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August 7, 2023, 5pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00pm ET on August 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[1] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that fighting is ongoing south of Bakhmut and that eastern Ukraine has been the epicenter of hostilities in the past week.[2] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged in an interview published on August 6 with Argentine news outlet La Nacion that the tempo of counteroffensive operations is slower than expected and stated that patience is necessary in order for Ukraine to win.[3] Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces are in the offensive phase of operations and continue to hold the initiative.[4]
Russian forces and occupation administrators continue to seek to mitigate the impact of recent Ukrainian strikes on logistics nodes along key Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting occupied Crimea with occupied Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk noted that Ukrainian strikes on the Chonhar and Henichesk bridges were intended to specifically target Russian plans and strategies and inhibit the ability of Russian forces to bring supplies and personnel to the front.[5] Humenyuk also emphasized that Russian forces must now route supplies and personnel through Armyansk, directly on the border between Kherson Oblast and Crimea and within 80km of the frontline.[6] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo reported that his administration has temporarily changed the logistics and vehicle crossing routes between occupied Kherson and Crimea due to damage to the Chonhar Bridge, including the suspension of bus traffic between Simferopol, Crimea and Henichesk, Kherson Oblast.[7] Russian milbloggers notably did not comment on the aftermath of the strikes on August 7, further supporting ISW’s previous assessment that Russian officials may have directed Russian correspondents to not offer commentary on Ukrainian strikes on Russian logistics nodes in Crimea to avoid generating panic within the information space.[8]
Russian opposition media outlet Verstka suggested that the Russian Investigative Committee and its head, Alexander Bastrykin, are directly involved in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia and the forced placement of Ukrainian children into Russian military training programs.[9] Verstka reported that the Russian Investigative Committee “took patronage” over Ukrainian children living in children‘s homes throughout Russia, and sent its employees to 10 such homes with toys, clothes, and school supplies in order to coerce the children to enter the Russian cadet corps. Verstka reported that Bastrykin personally visited Ukrainian children in Russia and told them that Russian victory depend on the children and that the Russian Investigative Committee is there to support them. Verstka reported that the Investigative Committee previously advertised the cadet corps to Ukrainian children from Donbas and stated that 78 Ukrainian children entered educational institutions, including the cadet corps and academies affiliated with the Investigative Committee, between February 2022 and March 2023. Verstka reported that Bastrykin ordered the cadet corps in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Volgograd to prepare to receive Ukrainian children from occupied Donbas as early as February 25, 2022. Verstka highlighted statements from Ukrainian children who said they felt compelled to participate in the Russian cadet corps due to the educational opportunity. The coercion of Ukrainian children, who are legally unable to consent to their deportations and participation in such military-patriotic re-education programs, is likely part of an ongoing Russian campaign to eradicate the Ukrainian national identity and militarize youth who have been forcibly deported to Russia.
China’s increasing misalignment with Russia on any settlement to end the war in Ukraine was reportedly evident at the talks in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on August 5-6. The Financial Times reported that the Chinese representatives at the meeting were “constructive” and “keen to show that [China] is not Russia.”[10] The Financial Times quoted one European diplomat present at the talks as saying that the “mere presence of China shows Russia is more and more isolated.”[11] The Chinese delegation reportedly indicated its willingness to attend the next meeting of a similar format that will likely also exclude Russia.[12] A Russian insider source alleged that Russia has rejected China’s 12-point peace plan for the war in Ukraine from February 2023 (which the Chinese delegation re-introduced during the talks in Saudi Arabia) and that some Chinese elites are secretly expressing their dissatisfaction with the actions of the Russian leadership regarding a peaceful settlement of the war in Ukraine.[13] These reports from the talks in Saudi Arabia and insider allegations, if true, align with ISW’s previous assessments that China is not fully aligned with Russia on the issue of Ukraine and that Russia and China’s relationship is not a “no limits partnership” as the Kremlin desires.[14]
The Ukrainian delegation at the talks in Saudi Arabia presented a 10-point peace plan that reportedly included calls for global food security, nuclear safety, environmental security, humanitarian aid, and prisoner releases.[15] Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff reported that all of the members of BRICS besides Russia – Brazil, India, China, and South Africa – attended the talks.[16] Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova predictably responded to the Ukrainian peace plan, calling it a “meaningless ultimatum, which is aimed at protracting hostilities.”[17] Zakharova thereby repeated a longstanding Russian information operation that absurdly claims that Russia, unlike Ukraine, “has always been and will remain open to a diplomatic solution” to the war in Ukraine.[18]
Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted a prisoner-of-war (POW) exchange on August 7. Ukrainian officials reported that 22 Ukrainian soldiers returned to Ukraine and did not state how many Russian POWs returned to Russia.[19] Official Russian sources have not reported on the POW exchange and Russian milbloggers have notably not commented on it either. Russian milbloggers have often criticized the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) when POW exchanges are not carried out on a one-to-one ratio between Ukrainian and Russian personnel.[20]
Key Takeaways: 
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove line on August 7 and did not make any confirmed or claimed advances. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk) and Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove) and that elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District) repelled a Ukrainian attack near Novoselivske (16km northwest of Svatove).[21]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on August 7 and advanced. Geolocated footage published on August 5 shows that Russian forces captured Novoselivske.[22] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces advanced into Ukrainian defenses near Vilshana (15km northeast of Kupyansk) and that Russian forces have advanced 11 kilometers along the front and three kilometers deep in the Kupyansk direction over the past three days.[23] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces captured Ukrainian positions near Karmazynivka (13km southwest of Svatove).[24] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Synkivka, east of Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk), north of Ivanivka (30km northwest of Svatove), south of Novoselivske, near Novoyehorivka (16km southwest of Svatove), Serhiivka (12km southwest of Svatove), and near Nadiya (13km southwest of Svatove).[25]
The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful limited ground attacks in the Kreminna area on August 7. The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Central Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian attacks in the Serebryanske forest area (10km south of Kreminna) and near Torske (14km west of Kreminna).[26]
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks around Kreminna on August 7 but did not make any confirmed or claimed advances. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks in the Serebryanske forest area and near Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[27]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut but did not advance on August 7. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the area between Yahidne (2km north of Bakhmut) and Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), where fighting is ongoing.[28] Multiple Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian infantry unsuccessfully attacked Russian forces from the direction of the Berkhivka reservoir on the northern flank of Bakhmut.[29] Multiple Russian sources also claimed that small Ukrainian infantry groups unsuccessfully attacked Russian forces near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[30] Ukrainian Defense Deputy Hanna Malyar reported that fighting is ongoing near Klishchiivka, Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut), and Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[31]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut and did not advance on August 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked Ukrainian forces near Andriivka, Kurdyumivka, Dyliivka (15km southwest of Bakhmut), and Druzhba (18km southwest of Bakhmut).[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a counterattack near Kurdyumivka but did not specify an outcome.[33]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line but did not advance on August 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Avdiivka, Krasnohorivka (directly west of Donetsk City), and Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[34] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted assault operations in Marinka and northwest of Avdiivka.[35] Malyar reported that Russian forces in the Avdiivka and Marinka directions primarily aim to capture Krasnohorivka, Marinka, and the surrounding settlements.[36]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border on August 7 and did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces continue offensive operations in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[37] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack on Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka), and several Russian milbloggers added that Ukrainian troops attacked Urozhaine with the forces of up to two infantry platoons with tank and armored vehicle support.[38] Some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops crossed the Mokryi Yaly River just west of Urozhaine, but that Russian forces ultimately repelled the attack and pushed Ukrainian troops back to their original positions.[39]
Russian forces conducted a limited and unsuccessful ground attack along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border on August 7. Malyar and a Russian milblogger reported that Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful attack to regain lost positions near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[40]
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 7 and did not make any claimed or confirmed gains. Malyar noted that Ukrainian forces continued successful offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction and are consolidating positions near Mala Tokmachka (10km southeast of Orikhiv) and Robotyne (15km south of Orikhiv).[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian troops launched a limited infantry attack with armored vehicles and tank support towards Robotyne, but that Russian forces repelled the attack.[42] Russian news outlet RIA Novosti claimed that Russian forces continue to repel Ukrainian attacks towards Robotyne and prevent Ukrainian forces from advancing past the outskirts of the settlement.[43] One milblogger noted that Ukrainian activity on this sector of the front is relatively low and claimed that a small sabotage and reconnaissance group attempted an unsuccessful sortie towards Pyatykhatky (25km southwest of Orikhiv).[44]
Russian forces conducted counterattacks and reportedly regained some lost positions in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Robotyne.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces counterattacked and successfully pushed Ukrainian forces back by 1.5km from the outskirts of Robotyne.[46] A Russian milblogger reported that elements of the Russian airborne (VDV) forces are redeploying from Kherson Oblast to the Robotyne area to defend against continuous Ukrainian attacks.[47] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov also claimed that elements of the Chechen “Vostok-Akhmat” battalion are also fighting in the Orikhiv area.[48]
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued routine artillery fire in Kherson Oblast on August 7. Ukrainian sources reported that Russian troops struck settlements along the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River, including Kherson City.[49] A Russian milblogger warned that Ukrainian forces have intensified their use of drone reconnaissance and counterbattery fire in Kherson Oblast.[50] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that the GUR “Shaman” battalion continues operations on the Russian-occupied east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast but did not specify where these operations are occurring.[51]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
The Kremlin continues efforts to portray itself as adequately mobilizing the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) for a protracted war effort. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Rostec Head Sergey Chemezov, who claimed that Rostec has increased production to accommodate the Russian state defense order but emphasized that Rostec still needs to fill critical personnel shortages.[52] Chemezov claimed that Rostec produced 90 percent of all Russian goods used in Ukraine and employs 592,000 personnel but urgently needs to fill 23,000 employment vacancies. Chemezov claimed that Rostec reduced its output of civilian goods from 45.5 to 44.5 percent to accommodate the Russian state defense order and that Rostec’s overall worker output has increased by 2.5 percent and wages by 17.2 percent. Putin stated that Rostec has met the state defense order so far but needs to further increase output, and instructed Chemezov to increase the production of modern weapons including T-90 tanks, Lancet drones, and aviation systems.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
Russian occupation authorities continue to use maternity capital benefits to coerce Ukrainian civilians in occupied territories to accept Russian citizenship and increase social control in occupied areas. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that the Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration has issued over 8,257 certificates for maternity capital in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast since January 1, 2023.[53] Occupation authorities may be pushing or coercing participation in social welfare programs in order to encourage population growth in occupied areas and to encourage families to register with Russian-controlled administrative organs, as ISW has previously reported.[54]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus).
ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.
An alleged Wagner Group commander reportedly denied Wagner’s presence in Belarus, despite a plethora of visual evidence confirming that Wagner forces are in Belarus. A Wagner-affiliated source claimed on August 7 that the alleged Wagner intelligence head (callsign “Bonya”) claimed that Wagner forces are not in Belarus.[55] The source also claimed that several Wagner sources announced that Wagner forces in Belarus unexpectedly went on leave to Russia while others went on a “business trip” to unspecified African countries.[56] Another Wagner-affiliated source refuted this statement and claimed that there are 7,000 Wagner personnel in Belarus, 12,000 Wagner personnel are on leave, and an additional 1,500 Wagner personnel deployed to Africa.[57] ISW has observed and reported on satellite imagery and other visual evidence of Wagner personnel in Belarus.[58]
Russian forces, likely including Wagner fighters, are continuing to train Belarusian forces in Belarus. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted images of the Belarusian 6th Separate Guards Mechanized Brigade conducting command post exercises at the Gozhsky Training Ground in Grodno, Belarus.[59] The Belarusian MoD claimed that trainers used “the experience of the special military operation” during the military exercises, suggesting that Russian or Wagner forces continue to train Belarusian forces.[60]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vDasR1LnzPoDVtY8Xj9jwYwuKvijARZX13o7Pup3emxwx5gAuZEm1QZ5G4bezsZEl
[2] https://t.me/annamaliar/990
[3] https://www.lanacion dot com.ar/el-mundo/entrevista-con-volodimir-zelensky-la-contraofensiva-es-complicada-probablemente-mas-lenta-de-lo-que-nid06082023/
[4] https://www.lanacion dot com.ar/el-mundo/entrevista-con-volodimir-zelensky-la-contraofensiva-es-complicada-probablemente-mas-lenta-de-lo-que-nid06082023/
[5] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/08/07/vorog-ne-mozhe-pidtyagnuty-resursy-i-znyzhuye-kilkist-obstriliv-nataliya-gumenyuk/
[6] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/08/07/vorog-ne-mozhe-pidtyagnuty-resursy-i-znyzhuye-kilkist-obstriliv-nataliya-gumenyuk/
[7] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/1057
[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080223
[9] https://verstka dot media/podrostki-iz-donbassa-v-kadetskih-kokrpusah-rossii
[10] https://www.ft.com/content/b82b533d-ae06-404b-8b6c-73e0ecd9e067
[11] https://www.ft.com/content/b82b533d-ae06-404b-8b6c-73e0ecd9e067
[12] https://www.ft.com/content/b82b533d-ae06-404b-8b6c-73e0ecd9e067
[13] https://t.me/rusbrief/143450 ; https://www.wsj.com/articles/with-china-attending-ukraine-peace-discussions-inch-forward-40855818
[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/moscow-beijing-partnership-has-no-limits-2022-02-04/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2023
[15] https://www.ft.com/content/b82b533d-ae06-404b-8b6c-73e0ecd9e067
[16] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/u-dzhiddi-vidbulisya-mizhnarodni-konsultaciyi-shodo-klyuchov-84737
[17] https://t.me/bbcrussian/50535 ; https://t.me/MariaVladimirovnaZakharova/5936 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/30377
[18] https://t.me/MID_Russia/30377 ; https://t.me/MariaVladimirovnaZakharova/5936
[19] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/08/07/z-polonu-vzhe-vdalosya-povernuty-2598-ukrayincziv-dmytro-lubinecz/; https://t.me/dmytro_lubinetzs/3278; https://minre.gov dot ua/2023/08/07/z-polonu-zvilnyly-shhe-22-zahysnykiv-ukrayiny/; https://t.me/ermaka2022/3383 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/50533
[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-4-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-25; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29
[21] https://t.me/mod_russia/29035; https://t.me/mod_russia/29030
[22] https://twitter.com/klinger66/status/1688259930686377984; https://twitter.com/operativno_ZSU/status/1688248260282957824; https://twitter.com/Teoyaomiquu/status/1687879932783820800; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1688213550274060290; https://t.me/wargonzo/14223; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1688213732617236480
[23] https://t.me/mod_russia/29035; https://t.me/mod_russia/29030
[24] ttps://t.me/z_arhiv/23893
[25] https://t.me/annamaliar/990; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vDasR1LnzPoDVtY8Xj9jwYwuKvijARZX13o7Pup3emxwx5gAuZEm1QZ5G4bezsZEl;
[26] https://t.me/mod_russia/29036; https://t.me/mod_russia/29034
[27] https://t.me/annamaliar/990
[28] https://t.me/rybar/50501
[29] https://t.me/dva_majors/23054 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/63828 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/63837 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/50782
[30] https://t.me/rybar/50501 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/23054 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/63837
[31] https://t.me/annamaliar/990
[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07sGbmMgjg8rxwGj7bGkhMZQRMVrvL7v4Hwka9RqwuCDZSVgPuvu8VcnyXE5fxvsFl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vDasR1LnzPoDVtY8Xj9jwYwuKvijARZX13o7Pup3emxwx5gAuZEm1QZ5G4bezsZEl
[33] https://t.me/wargonzo/14229
[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vDasR1LnzPoDVtY8Xj9jwYwuKvijARZX13o7Pup3emxwx5gAuZEm1QZ5G4bezsZEl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07sGbmMgjg8rxwGj7bGkhMZQRMVrvL7v4Hwka9RqwuCDZSVgPuvu8VcnyXE5fxvsFl
[35] https://t.me/wargonzo/14229 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/63837
[36] https://t.me/annamaliar/990
[37] https://t.me/annamaliar/990
[38] https://t.me/mod_russia/29035; https://t.me/rybar/50497; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/50808; https://t.me/dva_majors/23054
[39] https://t.me/batalyon_vostok/104; https://t.me/batalyon_vostok/105; https://t.me/dva_majors/23052;
[40] https://t.me/annamaliar/990; https://t.me/wargonzo/14229
[41] https://t.me/annamaliar/990
[42] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/50777; https://t.me/dva_majors/23069
[43] https://t.me/rian_ru/211364 ; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1688424628920745984?s=20
[44] https://t.me/rybar/50492; https://t.me/rusich_army/10270
[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vDasR1LnzPoDVtY8Xj9jwYwuKvijARZX13o7Pup3emxwx5gAuZEm1QZ5G4bezsZEl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07sGbmMgjg8rxwGj7bGkhMZQRMVrvL7v4Hwka9RqwuCDZSVgPuvu8VcnyXE5fxvsFl
[46] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/50777; https://t.me/readovkanews/63837; https://t.me/wargonzo/14229
[47] https://t.me/dva_majors/23071
[48] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3803
[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vDasR1LnzPoDVtY8Xj9jwYwuKvijARZX13o7Pup3emxwx5gAuZEm1QZ5G4bezsZEl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07sGbmMgjg8rxwGj7bGkhMZQRMVrvL7v4Hwka9RqwuCDZSVgPuvu8VcnyXE5fxvsFl; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/1088; https://t.me/ermaka2022/3380
[50] https://t.me/dva_majors/23054
[51] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/spetspryznachentsi-hur-mou-provodiat-uspishni-operatsii-na-livoberezhzhi-khersonshchyny.html
[52] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/71993
[53] https://t.me/vrogov/11447
[54] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2023
[55] https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/2688
[56] https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/2688
[57] https://t.me/grey_zone/19905
[58] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2023
[59] https://t.me/modmilby/30451
[60] https://t.me/modmilby/30451
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