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The placement of tactical warheads in Belarus puts Lukashenka’s political fate in Putin’s hands
“There won’t be any hesitation.” These were the words of Alexander Lukashenka on the possibility of Belarus using nuclear weapons last week.
Russian tactical nuclear weapons have reportedly already been moved into Belarus, according to separate statements by both Lukashenka and Vladimir Putin. “God forbid I’ll have to take the decision to use these weapons today,” Lukashenka said on 13 June. “But there won’t be any hesitation if there’s aggression against us.”
Ukraine intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov has since claimed that ‘no warheads’ have yet arrived in Belarus, but that the country’s warhead storage facilities are being prepared.
The arrival, real or otherwise, of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus was meant to be a victory for Lukashenka. He has been trying to convince Belarusians that the decision will strengthen Belarusian security, as the West is accused of trying to take control of the country and Ukraine of threatening to attack it.
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But in reality, the transfer of Russian nukes is likely driving a difficult process for Lukashenka: the Russian security establishment taking increasing control of Belarus under cover of its war against Ukraine.
Lukashenka first announced he was ready to offer Vladimir Putin the option of moving nuclear weapons into Belarus in the autumn of 2021.
Nuclear weapons are an old dream of Lukashenka’s. Long before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, he repeatedly expressed regret that Soviet warheads had been withdrawn from Belarus in the 1990s, calling this decision “a cruel mistake”.
Lukashenka saw weapons of mass destruction as a trump card that would finally force the international community to take him seriously. “If we had these weapons, they would be talking to us differently,” he said back in 2010. His sense of embattlement has only grown since the mass protests that directly challenged his hold on power in 2020.
The arrival of Russian nukes to Belarus, real or otherwise, hasn't given any political point to Lukashenka
Getty Images
But for Lukashenka to benefit from the decision to station nuclear weapons in Belarus, the decision would have to have made Belarus look like an equal partner. Instead, it made Belarus look like a Kremlin satellite, or even just a controlled territory.
On 25 March, Putin announced his intention to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, but said they would remain under Russian, not Belarusian, control. The Belarusian authorities do not seem to have been ready for the announcement – Lukashenka didn’t comment on it publicly for six days.
He broke his silence on 31 March, during his annual address to the National Assembly of Belarus. Lukashenka explained the move by claiming that the West was allegedly preparing to attack Belarus. But he differed from Putin in saying that Minsk would be given control of the warheads.
“This is our weapon,” Lukashenka stressed. “Now do you believe that we will strike back? We will strike back to the fullest!”
Lukashenka even tried to seize the initiative on the issue of nuclear blackmail from the Kremlin. He said he had ordered the immediate restoration of sites for the launch of the Topol-M intercontinental strategic missiles that were supposed to have been dismantled in the 1990s. (Strategic weapons are more powerful than tactical ones.)
“If need be, Putin and I will decide and introduce strategic nuclear weapons,” Lukashenka promised. “And they must understand this, the scoundrels who are abroad and are trying to blow us up from within and without. We will stop at nothing to defend our countries, our states and our peoples."
The Kremlin finished formalising its ‘nuclear arrangement’ with Belarus in late spring. Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu arrived in Minsk on 25 May and, alongside his Belarusian counterpart Viktor Khrenin, signed documents regarding the storage of tactical nuclear weapons in a special facility.
Lukashenka, meanwhile, was in Moscow, at the Eurasian Economic Union summit. The previous day, journalists had noticed a remark by the president of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, about the closeness between Belarus and Russia. “They even share nuclear weapons,” Tokayev joked, as Putin and Lukashenka sat on the stage beside him.
There is no point worrying about angering Lukashenka if all the important decisions in Belarus are already being made by Putin
Immediately after Tokayev’s remark, Putin said something to Lukashenka, while sitting next to him, and the pair shook hands. Lukashenka later told journalists the Russian leader said he had recently signed a decree on the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. Lukashenka was informed after the fact, in passing, like this was a minor event.
Even stranger remarks were made by Lukashenka the next day, when he was asked: “Are [nuclear weapons] already in Belarus?” Lukashenka replied: “Perhaps. When I arrive, I’ll find out.”
It seems it was no coincidence that the announcement was so disrespectful to the sovereignty of Belarus: Putin wanted to deprive Lukashenka of the chance to earn political points.
In the West, the Kremlin’s nuclear blackmail does not seem to have worked. The EU did call Moscow’s actions a “threat to to European security”, but the international reaction to the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus has been quite calm: the prevailing belief is that the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus actually changes nothing.
Indeed, with Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus, Lukashenka has lost any chance of distancing himself from the Kremlin in the event of Russia’s defeat. Sure enough, while the Ukrainian government once took a careful position on Belarus, it has now made a clear decision about which side the Lukashenka regime is on. Officials have started meeting the opposition in exile, introduced sanctions against Belarus, and recalled diplomats.
The logic of the Zelenskyi administration is simple: there is no point worrying about angering Lukashenka if all the important decisions in Belarus are already being made by Putin.
These events could also have significant consequences inside Belarus, but they are unlikely to manifest themselves in the near future.
According to a Chatham House poll, the percentage of the Belarusian urban population opposed to the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus in June 2022 was 80%. The Belarusian authorities, of course, deny that the decision on tactical nuclear weapons could be so unpopular. But in any event, the lack of support is unlikely to frighten Lukashenka.
First, there is nothing to indicate that the arrival of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus is about to spark an uprising. In contrast to the beginning of the war, when thousands of people took to the streets in anti-war protests, the news of the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons was received calmly in Belarus – not even solo protests were held. Most people view the arrival of weapons negatively, but won’t take risks under conditions of total state terror.
Second, the Lukashenka regime in its current almost totalitarian form is unconcerned about opinions in society. According to opinion polling, the approval rating of the dictatorship in recent years has been consistently around 20% to 25%. The 20% of those surveyed who have a “positive” or “rather positive” attitude towards tactical nuclear weapons are most likely Lukashenka’s supporters. These people support a strong government in Belarus, whatever it does – be it mass repression or support for Russian aggression against Ukraine.
Seemingly, after the post-election protests of 2020, Lukashenka is no longer seeking to expand his electoral support significantly: he is satisfied with a loyal, hardcore minority. This minority, in turn, does not perceive the deployment of nuclear weapons as an existential challenge. It seems that today only the question of Belarus’ direct participation in the war is capable of splitting the electorate of the dictatorship – according to a number of studies, between 3% and 11% of the country's inhabitants would support such a decision.
Lukashenka has had to explain to his entourage more than once that he is still running the country, not Putin
Getty Images
Meanwhile, for Lukashenka, it is extremely important that the regime’s core electorate sees nuclear weapons as a manifestation of strength rather than weakness.
By itself, the placement of tactical nuclear weapons should be a win for Lukashenka in the eyes of his faithful supporters. It should give the Belarusian security forces and regime nomenklatura confidence, convincing them that the regime is secure. When the decision was first announced in public, Lukashenka’s belligerent statements were met with thunderous applause every time.
But if Russia deploys tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus of its own volition, then the regime’s supporters may wonder who the country’s real master is. Belarus’ total dependence on Russia has already given rise to the phenomenon of double loyalty. Lukashenka’s security services have come to place special emphasis on defending Moscow’s interests. When protesters are detained, they are sometimes photographed against the backdrop of Z and V symbols and forced to apologise for their actions to the people of Russia, Putin, and Ramzan Kadyrov, the head of the Chechen Republic. Russian flags and portraits of Putin hang in the offices of some security officials.
An experienced politician, Lukashenka understands that this kind of dual loyalty represents a risk: in the end, the Belarusian security forces and nomenklatura could conclude that it is enough to be loyal only to Moscow. Therefore, over the past year, Lukashenka has had to explain to his entourage more than once that he is still running the country, not Putin.
By showing that the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus does not depend on Lukashenka, the Kremlin has struck at the regime’s weakest point – it makes the security forces and the Belarusian nomenklatura doubt the independence and autonomy of their leader.
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