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Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian meets with Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud in Tehran, Iran June 17, 2023. Photo: Majid Asgaripour/WANA via REUTERS
In recent weeks, talk of progress in the normalization process between Israel and Saudi Arabia, with American mediation, has resurfaced in the media.
The discourse on the subject follows two main focal points. The first is the apparent Saudi effort to show pragmatism, signaling to both the United States and Israel that there is something to talk about. The goal is to score points in Washington, and as a result, receive various benefits.
The very fact that such positive Saudi voices exist, whether they have merit or not, has an impact on preparing the Arab street for some movement toward Israel in the future.
At the same time, growing voices in Israel and the US are arguing that a new window of opportunity has opened for normalization.
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A second media talking point focuses on the demands and conditions placed by Saudi Arabia for progress to be made. This discussion also brings to light the hurdles that stand in the way of the desired breakthrough.
This discussion focuses on four core Saudi demands.
The first is the need to complete the rehabilitation of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS) in the US, as well as bring about a change in the broader American political perception of Saudi Arabia. Both have been tarnished in Washington in recent years following the murder of dissident Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the war in Yemen, and more.
Mainly within the Democratic Party, Saudi Arabia is viewed as part of the problem in the Middle East, and not as part of the solution.
President Joe Biden will have to carefully consider his steps and decide whether the political achievements inherent in an Israeli-Saudi breakthrough are worth the political price he could pay in an election year.
The second challenge concerns a Saudi armament and security wish list containing advanced US military capabilities and other security guarantees. In this context, the US will have to balance the preservation of Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME), in accordance with American law.
This balancing act will require a discourse with Israel, which for its part will also need to make decisions on how far it will acquiesce to Saudi expectations. and refrain from objecting to arms sales to Riyadh, and whether it is prepared to make an active effort to counter objections in Congress.
The third challenge deals with Saudi aspirations to advance the kingdom’s civilian nuclear program. These aspirations include aspects of uranium enrichment on Saudi territory.
US and Israeli officials have voiced similar concerns over the years, regarding the proliferation of civilian nuclear technologies that could be converted into military capabilities. That is especially true in Saudi Arabia, a country that has a history of hiding military capabilities and has cooperated with China on long-range surface-to-surface missile development.
The US outline for an acceptable pathway for Riyadh on civilian nuclear progress, based on a limited model (like the one taken by the UAE, which gave up on uranium enrichment on its soil), is unacceptable to the Saudis.
The danger of America and the world saying no is that Saudi Arabia will seek to develop its nuclear program via non-Western channels (China or Russia). Even if Riyadh does not create a linkage between the normalization process and progress in its civilian nuclear program, in the current situation, where China is gaining ground in the region, it makes sense for the US (in coordination with Israel) to create a compromise sphere.
The final challenge is the Palestinian arena. On the surface, the escalation in recent weeks in the West Bank and the Israeli government’s moves create an insurmountable obstacle for the Saudi leadership regarding any progress in the normalization process.
In the background is King Salman’s traditional position, which places the issue as a main topic, unlike his son who is largely tired of the Palestinian issue and sees it as merely disruptive. It’s possible that MBS would settle for a prolonged lull that would allow him to make progress in normalization.
It should be noted that the issue of the Palestinians has and continues to come up in American discourse on normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia — though in this case, this seems to be the result of leveraging the normalization option to pressure the Israeli government.
So where do things stand?
There is no doubt that normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia is an important and very lucrative goal. There is a good reason that it is considered the “holy grail” of the Middle East peace process.
Normalization agreements would be accompanied by economic and other agreements that will create many options when it comes to regional connectivity, business cooperation, the development of interconnected infrastructure in transport, and energy, joint climate crisis adaptation, and more.
Points of balance can be found between Israel’s security needs and Saudi ambitions, as well as the common desire to build a regional system against Iran.
LTC. Tomer Barak (IDF, Ret.) is a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute. He is a 21 year veteran of the IDF. He served in the Israeli Military Intelligence and in the Strategic Planning Division.
The MirYam Institute is the leading international forum for Israel focused discussion, dialogue, and debate, focused on campus presentations, engagement with international legislators, and gold-standard trips to the State of Israel. Follow their work at www.MirYamInstitute.org.
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