At the beginning of this month, an Egyptian border policeman named Mohamed Salah killed three Israelis soldiers—and received much praise from a broad cross-section of Egyptian society. The incident highlights the paradox whereby Cairo and Jerusalem work together very closely on matters of security, but anti-Semitism and hostility toward Israel are widespread among the Egyptian populace, and evident in state-controlled media. Haisam Hassanein explains what could be done to rectify this situation:
The most pragmatic way for President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to start changing the conversation about Israel inside Egypt may be to begin in Tel Aviv, where Cairo maintains a lethargic embassy whose staff is not curious about Israel and does little to promote a warmer peace. For example, the embassy does not facilitate visits for Egyptian businessmen and academics interested in cooperating with their neighbor to the north.
Egyptian diplomats barely participate in public events organized by the Israeli foreign ministry, academic institutions, or commercial entities. Many of them do not speak either English or Hebrew and live in Arab Israeli towns. The few who have command of English and Hebrew spend most of their time between Ramallah and Bethlehem. Unlike every other Egyptian embassy, the mission in Tel Aviv has no official Twitter account or Facebook page.
To encourage a change, American and Israeli officials must communicate to their Egyptian counterparts behind closed doors that keeping their relationship with Israel secret is the wrong approach.
U.S. congressional delegations visiting Israel should make a special point of knocking on the door of the Egyptian embassy. Cairo’s envoy, Ambassador Khaled Azami, did not even attend the funeral services of the soldiers killed last week, nor did he visit the wounded. Those who visit Azami should point out how he can revive his diminished status in town by becoming more of a public figure, since Abraham Accords ambassadors are celebrated everywhere in Israel.
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More about: Egypt, General Sisi, Israel-Arab relations
While reports vary as to the details of the informal agreement currently being negotiated between Washington and Tehran, the basic outline is clear: the ayatollahs will receive billions of dollars and keep their nuclear program, and in return will release hostages and make an unenforceable promise to cease enriching uranium past the 90-percent threshold necessary for weaponization. Richard Goldberg and Behnam Ben Taleblu write:
In addition to repeating the same mistake [as the 2015 nuclear agreement] of leaving nuclear infrastructure and centrifuges intact, this arrangement adds insult to injury by capping Iran’s uranium enrichment-purity level at 60 percent, [far beyond what is necessary for civilian use], which the regime can quickly enrich to weapons-grade, or 90 percent.
The administration may [also] be violating U.S. law by providing sanctions relief to Iran without first notifying Congress and waiting 30 days before releasing funds. . . . The statute specifies that within five calendar days after reaching any agreement with Iran relating to its nuclear program, the president must transmit the full agreement to Congress “regardless of the form it takes.” The president must also transmit additional materials related to any agreement. . . . These parameters suggest that Congress must review even an unwritten, informal deal.
Despite warning the public of deepening military and strategic ties between Iran and Russia, the Biden administration is moving forward with an agreement that would indirectly subsidize Iran’s transfer of weapons to Russia. Lax sanctions enforcement would also open new opportunities for Russia to use Iran for expanded sanctions evasion and to learn from evolving Iranian sanctions-busting practices.
Fortunately, Goldberg and Taleblu observe, Congress has the means at its disposal to stop a deal—if it has the will.
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More about: Iran, Iran nuclear program, Joseph Biden, U.S. Foreign policy