Jeffrey Feltman is the John C. Whitehead visiting fellow in international diplomacy at the Brookings Institution. He was former U.S. special envoy for the Horn of Africa, and the former U.N. undersecretary general for political affairs.
The violence that erupted on April 15, and is now metastasizing between Sudan’s two most powerful generals and their respective forces, was sadly predictable. The marriage of convenience between the two warlords — built on a shared contemptuousness of Sudanese civilians’ democratic aspirations — collapsed into winner-takes-all battle for supremacy in which civilians are the collateral damage.
It didn’t start this way. In the aftermath of the popular revolts that ousted longtime Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir in 2019, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemedti), leading the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), overcame bureaucratic and ethnic jealousies by establishing common cause.
Unfortunately, their partnership was premised on undermining, delaying and ultimately derailing Sudan’s transition to democratic, civilian rule. The two sought to evade accountability for crimes dating back to the genocide in Darfur and the more recent massacre of over 120 unarmed protesters in June 2019. Above all, their arrangement was based on the shared understanding that Sudan’s military would never report to civilian authorities.
Left undecided until today was which general would end up on top once the civilians were permanently sidelined.
For the Sudanese military and the RSF, the partnership was wildly successful while it lasted. They postured as partners of Sudan’s civilian parties while cultivating and exploiting their bickering. They humored international partners supporting the civilian-military transitional government. They cultivated the pretense of being responsible players on the world stage by pledging to partner in counterterrorism operations, and by telegraphing their support for the Abraham Accords and normalization of relations with Israel.
Sudan’s heroic resistance committees — the decentralized and indefatigable protest movements that were the primary engine behind toppling Bashir — remained generally suspicious of the generals. But the international community adopted what, we told ourselves, was the only realistic approach: dealing with the warlords themselves.
The SAF and the RSF were entrenched in all aspects of Sudanese life, with Hemedti in particular enriching himself, including via mining schemes with the Russians. We avoided exacting consequences for repeated acts of impunity that might have otherwise forced a change in calculus. Instead, we reflexively appeased and accommodated the two warlords. We considered ourselves pragmatic. Hindsight suggests wishful thinking to be a more accurate description.
On Oct. 24, 2021, during my tenure as the first U.S. special envoy for the Horn of Africa, my team and I, along with U.S. diplomats from our embassy, had a series of meetings to address what Burhan and Hemedti insisted were their concerns with the transitional arrangements. In a final session that included both generals plus the civilian prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok, we presented ideas for easing tensions, addressing some of the generals’ concerns in hope of renewing the momentum behind the civilian-military partnership at the heart of the process. The generals and Hamdok committed to the plan we proposed.
Yet five hours later, despite having the United States backing their preferred compromises (including on when the head of the transitional government would shift from military to civilian), the generals staged a coup, arresting Hamdok, his cabinet and dozens of others. We had tried to work with the generals in good faith. Their action demonstrated that they never intended to reciprocate. Since then, history has repeated itself again and again: SAF and RSF leadership have made commitments only to subsequently break them.
Most recently, the United Nations, the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authorityon Development (IGAD) had facilitated discussions on establishing a civilian government. The Quad — the United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates — helped broker a framework agreement to this end. The European Union, Norway and others pitched in.
One can debate whether the creation of a civilian government in early April, as planned through these discussions, would have been sufficiently credible in the eyes of the resistance committees. But that is all in the past now. The Sudanese military and the RSF short-circuited any debate by abandoning the negotiations and going after each other instead. As of this writing, Burhan and Hemedti appear to be engaging in a fight to the death.
With admirable speed, regional leaders agreed to send a team of three heads of state to Khartoum. Sudan’s neighbors know that, even if the primary victims of the Burhan-Hemedti blood feud will be Sudan’s beleaguered population, the region, too, will suffer in the case of an all-out civil war. The Arab League has also demanded a cease-fire.
One can expect the African Union, United Nations, E.U., and United States will want to support this initiative. Such support will be necessary. But given that the international community’s reputation has been badly tarnished by its insistence on working with the same generals who are responsible for this latest violence, the region will have to take the lead.
The greatest disservice that could be done to the Sudanese people, to the integrity of Sudan as a sovereign state, to the security of Sudan’s neighbors, and indeed to international peace and security, would be to allow negotiations between the belligerents to yield yet another internationally endorsed compromise predicated on power-sharing. At least now it should be clear that Burhan and Hemedti are not reformers — and that they will never be reformed.
In any case, a cynical cease-fire premised on power-sharing between the warlords will not be stable. The Sudanese people’s aspirations for democracy and civilian rule are not easily ignored. Even during the heyday of the Burhan-Hemedti partnership, brute force did not vanquish the resistance committees.
Until now, Sudan’s civilians have faced a unified front in Burhan and Hemedti. Assuming it survives, it is conceivable that a civilian authority will be able to better face down a possibly divided and battered security apparatus less able or willing to enforce its rule. Such an outcome may prove unlikely. But it is the only glimmer of hope one can find in this awful tragedy.