Washington and the world
Fourteen Russia experts on what we learned about Putin over the past few days, and what the attempted mutiny could mean for Russia and the West.
By POLITICO MAGAZINE
Link Copied
The last few days have been alternately strange, confusing and nerve-wracking. The world watched as tension between several of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s most loyal lieutenants broke into the open, and one of them turned his guns on targets in his own country.
For now, the situation appears to have been resolved with an offer of exile to Yevgeny Prigozhin, leader of the mercenary Wagner Group, who resisted having his forces integrated into the Russian army and sent them into Russia to confront the military leadership. But it remains unclear to what extent Putin and the autocratic regime he has spent the last 23 years building has been damaged by the display of defiance, either short term or long term.
So we asked some of the most astute observers of Russia and its leader to share their thoughts on what we’ve learned about Putin in the last few days, and what that might mean for Russia — and the West — going forward.
Some think this is the beginning of the end of Putin’s rule while others think he could use the episode to consolidate his power. Some see a future of bitter infighting among elites in Russia and others see an escalation of the war in Ukraine. There’s also the complicating factor that there might be much more behind this settlement between Putin and Prigozhin than we understand now.
Here’s what they had to say:
Daniel Fried is former assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia, former NSC senior director for Europe and Eurasia, former ambassador to Poland, and now a Weiser Family distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council.
We have learned in the past 48 hours that Putin’s hold on power is vulnerable and that the Russian state is decrepit. That doesn’t mean Putin will fall tomorrow. But, faced with a military mutiny, Putin had to negotiate. Prigozhin was able to seize the city of Rostov-on-Don and drive on Moscow because, it seems, he either had tacit support in a lot of places or that a lot of people in the Russian system didn’t care enough to exert themselves to stop Prigozhin and his small force.
Putin himself brought up 1917 as an analogy. Bad idea putting himself in the place of Tsar Nicholas II but apt: Nicholas II presided over an unsuccessful war, incompetently led. So is Putin. The Russian state by 1917 was huge but hollow. The burden is now on Putin to show that Putinism means something other than chaos and a failing war, weakness clear to Russians and to Putin’s friends and foes in the wider world. That’s a challenge Putin may have trouble meeting.
Kathryn Stoner is senior fellow and the Mosbacher director of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at the Freeman Spogli Institute, professor of political science at Stanford University, and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. Her most recent book is Russia Resurrected: Its Power and Purpose in a New Global Order (2021).
There is much we still don’t know about the peculiar end to Prigozhin’s 36-hour mutiny against the Russian military leadership. But we must be careful not to draw the conclusion, as many analysts have already rushed to do, that this incident has dealt Putin’s regime a death blow. It has merely demonstrated something that serious Russia watchers have known all along — Putin is not infallible and all powerful; Russian politics exist, there is internal strife, and elites sometimes have deadly turf battles. We just saw some of this spill rather crudely out into the open because high politics under Putin is a game of personal loyalties rather than of institutions. Putinism is a bit of a house of cards — he played Prigozhin and his Wagner mercenaries off Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov presumably to spur Russian defense forces onward in their ill-managed “special military operation” in Ukraine. But Prigozhin got a little carried away, and Putin overestimated his own ability to control the monster that he had created. The short-lived mutiny was the result of his mafia-style rule of Russia.
Especially striking about this whole incident are three things. First, the ease with which Wagnerites were able to seize a major Russian city (Rostov-on-Don) and their subsequent rapid progress to within 200 km of Moscow indicates they may well have been picking up followers from regular Russian military units as they went. That would explain, second, Putin’s speech to the Russian people where he seemed to be preparing the country for civil war more than assuring his fellow citizens that this was just a mutiny by a ragtag bunch of mercenaries. He seemed genuinely frightened. This undermines the narrative of Putin the all-powerful both at home and abroad — an image he has cultivated carefully through his control of the Russian media. But it doesn’t provide evidence of a serious undermining of his authority. Third, the entire rebellion ended with Prigozhin going into exile in Belarus, a Russian vassal state, rather than to a labor camp in Siberia and his mercenaries going back to barracks. Why? We still don’t know what exactly he was promised but given that we know Putin doesn’t easily forgive and forget those whom he considers traitors (recall the poisoning of former KGB spy Sergei Skripal in the U.K. a few years ago, for example), Prigozhin likely is not sleeping well in Minsk.
This whole incident, however, is a reminder that Putin is powerful, but not infallible. The war in Ukraine is causing division among his clients and he lost control of one temporarily. The other lesson is that Putin has demonstrated that he fears internal dissent and rebellion more than he fears NATO and purported “neo-Nazis” in Ukraine. And well he should.
Nikolai Sokov is senior fellow at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Nonproliferation.
I am not sure we learned much about Putin and his prospects. Prigozhin’s adventure was not a coup, perhaps not even a mutiny. Putin classified it as such, but it’s worth noting that Prigozhin did not utter a single word against Putin. The thrust of his statements and action was against “Moscow generals,” Shoigu and Gerasimov first of all, but not just them. Putin sided with the military; he had signed a decree that all military groups outside the armed forces had to be inducted. All agreed without resistance except Wagner. The military, according to unconfirmed information, planned to use force against Wagner and arrest Prigozhin, hence his response, but he clearly treated Putin as the highest arbiter.
I do not anticipate any impact on the war. I do not anticipate any weakening of Putin and regime from this event. In fact, his support among the military might increase — both from Shoigu and top brass, but perhaps more importantly from generals and officers at the frontline. (Recall that Gen. Sergei Surovikin, perhaps the most popular general at the moment, chastised Prigozhin for risking a civil war in the midst of a war with outside adversaries; his attitude is the same as Putin’s.) I even suspect that what happened on June 24 may have helped somewhat defuse tensions that had been growing within the Russian body politic.
That said, I do not rule out a big shake-up within the top brass, which has demonstrated pretty poor performance during the last year and a half — exactly what Prigozhin wanted. This could make Putin more popular in the armed forces.
Rajan Menon is director of the Grand Strategy Program at Defense Priorities.
The Prigozhin saga showed that Russia’s military and security forces were caught completely unawares when the Wagner Group crossed the border from Ukraine and, without encountering any significant resistance, took control of the streets of Rostov and then headquarters of Russia’s Southern Military District, home to its 58th Combined Army, pillaging weapons. Prigozhin and his armed retinue then traveled up the M4 highway toward Moscow, via Voronezh and Lipetsk provinces — an astonishing achievement. The Russian state was rattled: Two senior generals made emotional appeals to Wagner forces to lay down their arms. Key highways were closed. In some places the internet was shut down to muzzle Prigozhin. Security in Moscow was tightened feverishly. Some Russians resorted to panic buying. Putin was forced to assure his people that the rebellion, which he described as a threat to the state comparable to the 1917 Revolution that toppled the tsar (itself a testimony to how seriously he viewed the threat) would be quashed. In all, a stunning chain of events.
For the moment, this much is certain: The image of invincibility Putin has sought assiduously to project for over two decades has been tarnished. Yes, the crisis was defused; but that required cutting a deal (we don’t know the terms) with Prigozhin (with Belarus’s president Alexander Lukashenko playing mediator), even though Putin had publicly accused Prigozhin of treason. Plus, Putin was forced to rely on help from the fighters of one warlord (Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov) to help vanquish those of another (Prigozhin). Putin’s spinmeisters will doubtless claim that he remained calm and decisive and defused the crisis. But three things are undeniable: The government was badly shaken, completely surprised and unprepared — not a good look. A state’s fundamental duty is to maintain domestic order. The last few days have called the Russian state’s readiness and competence on that front into question. Will its lapses tempt other rebels down the line? We cannot know, but Putin has doubtless pondered that possibility.
The effect of the Wagner Group’s presumed disbandment on the war in Ukraine also remains unclear. Wagner fighters have, on balance, performed better on the battlefield than regular Russian forces. But because Russia is now dug in for the defense, their absence won’t be transformative anytime soon. Eventually, however, Russia will move to offense. We’ll then have a better sense of the military consequences of the Prigozhin rebellion.
Michael Kimmage is a professor of history and department chair at the Catholic University of America. He formerly served on the policy planning staff at the U.S. Department of State, where he held the Russia/Ukraine portfolio.
Prigozhin’s curious attempt at a coup is not a harbinger of a popular revolution in Russia. It is not a 1917 redux. The rebellion was quickly wound up. When on the march, Prigozhin demanded neither an end to the war nor an end to the regime. His requests took the form of a personal vendetta against the Ministry of Defense. Though there was a period of indecision in the Kremlin and on the ground (attributable in part to the desire of Russians not to kill Russians), at no point was Prigozhin on the verge of peeling off a meaningful group of elite co-conspirators and making them a part of his insurrection. This was a coup that began as a whimper and ended as a whimper.
What this bizarre episode signals is a new way of doing business in Russia. Vladimir Putin has drained Russia of public politics. Everything is the regime and everything — supposedly — is in harmony with the regime. The people are quiescent. But this is merely the surface of Russian politics. The reality is fierce infighting within the elite, a sprawling and often miserable war (for Russian soldiers) and an aging autocrat whose style balances improvisation with procrastination; and this autocrat has mired himself in a war that he may not lose but that he cannot win. As in ancient Rome, enterprising generals have the potential to take matters into their own hands and to declare themselves Caesar. Prigozhin’s trial run was a burlesque version of what may become a regular feature of Russian politics: calculated plans for depriving the state of its monopoly on violence (not to destroy the state) and thus to take power at the barrel of a gun, continuing the regime while changing its leadership. The tsar is old; the state is weak; the future is open.
Tatiana Stanovaya is founder/CEO at R.Politik and senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.
Prigozhin’s rebellion wasn’t a bid for power or an attempt to overtake the Kremlin. Prigozhin’s objective was to draw Putin’s attention and to impose a discussion about conditions to preserve his activities — a defined role, security and funding. These weren’t demands for a governmental overthrow; they were a desperate bid to save his enterprise.
Prigozhin was caught off-guard by Putin’s reaction (he vowed to put down the rebellion with force) and found himself unprepared to assume the role of a revolutionary. He also wasn’t prepared for the fact that Wagner was about to reach Moscow, where his only option remained to “take the Kremlin” — an action that would inevitably result in him and his fighters being eradicated. Lukashenko presented Prigozhin with a Putin-endorsed offer to retreat on the condition that Prigozhin would leave Russia and Wagner would be dissolved.
Putin and the state have been dealt a severe blow which will have significant repercussions for the regime. However, I want to emphasize that image has always been a secondary concern for Putin. Setting optics aside, Putin objectively resolved the Wagner and Prigozhin problem by dissolving the former and expelling the latter. The situation would have been far worse if it had culminated in a bloody mess in the outskirts of Moscow. And no, Putin doesn’t need Wagner or Prigozhin. He can manage with his own forces. He’s now certainly convinced of that.
Matthew Rojansky is CEO of the U.S. Russia Foundation and distinguished fellow of the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute.
Prigozhin’s gambit may have failed, but it was a stress test of Putin’s public image and of the regime’s internal security order — from which both have emerged looking more vulnerable. Most troubling for Putin will be to figure out just how far the treasonous tentacles of Prigozhin and his likely higher-up allies within the regime may have spread. The relative silence of some senior regime figures when Prigozhin openly challenged Putin’s authority, and when his forces appeared likely to drive all the way to Moscow, means that purges are likely — even if they happen quietly and at a later date. That Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov’s private militia set out to dislodge Prigozhin’s mercenaries from Southern Command HQ in Rostov, meanwhile, raised serious questions about how far Moscow’s authority really extends in this vast country of 11 time zones.
Apart from scouring the ranks of his own regime for disloyal elements, and potentially alienating many others in the process, Putin will face hard choices in his ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Kyiv wisely focused on exploiting the insurgency for tactical gains, such as around Bakhmut and in the South, and on reinforcing its requests to western partners for more advanced weapons to sustain the fight in the long term. The events of the past two days, which pitted one Russian force against another, can hardly have helped the morale of Moscow’s troops in the field. Yet Putin is unlikely to respond by accepting the need to back down from a disastrous war that has now, perhaps, become existential for his dictatorship. Instead, Putin may well see doubling down as the solution to all his problems — declaring martial law and a new round of mobilization to enable stepped up repression, to distract from his weakness at home, and to try to make the war match his dark fantasy of a fight for survival for Russia itself.
Erica Frantz is an associate professor of political science at Michigan State University, where she studies authoritarian politics and the dynamics of political change.
It has always been in the cards that the situation with Prigozhin could escalate. Putin has thus far managed to stay above the fray with the infighting between Prighozin and the military elite, and one could say that in some ways he used the rivalry to his advantage: So long as different actors with arms were bickering with one another but maintaining loyalty to Putin, his rule was secure. That said, the fact that Prigozhin’s recent actions were so public — and pretty much impossible to hide from the Russian people — was undesirable (to put it mildly). Not only did they place divisions over the war effort on the public’s radar, but they raise questions about the extent to which Putin truly has the security apparatus under control.
Once the dust settles, however — and it likely will, given that others with arms did not join Prighozin’s rallying call — Putin will probably emerge even stronger in terms of immediate internal threats to his rule. When dictators survive public challenges like this, they often ratchet up repression in the period after and engage in all-out campaigns to signal their strength. But where the Prigozhin incident could be most consequential is with developments in Ukraine. The visible crack in Putin’s armor could prove to be a major motivator for Ukrainian forces and, importantly, the world powers who back them. And, should Putin lose the war, opportunities for political change in Russia may present themselves that did not exist otherwise.
Steven Pifer, an affiliate of Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, is a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine.
Life comes at you fast. In Russia, a lot changed over the course of June 24. The day began with Prigozhin’s forces in Rostov and heading to Moscow, as their leader demanded to see the defense minister and General Staff chief. In Moscow, the FSB issued an arrest order for Prigozhin, while Putin said he would crush the mutiny and bring the traitors to justice. By nightfall, Prigozhin’s troops were returning to their camps, abandoning Rostov and their march on Moscow. Prigozhin himself was headed to Belarus, with his arrest warrant canceled and his troops offered the opportunity to join the Russian army.
The “settlement” supposedly brokered by President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus leaves Putin, who was invisible during the day except for a short morning TV broadcast, as damaged goods. It provided the impression that all was forgiven, likely because the Russian president feared the prospect of Prigozhin’s troops parading in Moscow — even if they lacked the numbers to take control of the capital. It is harder to understand Prigozhin. His demands went unmet, yet he ordered his troops back to garrison, accepted that they might join the Russian army that he detests, and meekly set off for Belarus. There clearly is more behind this “settlement” than we understand.
Evelyn Farkas is the executive director of the McCain Institute and former deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia/Ukraine/Eurasia.
The now-arrested military revolt by Prigozhin and his Wagner mercenary group is the biggest challenge to Vladimir Putin’s authority in the 23 years he has governed Russia. Prigozhin not only challenged the way the war has been unfolding — something he’s been doing for months — but this time he questioned Putin’s justification for the war, rejecting Putin’s claim that Russia’s military operation was necessary to save Ukrainians from neo-Nazis controlled by the West. Instead, Prigozhin stated that the war objective was to enrich elites and raise the military rank of Defense Minister Shoigu (his military titles were awarded to him in his previous civil defense role running Russia’s emergencies ministry). Prigozhin avoided calling Putin out by name, and Putin returned the favor when he called Prigozhin’s revolt “treason.” This left both of them the room to engineer what looks like a compromise. But it is undeniable that Putin lost control of Prigozhin. He lost the monopoly on the use of force and though he appears to have restored his control, the episode revealed his weakness. His speech — the content of it, raising the specter of historic revolution on par with the 1917 Russian Revolution, and the anger in his voice — revealed his lack of control and worry over the situation.
There is now blood in the water. Elites around Putin, including key security leaders, will likely seek to take advantage, and Putin will almost certainly clamp down further on Russian officials and society. He will likely take retribution against anyone who helped Prigozhin. He may also fire Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov (he did fire Shoigu’s predecessor for unpopularity with the military and an appearance of ineptitude). But this may well be the beginning of the end for Putin, politically, even if it takes time. The clear winners of yesterday’s events are Ukraine and Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko. Belarus’ sovereignty hangs by a thread — having Prigozhin as his prisoner gives Lukashenko a bargaining chip to use against Putin.
As for Ukraine, a Russian military and defense establishment distracted by infighting, and troops further demoralized by attacks against the legitimacy of the war, may be easier to defeat. Having said that, Ukraine’s military victory is not a foregone conclusion. The United States, our allies and partners will have to continue to provide more and better equipment, including more fighter aircraft, intelligence and training to Ukraine. If we remain united and increase pressure on Putin, we can get Russia to withdraw from Ukraine and to back down. We have seen that Putin is capable of de-escalation and we cannot afford to become complacent. No Russian leader can be expected to relieve us of our responsibility to stop Putin’s brutal inhumane neo-imperial foreign policy once and for all.
Terrell Jermaine Starr (@terrelljstarr) is an independent journalist and host of Black Diplomats podcast. He is based in Kyiv.
Everyone here in Kyiv feels the dysfunction between Putin and Wagner head Prigozhin benefits Ukraine. How? That’s a tougher question to answer — especially on the battlefield. Mamuka Mamulashvili, head of the Georgian Legion, told me it will take some time before he and his men can ascertain if any weak points have been created amid the uncertainty of Wagner. So far, he’s seen no difference in Russian resistance. Keep in mind Ukraine has been conducting “shaping operations” looking for weak points in this first interaction of the counteroffensive and Wagner’s actions in Russia haven’t changed that. Had Prigozhin made it to Moscow and tried to overthrow the Kremlin, military resources could have possibly been reallocated to Moscow from the Ukrainian theater. But that didn’t happen.
If Prigozhin does go to Belarus, as the Kremlin claims, there are concerns that Wagner could attempt a march towards Kyiv from the North. But we don’t know how many troops he’ll take with him or, frankly, if he’ll be alive long enough to lead such an offensive. Not to mention that such an attempt would likely fail; Putin failed in his first attempt with his best forces to take the capital in 2022 and Ukraine repelled them. This ordeal has humiliated Putin. Keeping Prigozhin breathing will continue to weaken his standing in Russia, so the Wagner head’s days are likely numbered — no matter how instrumental he’s been in keeping Russia viable in this war.
But one thing is clear: There are major cracks in Putin’s power. How Ukraine will exploit them politically and militarily remains unclear at the moment.
Olga Oliker is Crisis Group’s program director for Europe and Central Asia.
The big thing we learned about Putin was that he doesn’t seem to have prepared for this contingency. After so many years of crushing dissent from the left, the actual threat came from the right, where the Kremlin had actually allowed criticism. The announcement of a speech, followed by a delay, followed by the release of a pre-recorded statement speaks volumes. The Kremlin seems to have thought that the experiment they were running with easing the state monopoly on violence was under control. This weekend proved that it wasn’t.
I don’t expect immediate impact on the war as a result of this. The Kremlin may choose to punish Ukraine because it’s there, but it has been punishing Ukraine for 14 months. But it will be interesting to watch what this experience does to strategy, morale and command and control. This isn’t so much about integrating Wagner, which will surely present challenges, as it is about how undefended Russia is and the now visible limits of state power. Furthermore, Moscow has been sending the message to both its domestic audience and the world for some months now that it can keep the war going forever, and that therefore it is set to outlast Ukraine and its Western supporters. The events of this past weekend suggest that Russia’s staying power is rather more brittle than advertised.
Kimberly St. Julian-Varnon is a Ph.D. candidate in History at the University of Pennsylvania, focusing on Russia and Eurasia.
We’ve learned the danger of allowing a private mercenary force to be a cornerstone of Russian foreign policy. Prigozhin has shown that he is not trustworthy and that the Ministry of Defense’s move to incorporate Wagner into its purview likely resulted from this realization. Moreover, Russian elites have remained quiet about what happened, and Prigozhin has not attacked Putin. Instead, his comments were aimed at the Ministry of Defense and General Staff, people he has been feuding with for months.
It is too early to see this as the death knell for Putin’s regime. We have seen columns of Wagner troops barrel toward Moscow then turn back; Prigozhin agree to exile in Belarus; and continued Russian shelling of Ukrainian targets. So, the next few days to weeks will be critical to Putin’s longevity, and I expect to see severe political repressions against those he has marked as incompetent or untrustworthy since Prigozhin began his March for Justice.
Rose Gottemoeller is the Steven C. Házy lecturer at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Formerly, she was deputy secretary general of NATO and undersecretary of state for Arms Control and International Security.
Putin has become careless about brandishing nuclear weapons during the war in Ukraine, even setting out an apocalyptic vision by insisting that a world without Russia is not a world worth having. This extreme language of nuclear Holocaust, whether he believed it or not, was for deterrent effect. He embraced nuclear weapons to keep the United States and its NATO allies off his back and out of his way as he pursued his adventure in Ukraine.
It did not work out that way. The United States and NATO were not ready to fight inside Ukraine, but they were willing to do everything else to support Kyiv’s cause — economic, political, security and military assistance to ensure Russia’s defeat. Nuclear weapons failed Putin as a guarantee against external meddling.
We learned on June 24 that they are no help to him internally, either. He could not brandish nuclear weapons in the face of the Wagner Group uprising. It would have meant national suicide if he had done so — the potential for nuclear weapons to be used on Russian territory in the midst of a burgeoning civil conflict.
Russian nuclear attacks against Russians — a terrible notion that highlights again the limited utility of nuclear weapons as anything but a deterrent against other nuclear use. They are not the authoritarian’s silver bullet when his power is strained to the breaking point — far from it. In fact, they represent a consummate threat to national and global security if they should fall into the wrong hands in the course of domestic unrest.
For that reason, the United States has a clear interest in reminding Putin and the power actors in Russia that their nuclear weapons and fissile materials must never fall into the wrong hands, whether militia strongmen or death merchants willing to sell them to the highest terrorist bidder. We conveyed this message well at the time of the Soviet breakup in 1991-92 and ended up closely cooperating to ensure that Soviet nuclear assets did not go astray.
Although such cooperation is impossible today, we can take this message to the global community and especially, to the states possessing nuclear weapons. We must engender intensive and active cooperation to prevent nuclear theft and terrorist misuse. Perhaps we need to look again, as the United States of America, at the nuclear security summits that President Barack Obama pioneered. The concept got leaders around the world to focus on the problem, stop loose nuclear talk, and put new measures in place to protect, control and account for nuclear weapons and the fissile material that go into them. This is what we need to do with nuclear leaders again — and especially with Putin.
Link Copied
© 2023 POLITICO LLC