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific is Washington’s top concern. Analysts believe that the primary objective of the pact is the containment of a rising China, even though the objectives and motivations underlying AUKUS have not been publicly disclosed by any of its signatories
The action demonstrates how AUKUS, in conjunction with a new wave of U.S.-Australia force posture initiatives, can develop a collective deterrent policy more quickly than anticipated by many. It also provides a glimpse into the U.S.-Australian alliance’s seismic change, as Canberra positions itself as a key supporter of advanced American military operations to maintain a stable balance of power in the increasing challenges in the Indo-Pacific area.
The U.S.-Australian alliance, however, has faced some challenges in recent years. Under Trump, the US was ill-run, fragmented, unattractive, and weak. Although Biden is far from a perfect leader, his style reflects a noticeable change in American policy, which Australians appear to value.
This change has been taking place covertly. Washington and Canberra have been covertly rewiring the alliance through several new initiatives under the 2014 Force Posture Agreement, driven by a shared understanding of the need to support the regional balance of power in opposition to China’s growing military power and the United States deteriorating strategic position. A historic decision was made at the Australia-United States Ministerial Dialogue in 2021 to intensify force posture cooperation across five key areas—four service-based projects involving the Australian Defense Force (ADF) and the U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps, Navy, and Army, and a cross-cutting logistics, sustainment, and maintenance enterprise-sped up this process.
Despite the Australian Defense Force (ADF) having a lengthy history of fighting with American forces, Australian bases have never been formally included in American war intention. Additionally, they haven’t been used as a staging area for American military activities, at least not since World War II. Now, this is essentially altering. Australia is quickly developing into a base for other forms of force projection and will soon be the only ally in the world to host and assist military operations by forward-deployed U.S. strategic bombers and SSN attack submarines. U.S. warfighters will depend on Australian bases, infrastructure, and other resources as these new force posture initiatives develop and take center stage in American preparations.
The U.S.-Australian partnership has strengthened over the past year, but there are still disagreements. Washington wants Canberra to do more to combat climate change, and Canberra wants Washington to challenge China’s economy, which continues to be the top trading partner for the majority of Indo-Pacific nations. The Trans-Pacific Partnership departure by Trump badly damaged American influence in Asia. To make amends, Biden will need to put in a lot of effort.
The United States and Australia do not have highly established systems for coordinated military planning, in contrast to NATO and other American alliances, and have not yet defined how they might allot roles, tasks, and capabilities to prevent and address high-end security threats. This is a problem that needs to be addressed head-on by SRF (Submarine Rational Force)-West and other posture solutions. The political truth that posture integration is a two-way street must be accepted by both parties.
Australia has made a very explicit commitment to supporting Washington in a regional crisis by making the autonomous decision to host a significant U.S. warfighting force on Australian land. However, it has also given itself some insight into and power over American military plans, as well as enough stake in the outcome to positively influence them.
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The end of the Cold War and the influence of globalization brought a significant influence in the expansion of actors, issues and scope of study in the international relations study discipline. The dominance of the States as the main actor has been transformed by the emergence of non-state actors which can be seen in the form of Inter-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Multinational Corporations (MNCs), media and individuals (Mukti, 2013). Expansion in various aspects then gives authority for sub-national actors under the state to play an active role in achieving their regional interests. This phenomenon then gave birth to Sister City international cooperation involving the smallest unit of state in the form of cities or provinces.
Understanding the Concept and Legal Framework of Sister City
Sister City could be defined as a broad-based long-term partnership between two local governments in order to develop friendly relations and promote cooperation in tourism, social and trade relations that benefit both regions. The new cooperation will be officially recognized after the highest officials who are elected or appointed from the two regional governments sign and bound themselves into a sister city legal agreement. This concept was also introduced hoping that it can help a city or province develop to become a responsive and resilient area in dealing with governance issues (Nuralam, 2018).
The implementation of Sister City in Indonesia was formed in accordance with the circular of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 193/1652/PUOD of 1993 concerning Procedures for Establishing Inter-City (Sister City) and Inter-Provincial (Sister Province) Cooperation Relations within and outside the country. Regional government authority as an actor recognized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in foreign cooperation relations is regulated in Law No. 37 of 1999 concerning Foreign Relations, Law No. 24 of 2000 concerning International Agreements, and Law No. 23 of 2014 concerning Regional Government which replaced Law No. 32 of 2004 concerning Regional Government (Pujayanti, 2018).
In carrying out Sister City cooperation, there are several principles that are of concern and then become a driving factor for the realization of cooperation in the form of an MoU. The principle consists of seven main points, namely: (1) There are similarities between the two actors; (2) Potential exchange between the two actors in cultural, educational, economic aspects; (3) There is a reciprocal positive exchange; (4) Oriented to society; (5) Strategic benefits in the short and long term; (6) The existence of privileges and closeness that distinguishes it from other sister city collaborations; (7) Stable political conditions to ensure the continuity of the cooperation implementation process (Shaw & Karl, 2002).
The principles mentioned above basically aim to provide benefits for local governments that are bound by the MoU. Several forms of benefits from the Sister City cooperation include: (1) the creation of opportunities for knowledge transfer and transfer of experience which assist in the management of development in aspects of cooperation that have been agreed upon by both parties; (2) support the emergence of ideas and the active role of local governments and communities; (3) strengthening friendly relations between the two local governments involved including their communities; (4) creating space for the transfer of culture so as to enrich regional culture.
Memorandum of Understanding on the Bandung-Seoul Sister City Cooperation
Diplomatic relations between Indonesia and South Korea have been officially formed since September 17, 1973. Cooperation between the two countries has shown an increase, especially after the signing of the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership agreement in 2006 under the administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Various kinds of cooperation have been formed between the two, starting from the level between countries to inter-regional governments, one of which is the Sister City between the City of Bandung and the Metropolitan City of Seoul. Similarity in administrative status at the City level between the two is the main requirement for the formation of cooperation as stated in article 5 of the Minister of Home Affairs Regulation (Permendagri) No. 03 of 2008 which regulates the terms of Sister City cooperation. Cooperation between the cities of Bandung and Seoul has started since the signing of the Letter of Intent (LoI) in May 2015 which was then followed by the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) by the Mayor of Bandung Ridwan Kamil and Mayor of Seoul Park Won Soon on October 7 2016 in Seoul. The MoU regulates several points of cooperation agreed upon by the Bandung City Government and Seoul Metropolitan City Government, namely as follows: (1) Exchange of best practices in urban economics (including technopolis development), urban planning, slum improvement, watershed rejuvenation, mode of transportation cities, smart transportation systems, digital platforms and e-government; (2) cultural, arts and tourism exchanges; (3) Economy and investment; and (4) Personnel exchange and short-term training of Local Government officials and staff to increase human resource capacity (Bagian Kerjasama Kota Bandung, 2017).
Rational Choice Analysis in Sister City Bandung-Seoul Cooperation
The theory of rational choice explains how interactions between actors and resources are formed which are attractive in nature. The actor’s attention to resources controlled by other actors will create a sense of mutual interdependence which then influences actions to maximize the actualization of their interests (Coleman, 1990).
Seoul is an example of a city that has succeeded in restoring the Cheonggyecheon River. The restoration of the function of the river, which played an important role in the history of the Joseon Dynasty, succeeded in transforming a formerly slum area into a green pedestrian area through the 5.8 Kilometer Revolution project initiated by Mayor Lee Myung Bak in 2003 and realized in 2005 (Suryoputro, 2009). The restoration of the Cheonggyecheon river has had a positive impact, starting from lowering the city’s temperature in the summer to changing the image of the city of Seoul into an environmentally oriented city. In this Sister City collaboration and its relationship with Rational Choice Theory, Bandung and Seoul are actors who have resources in the form of technology, urban planning and cultural management. This actor then has the capacity to control the resources he has to achieve his interests. The Sister City collaboration between Bandung and Seoul can be seen as an effort made by the Bandung City Government as a rational actor to maximize Seoul’s urban planning management resources to actualize its interests (Apriliani, 2017).
The City of Seoul, which has experience in urban planning, then provided assistance to the Government of Bandung City in carrying out the restoration of the Cikapundung River, which is located in Pasirluyu, Gregol District. Slum and disorganized riverbanks because unregulated residential areas are planned to be revitalized and then built several facilities, such as parks, planting vertical plants, and arranging slum housing (Pemerintah Kota Bandung, 2016).
Conclusion
Having similarities at the administrative level, Bandung City and Seoul Metropolitan City as rational actors have authority in managing their resources to achieve the interests of their respective regions. The Bandung-Seoul Sister City collaboration which was signed in 2017 was carried out with the hope of providing benefits for both parties. For the city of Bandung, which is experiencing problems with urban planning, especially watersheds, Seoul’s track record in river restoration is an attraction. Several other forms of implementation of the Bandung-Seoul Sister City (FA, Bainus, & Riswanda, 2020) are Collaboration between the Seoul Tax Department and the Bandung City BPPD, the 2017 Seoul Friendship Fair, the establishment of Little Bandung in Seoul City and Workshops for staff of the Bandung City Regional Tax Service Agency.
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Three months ago, I Wayan Koster, the governor of Hindu-majority Bali, made his mark on the international stage by banning an Israeli squad from participating in this year’s FIFA Under-20 World Cup.
Operating at the intersection of domestic Indonesian politics, his country’s foreign relations and the fuzzy lines allegedly separating sports and politics, Mr. Koster is weighing a repeat performance with a double whammy.
However, this time around, the stakes for Indonesia and Mr. Koster may be higher.
If Mr. Koster opposes Israeli participation again, Indonesia could be deprived not only of the hosting of the Association of National Olympic Committees’ (ANOC) World Beach Games, the world’s most significant water and beach sports event, but also of its general assembly scheduled to open on August 13, a day after the tournament.
Worse, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) could sanction Indonesia by banning it from the 2028 Los Angeles Summer Olympic Games.
In 1964, the IOC barred Indonesia from participating in the Tokyo Summer Olympics after the Southeast Asian nation refused to let Israel and Taiwan compete in the 1962 Asian Games.
Under international sporting rules, hosts must guarantee access to qualifying athletes and teams irrespective of whether countries have diplomatic relations. Indonesia refuses to recognise Israel as long as the Jewish state fails to solve its long-standing dispute with the Palestinians.
So far, Mr. Koster and the Indonesian government, eager to avoid suffering additional reputational damage after FIFA stripped Indonesia of hosting rights earlier this year and moved U-20 World Cup to Argentina, appear to be hedging their bets.
As governor of a tourism-dependent island famed for its tolerance and hospitality that was hard hit by the Covid-19 pandemic, putting Bali at the center of international controversy would seem not to be in Mr. Koster’s interest.
In addition, the refusal, backed by Central Java Governor Ganjar Pranowo, to host an Israeli World Cup team produced mixed results.
Mr. Koster reportedly banned the Israeli soccer team at the behest of Megawati Sukarnoputri, a former president and head of President Joko Widodo’s ruling Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P).
The ban was intended to bolster support for Mr. Pranowo, the PDP-I’s candidate in next year’s presidential election. Mr. Widodo is constitutionally barred from running for a third term.
The move proved problematic because it juxtaposed two deep-seated Indonesian passions: support for the Palestinian cause and a love of soccer. Passion for soccer may be less of a consideration with the Beach Games, even though football is one of the tournament’s 14 disciplines.
“Instead of gaining an electoral boost by echoing anti-Israel Islamic elements, Koster and Pranowo’s public rejection of the Israeli youth soccer team has become a boomerang. These two men are attracting negative attention, not least from a large number of Indonesian football fans,” noted political scientist Burhanuddin Muhtadi as Indonesia lost its World Cup hosting rights.
Mr. Koster and Indonesian sports minister Dito Ariotedjo appear to be betting that Israel will not qualify for any of the Beach Games’ disciplines. That could be a risky bet, with the last qualifying events only ending next month.
Seemingly prematurely, the two men base their bet on confusion over an ANOC list of 69 countries. Mr. Koster believes the list, which does not include Israel represents countries qualified to participate in the Beach Games. ANOC says the document lists countries taking part in a seminar.
“I had an agreement when I received the visit of the youth and sports minister and the chairman of the Indonesian Olympic Committee, Mr. Raja (Sapta Oktohari), that the World Beach Games in Bali could be held without Israeli participants,” Mr. Koster said last month.
Mr. Koster’s track record with the World Cup, coupled with the confusion, has ensured that, unlike the FIFA tournament, the Beach Games have not sparked anti-Israeli protests.
The Israel Olympic Committee insists that “Israeli athletes will participate in the ANOC only if they are given equal conditions to those of other countries.”
The Committee said the International Olympic Committee “is in continuous contact with us on the matter, and we are confident that they will uphold the equality and right of the State of Israel to compete.”
So far, Israel’s men’s basketball 3×3 team and Israeli women swimmers are believed to have qualified for the Bali Beach Games.
Losing the Beach Games, just months after the World Cup loss, would cast a further shadow over Indonesia’s efforts to play a more prominent international role.
The Southeast Asian nation last year earned kudos for chairing the Group of 20 (G20), which brings together the world’s largest economies.
This year, as chair of the 10-nation Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Indonesia has been managing evolving differences in the group on how to approach the Myanmar junta.
Thailand broke ranks with ASEAN by hosting the junta’s foreign minister on Sunday for informal peace talks. Myanmar has been roiled by violence since a 2021 coup, with the military battling to crush an armed pro-democracy resistance movement on multiple fronts.
ASEAN has barred Myanmar from attending senior-level meetings for failing to honour an agreement to start talks with its opponents.
On another front, Indonesian Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto, like PDP-I’s Mr. Pranowo, a candidate in next year’s presidential election, proposed a peace plan to end the Ukraine war earlier this month. The plan called for a demilitarised zone and a United Nations referendum in what he termed disputed territory.
As G20 chair, Mr. Widodo travelled to Moscow and Kyiv last year to offer his services to mediate peace talks between the warring parties.
Controversy over the Beach Games puts Mr. Widodo in a bind.
“Israeli participation in the Beach Games puts Widodo between a rock and a hard place. What is good for Indonesia may not be what his party thinks is good for its electoral prospects,” said an Indonesian analyst.
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