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In the rapidly evolving landscape of international security, the recent unveiling of a modified Soviet-era submarine by North Korea has raised serious concerns. On Sept. 6, North Korea showcased a revamped submarine with the apparent capability to launch ten ballistic missiles. While it is understood that North Korea would require multiple submarines of this type to achieve full operational capacity, the mere existence of such a vessel represents a significant shift in the military balance in and around the Korean Peninsula.
The modified North Korean submarine operates on a diesel engine, a design choice that imposes certain limitations. Notably, it constrains the submarine’s ability to launch ballistic missiles across the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean. However, the East Sea’s favorable conditions for underwater vessels enhance the threat posed by this weapon system, especially concerning South Korea’s security.
In response to this growing threat, proponents in South Korea have advocated for the development of nuclear submarines for two compelling reasons. Firstly, nuclear submarines have the remarkable capability to stay submerged for months, in stark contrast to conventional diesel-electric submarines, which are limited to days or weeks underwater. Secondly, nuclear submarines can maintain speeds of up to 40 knots at depth, a critical advantage over non-nuclear submarines that struggle to achieve speeds exceeding twenty knots underwater for prolonged durations, necessitating frequent resurfacing for battery recharging. These attributes make nuclear submarines ideally suited for detecting and neutralizing North Korean ballistic missile submarines.
The public sentiment in South Korea largely aligns with this viewpoint, overwhelmingly favoring the development of nuclear-powered submarines as a means to counter the North Korean threat. The concept revolves around South Korean nuclear submarines lying in wait for North Korean submarines to depart from their ports, tracking and shadowing these vessels, and taking decisive action if any indication of an attack emerges.
However, realizing this vision poses a complex challenge. The Republic of Korea must engage in negotiations with the United States to secure a new agreement regarding the use of atomic energy, a process that demands substantial effort and diplomacy and which could potentially generate friction between the two allies.
The duration and consequences of these negotiations remain uncertain, leaving South Korea with a pressing question: What steps should be taken in the interim?
North Korea’s development of additional ballistic missile submarines and resolution of operational issues is expected to span three to five years. During this critical period, South Korea must establish a robust defense against this threat. Even if a new atomic agreement with the United States is successfully negotiated, the timeframe for designing, constructing and deploying nuclear-powered submarines is unlikely to align with the urgency of the situation. Thus, an immediate response is imperative.
One viable alternative to nuclear submarines is an investment in enhanced anti-submarine capabilities, which would be instrumental in patrolling, tracking and containing North Korean naval threats. Collaborative efforts with the United States and Japan to monitor the first island chain could foster trust and cooperation, potentially paving the way for a South Korean nuclear-powered submarine project in the future.
This comprehensive approach includes the upgrading of South Korea’s air-independent propulsion submarines, anti-submarine aircraft and naval surface combatants. Collaborative initiatives with Washington and Tokyo should focus on the enhancement, sharing and analysis of acoustic and non-acoustic anti-submarine sensor information. Moreover, South Korea should direct resources toward developing new anti-submarine technologies, including airborne and underwater drones, anti-submarine wave runners, and artificial intelligence-enhanced anti-submarine systems.
Cost is a pivotal factor in this deliberation. The construction and maintenance of a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines entail substantial expenses that necessitate a considerable increase in the defense budget. The fiscal implications of such a commitment must be meticulously evaluated and weighed against the urgency of the threat.
In conclusion, the North Korean ballistic missile submarine presents a formidable challenge to South Korean security. However, the pursuit of a nuclear-powered submarine project must be balanced with the ability to meet the threat in a timely manner and within budget constraints. As we navigate this complex and evolving security landscape, a comprehensive strategy that includes enhancing anti-submarine capabilities remains a prudent course of action while negotiations and preparations for a nuclear-powered submarine program progress.
Chun In-bum (truechun@naver.com) served as a lieutenant general of the ROK Army and commander of Special Forces Korea.
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