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Reports indicate that the current bilateral trade between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ghana is worth around £2.2 billion, with the trade in goods and services increasing by £778 million between 2021 and 2022.
Both are looking to boost economic cooperation. At the 8th UK-Ghana Business Council meeting held mid-June in London, saw the two countries commit to strengthen trade and increase investment.
The meeting was co-chaired by the Minister for Development and Africa, Andrew Mitchell, the Minister for International Trade, Nigel Huddleston, and the Vice-President of Ghana, Dr Mahamudu Bawumia.
Both are looking to further strengthen their existing trade partnership with a new investor group. The two countries have launched a new investor group to help identify mutually beneficial investment opportunities boost existing economic partnership.
This investor group to help identify mutually beneficial investment opportunities. The investor group is targeting industries such as pharmaceuticals, textiles and agro-processing.
“This Council has played a huge role in boosting trade with Ghana, supporting hundreds of millions of pounds worth of deals in various sectors, from textiles to agriculture,” Minister Huddleston said.
Since its formation in 2018, the Council has supported over £223 million of investment in infrastructure across the country and created opportunities for both UK and Ghanaian businesses.
The business-led UK-Ghana Investor Group will include UK investors and key investment facilitation agencies in Ghana and the UK. It will help generate leads on viable projects in areas such as pharmaceuticals, textiles, and agro-processing. The deal will be providing support to package the projects and find UK investment.
A support package for Ghana’s economic recovery from Covid was also announced. A total of £1 million in funding will go to developing infrastructure projects and increasing carbon markets.
“The economic partnership between the UK and Ghana is thriving, with ever increasing bilateral trade and our new investor group set to find fresh opportunities for businesses both here in the UK and Africa. By working together we are creating jobs and strengthening our historic trade links, to the benefit of both our economies,” Minister for Development and Africa Andrew Mitchell said.
The UK-Ghana Business Council session follows the first meeting of the Trade Partnership Agreement Committee in April this year. The UK-Ghana Trade Partnership Agreement provides duty-free, quota-free access to the UK market for Ghanaian exports.
Next April, London will host the 2024 UK-African Investment Summit, bringing together political and business leaders, as well as representatives of international and regional organisations from the UK and African countries, including Ghana, as a further boost to trade and investment.
The United Kingdom is one of Ghana’s major trading partners and has been involved in various sectors of Ghana’s economy. Ghana exports a variety of goods to the United Kingdom, including agricultural products such as cocoa beans, fruits, vegetables, and fish. Other exports include gold, oil, timber, and various manufactured goods.
On its part, the UK exports a range of products to Ghana, including machinery, vehicles, pharmaceuticals, industrial equipment, and manufactured goods. The UK also provides services such as financial and consultancy services to Ghana, according to the report.
The Wagner, War Crimes and Warlord: The case of the Central African Republic
Wither Françafrique? France’s fading role in African Great Power Competition
MD Africa Editor Kester Kenn Klomegah is an independent researcher and writer on African affairs in the EurAsian region and former Soviet republics. He wrote previously for African Press Agency, African Executive and Inter Press Service. Earlier, he had worked for The Moscow Times, a reputable English newspaper. Klomegah taught part-time at the Moscow Institute of Modern Journalism. He studied international journalism and mass communication, and later spent a year at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. He co-authored a book “AIDS/HIV and Men: Taking Risk or Taking Responsibility” published by the London-based Panos Institute. In 2004 and again in 2009, he won the Golden Word Prize for a series of analytical articles on Russia’s economic cooperation with African countries.
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The Wagner Group’s involvement alongside the Russian troops’ capture and the sustained resistance with the Ukrainian forces over the city of Bakhmut in late February this year has further intensified the Russian stronghold in eastern Ukraine. Despite reports of increased Ukrainian forces counterattack on Russian military troops stationed in Bakhmut since May 2023 alongside the continued West sanctions on Russia, the Wagner Group and in extension the Russian economy appears to be unscathed by the Ukrainian military troop offensive.
The Wagner Group; considered separate from the Russian military, as a volunteer organisation has been considered as President Putin’s “private army” founded and backed by Yevgeny Prighozin, a close confidante and a former minister of President Vladimir Putin’s ‘kitchen cabinet’. With the intensification of the Russian intervention in Ukraine, the pressures of the campaign alongside the free-will deals between the Wagner and Putin directly have further created a void in relations between the Russian Defence Ministry and Prighozin’s Wagner Group.
The article attempts to connect the Wagner’s increased finances to procure arms and ammunitions without having made any deals (overt or covert) with Sergei Shoigu or his military commander chief Valery Gerasimov. The centre of geopolitical context would shift to the Central African Republic (CAR), where the Wagner’s success in maintaining its security stronghold has been and continues to be unaffected with increased authoritarian political influences in the Sub-Saharan Africa.
The Wagner Group’s exploits across the Sub-Saharan Africa have been staged as a means to protect the citizens from the increased fragmentation caused by inter-clan rivalry that have surfaced from the regional geography and domestic politics of the concerned arena to that of national politics and regime change, in particular. In portrayal of such defensive light, the Group led by its founder-leader Prighozin have taken forward their soft and ‘behind the scenes’ offensive in efforts to finance the Group and the larger Russian offensive moves in the Ukraine War.
While the Wagner Group’s activities in Mali and Libya have been brought to the public light in a phased manner by the Western media in collaboration with the state channels, the Wagner’s exploits in the Sudan crisis as well as the Central African Republic regime have been unable to be deciphered until mid-May this year. There have been reports in the previous years which have briefed on the Wagner and in extension, the Russian involvement in the Sudan political regime in the support of the Rapid Support Forces led by General Hamdan Dagalo Hemedti. Thereafter the connection with the Rapid Support Forces have brought the Wagner mercenary in contact with the large gold mines of Sudan which are wholly controlled by General Hamdan Dagalo. However, the Wagner chief Prigozhin’s statement in March highlighted the Group’s neutrality in the Sudanese crisis of 2023 between the Sudanese National Forces and the Rapid Support Forces.
Coming to our focus of study, the Wagner’s campaign in Central African Republic has been brought to light in May 2023 with the Russian forces’ stronghold in Bakhmut against the phased and slow, yet equally powerful Ukrainian counter-offensive to recapture Bakhmut territory. The central question then arises as to the sources of funding for Wagner’s full-scale campaign in Bakhmut given the increased toll of the year-long war on the Russian economy and yet the projection of an ‘unaffected’ growth rate in Russia.
The answer to this lies in Central African Republic and in particular, its capital city of Bangui. Media reports have claimed that the Wagner Group provides a two-fold service to the country since its arrival in 2018. One, the Wagner Group’s overt assurance of protection of the Republic’s citizens from inter-clan rivalry. Two, the Wagner Group’s assurance to the the President Faustin-Archange Touadera on security protection and regime stability. All these services conveyed in covert return for their control over the Central African Republic’s gold mines and forests.
Some downtrodden communities of the Central African Republic consider the Wagner Group as their saviour in protection against the rival, elite clans that surround the capital city of Bangui. The Wagner uses this opportunity to glorify their strength among the weaker clans in the form of sponsor movies on the Wagner exploits of protection and worship by the minority clans of the Republic.
In the cover for civilian protection, reports have stated the Wagner Group’s outright use of violence tactics to torture civilian-linked gold firms to handover their business, manpower and profits to the Wagner Group. All these activities being approved by the nod of President Faustin of the Central African Republic. There have been instances of civilian victims having escaped from the clutches of the Wagner camps and fleeing out of the Republic into the nearby countries of Cameroon, Gabon and Democratic Republic of Congo.
In similarity with the Wagner Group’s war crime cases in Mali, the mercenary group has inflicted torture and camp custody cum brutal tactics on familial heads of firms dealing in gold mining business. Sources reveal that the Wagner Group adopts the brutal tactic of killing the victim’s close aides and family members. The victim was then brought a so-called Wagner private prison cell in the camp and met with brutal torture techniques that would measure slow, yet painful death of the victim.
According to CBS News, satellite images show the Wagner Group’s development of the Ndassima Gold Mine over which the Wagner has acquired a 25-year mining concession in 2018.
Source: CBS News
Although the Wagner Group does involve in acquisition deals regarding mining and land purchase, reports show the Wagner’s indirect involvement in signing contracts through its shell companies across the Central African Republic.
Among the shell firms owned by the Wagner Group, Midas Resources, Ferrum Mining and Bois Rouge have been found prominent in major gold mining and timber transportation deals across the Sub-Saharan African region countries. The gold mined from Ndassima is loaded onto a Wagner private aircraft stationed every Tuesdays and Saturdays in Bangui M’Poko Airport before it heads to the United Arab Emirates. Within eight hours of halt duration, the gold is supposedly unloaded and subsequently loaded into a Russian aircraft parallelly stationed and is then carried to Moscow. Apart from this, the Wagner has also been involved in timber transportation. The Wagner has been involved in exports of virgin redwood timber trees from the forests of Central African Republic. The collection of redwood timber trees is transported via checkpoints to Cameroon’s Garoua-Mboulai for storage prior to being shipped to foreign clients. The report indicates the mining and timber collection business of the Wagner Group under the government’s approval as indicated by a safe passage approval document demonstrated by drivers of Wagner trucks and stamped by the Central African Republic administration.
The ongoing Russian intervention in Ukraine and the Wagner Group’s increased acquisition of arms and ammunitions into the offensive in Eastern Ukrainian territories surrounding Bakhmut have continued to pressurise the day-to-day sustenance of the downtrodden economies of Sub-Saharan Africa, especially Central African Republic where the ‘poor continue to pay for their own suffering’. This series of Wagner supply chain in Sub-Saharan Africa may also indicate the Wagner Group’s lack of dependence and thereafter interest with mending their relations with the top leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defence, especially with the likes of Defence Minister Shoigu and Commander Gerasimov and thereafter the increased tensions over Prigozhin’s ‘prisoners turned army’ Group mutiny the Russian military in the Eastern Ukrainian battlefield.
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“Death to France and its alli es!” In Bamako, Mali’s capital, demonstrators gathered in January of 2022, for an anti-France demonstration supported by the transitional government that had taken power the year prior. Across the sea of people were signs bearing the French tricolor with a skull in the middle.
Since 2013, French forces operated beside their Malian counterparts as a part of the French counterterrorism operations Serval, and then Barkhane. Today, the relationship, which weathered several coups prior is no more; French forces withdrew just last year, following a diplomatic row that saw the expulsion of the French Ambassador in Bamako. Now, Wagner mercenaries have replaced the French forces in the country’s anti-terror struggle—to little success. In fact, Wagner forces have been credibly accused by a recent United Nations report of massacring, raping, and torturing over 500 civilians in Moura, in the Mopti region.
With France’s position in the region growing tenuous, and increasing competition from myriad state and non-state actors, is this the end of Françafrique? Will China, Russia, or other actors supplant the old neocolonial order for a new one? And how will this effect the region’s security, and economy?
From colonial robbery to counterterrorism
Since the first modern encounter between Europe and Africa, the relationship has been defined by exploitation. The various expeditions deep into the heart of the continent were aimed at one primary goal; extracting the continent’s resources, whether rubber, gold, or diamonds, and exploiting human capital, through slavery. The British had come to Egypt to control the Suez, and South Africa to extract a fourth of the world’s gold, and diamonds. The French came to Algeria to extract the Algerian Dey’s fortune. Belgium, known for their extreme cruelty against the Congolese under Leopold II, came for rubber. All of the ‘great’ European empires pillaged the continent of its vast natural resources, and murdered the native population to achieve the greatest heist of all time—the robbery of Africa’s future.
The most radical reorganization of the global order in the last century, the World Wars, brought down the colonial period—but not colonialism. While much of Africa achieved independence in the 1950s, and 1960s, colonization was replaced by a system of spheres of influence that matched historical delineations of European domination.
Thus, Françafrique, or the French pré carré was born. The French colonial presence in much of North and West Africa was replaced by an exclusive economic, and politico-military arrangement. French patronage became paramount; providing economic stability and opportunity through the Central African Franc (CAF), and investments from companies like the French energy giant, Totalenergies, and regime security through French military deployments throughout the region.
Françafrique is about paternalism and patronage; ensuring the privileged French position on the continent—in spite of the lost of empire experienced through decolonization. Today, it has manifested itself heavily in the French counterterrorism operations, like Serval, and Barkhane. Since America’s Global War on Terror began, the specter of jihadism across West Africa has especially driven the forward deployment of French forces to the region. Excluding the recent case of inter-ethnic violence in South Sudan, the ethno-nationalist conflicts of the 1990s have largely been replaced by a new norm of creeping Islamist destabilization.
As Catherine Gegout points out in Why Europe Intervenes in Africa: Security Prestige and the Legacy of Colonialism, European interventions throughout the colonial, and post-colonial period were predicated primarily on upholding security. In the period prior to 9/11, this was namely a question of cooperation with African states—where uncooperative regimes were ousted in favor of more pliable ones. This has shifted from maintaining friendly proxies to uphold European security, to explicitly combatting terrorism. Economic interests have waned as a driving factor, as new actors like China have supplanted the old European neocolonialism. Finally, the traditional historical ties have waned as a factor of relations—with France shifting focus from their traditional Francophone core, to Anglophone countries like Nigeria.
La Mort
It seems that the death of Françafrique is predicated on two assumptions; the first is an economic assumption, and the second a politico-military one. France’s position as a driver of economic opportunity is fading. The CAF is a prime example of French dominion—a currency wholly controlled by Paris for their own profit, imposed upon its former subjects. Furthermore, China has become a principal partner of much of Sub-Saharan Africa. From Equatorial Guinea, to Ethiopia, and as far south as Zambia, Chinese investment projects continue to multiply. In Kenya, China has funded to the cost of over $4. 7billion, the Nairobi-Mombasa railway, and built up industrial zones within the country to connect them to the port of Mombasa. In
Zambia, over $6 billion in loans are held by Beijing, which is over 65% of their debt. This has brought Chinese companies to invest in Zambian copper mines, allowing for the country to extract natural resources to fuel its economic engines. China has quickly supplanted France, economically, a trend that will surely continue.
The other key factor, is a failure of onerous French operations in the Sahel. French efforts at defeating Jihadists have been complimented by measures to promote good governance. France has been keenly aware that the problems facing the region cannot be solved solely by military force. France’s promotion of Western, democratic values does not resonate well with both traditional elites, who are keen to stay in power, and the starving masses who seek food security, and stability. Take Mali, for example. Prior to the September 2020 coup, the economy was in shambles, with 15% youth unemployment, and people were quite literally starving in the streets because of extreme poverty—which increased to over 19% by 2022. European lectures on liberal-democratic values, which manifests itself in conditioned economic aid, are no solution to the immediate challenge of poverty and starvation.
Searching for alternatives
Chinese money has become a plentiful alternative to neocolonial relations with old colonial masters, and Russian military assistance, through Wagner mercenaries and military aid, has become an alternative to the French Army. Both of those options, despite the threat of Chinese‘debt trap diplomacy’, and the ineffectual and violent performance of Wagner, are stabilizing for political elites across Africa. Chinese aid does not come with conditions like Western development assistance, and Wagner is unlikely to raise issues of ethical war-fighting like the French Army would. This is a win-win alternative to the traditional western neocolonialism.
But what does it mean for the region?
Instability in West Africa will continue to be an underlying feature of the regional system. This intractable reality is not going to change, regardless of the changing preponderance of influence and power of external actors within the region. Chinese aid, nor Wagner mercenaries, will be able to transform the underlying social, and political conditions that make the region rife for instability and chaos. It is unlikely that the threat of Jihadism, the primary security concern for much of Europe, will ebb. This will become an increasing concern for the European Union, as they try to further integrate the continent’s disparate security architecture.
While it’s true that a greater Chinese, and Russian presence is a boon for authoritarian elite, this is not a major implication. In fact, for example, the French have only been marginally committed to democracy in the region. In Mali, the French have had no qualms with working with the various juntas, so long as they were cooperative. That being said, neither the Chinese nor the Russians make any illusions to supporting any sort of democratization or liberal values in West Africa; they are markedly more transactional than the French.
As Françafrique passes, neocolonialism will be here to stay. The very existence of Françafrique is anathema to the aspirations of the people of West Africa, and to the elites who cling to power. As the position of Africa in the world continues to grow, with the continent to expected double its population by 2050, to a quarter of the global population, competition will continue to heat up between the great powers. Françafrique will be replaced by a diverse arena for competition, where the old neocolonial powers are replaced by new ones.
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The African peace mission on Russia-Ukraine crisis comprised four presidents: President of the Republic of South Africa Cyril Ramaphosa, the head of the Mediation Group. The current Chairman of the African Union (AU) and President of the Union of Comoros Azali Assoumani; President of the Republic of Senegal Macky Sall and President of the Republic of Zambia Hakainde Hichilema.
The mission was also expected to include the leaders of Egypt, the Republic of the Congo and Uganda. Egypt was represented by the country’s prime minister, President of the Republic of Uganda Yoweri Museveni was diagnosed with the coronavirus right before the trip, while his Congolese counterpart Denis Sassou Nguesso decided not to take part.
The high-ranking delegation went through Warsaw, Poland and then by train to Kiev and St. Petersburg. In the run-up to his departure, Ramaphosa said that “the conflict between Ukraine and Russia is a grave situation that affects all of us in an interconnected world.”
United Nations’ Resolutions: More than half of Africa’s 55 states voted in favor of United Nations resolutions condemning the invasion of Ukraine, while most of the rest abstained. Many African states have maintained a non-aligned position, but Washington says these African leaders must necessarily define the “true non-alignment” position.
One distinctive feature in all these is that Africans have different views on the conflict. South Africa and Uganda are seen as leaning towards Russia, while Zambia and Comoros are closer to the West. Egypt, Senegal and Congo-Brazzaville have remained largely neutral.
Ramaphosa’s government has come under growing pressure from the United States because of its alleged support for Russia.
Reasons: The key aim of African peace mission primarily to propose “confidence-building measures” in order to facilitate peace between the two countries. It was to seek a peaceful settlement of the conflict which began Februay 22, 2022.
Russia referred to it as “special military opration” largely directed at “demilitarization” and “denazification” in neigbouring Ukraine. Both Russia and Ukraine were part of the Soviet Union. After the Soviet’s collapse in 1991, both as independent states have, in the first instance, legal claims to their individual territorial integrity and political sovereignty within the international law.
The African delegation had on their agenda to discuss the export of Ukrainian grain and Russian fertilizers. As well-known, Russia-Ukraine crisis as well as the sanctions have had an adverse effects on African economies and livelihoods. But most of the African countries have claimed neutrality in the conflict, Moscow has long nurtured good political relations with the governments on the African continent.
Russians are currently in a dilemma. Globethrotting for Soviet-era friends, and to avoid isolation. Russians are soliciting for support for its illegal invasion of Ukraine. This is absolutely different from the emerging multipolar world. A multipolar world must have relative peace and be more integrative, but Russia has partitioned the world.
Background: Russian President Vladimir Putin insisted that he was still open to any contacts to discuss possible scenarios for and taking a resolution of the Ukraine conflict. Russia is open to negotiations. We know that Moscow has already annexed four regions in eastern and southern Ukraine as well as the Crimea peninsula, which it seized in 2014.
Ukraine wants to protect its territory from illegal encroachment. It clearly says its own peace plan, which envisages the withdrawal of Russian troops from all Ukrainian land, must be the basis for any settlement of the war.
What documents say: The peace mission could propose a series of “confidence building measures” during initial efforts at mediation, according to a draft framework document. The document states that the objective of the mission is “to promote the importance of peace and to encourage the parties to agree to a diplomacy-led process of negotiations”.
According to a framework document, those measures could include a Russian troop pull-back, removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Belarus, suspension of implementation of an International Criminal Court arrest warrant targeting Putin, and sanctions relief, it indicated.
A cessation of hostilities agreement could follow and would need to be accompanied by negotiations between Russia and the West, the document stated. Kyiv says its own plan, which envisages the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian land, must be the basis for any settlement of the war.
How it started: The main organizer of this peace mission is non-profit Brazzaville Foundation based in Britain. Jean-Yves Ollivier, has described the mission’s goals as modest.
He said the aim was to start talking rather than to resolve the conflict, to begin a dialogue on issues that do not directly affect the military situation and build from there.
The other is to try and find solutions to issues that matter to Africa, like grain and fertilizer. Ollivier expected African leaders to persuade the Russians to extend the fragile agreement that allows Ukraine to ship grain through the Black Sea.
Ollivier heads a UK-based organization known as the Brazzaville Foundation, which focuses primarily on peace and development initiatives in Africa.
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